CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY

Volume 1 Nos 2/3
Oct 1982 – Jan 1983

CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY

The Journal of
The Society for Central Asian Studies,
P.O. Box 131, Oxford OX1 2NJ, England

Published by
Oxford Microform Publications
19a Paradise Street
Oxford OX1 1LD
England

 ISSN 0263 4937
Typeset and produced by Oxford Print Associates

CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY VOLUME 1 NUMBERS 2/3 NOVEMBER 1982

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The Russian Conquest of Central Asia

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Russia's expansion in Asia has been studied by Western scholars who have mostly described the events from the Russian point of view. In this article I will try to look at the events not only from the Russian point of view but also from the Central Asian point of view. Then, I believe, it will be possible to see a true picture of the events which occurred in the very heart of Asia.

Before studying Russia's conquest of Central Asia it is appropriate to give an account of her early south-east expansion, in particular her conquest of the Caucasus, which played an important role in the future of the Central Asians. Then it is possible to understand the reasons for Russia's desire to conquer the Khanates of Khokand, Bukhara and Khiva.

When the Tatar domination was ended in 1480, the Russians started a reverse movement into Asia. Their first success was the conquest of Kazan in 1552, which opened the gates of Asia for them.[1] After that the Russians turned to clearing the Volga all the way to the Caspian Sea. Control of the river offered commercial and strategic advantages. Merchants wanted to increase their trade with Persia, Central Asia, and even India, and the Volga was the gateway to these countries. Also the Volga was so wide that it was difficult for nomads to cross. Control of the river, especially after the conquest of Astrakhan in 1556 and the subjugation of the Cossacks, who controlled the area from Volga to Siberia, in the 1570s and 1580s, not only improved the Russian position but also gave superiority in their struggle with the steppe peoples, notably the Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs and Kalmyks of the East.[2]

At the beginning of their conflict with the steppe peoples, the aim of the Russians was to adopt a defensive posture in order to protect their territory against the raids of their enemies. However, with the help of the warlike Cossacks, this defence slowly changed to the offensive, leading ultimately to the subjugation of the steppe peoples.

Thus, the Russian campaigns to the steppes began. But this created problems in the area.

The Russian conquest of Astrakhan ended direct relations between the steppe Muslims and Istanbul and pilgrimages to Mecca. This sudden and unexpected expansion by Russia alarmed the Muslim people of the steppes; so they began sending emissaries and letters to Istanbul asking for help.[3] This brought the intervention of the Ottoman Empire, which, in fact, was the only serious intervention in the history of Russia's expansion in Asia until that of the British in the 19th century.

Turkish authorities planned to prevent Russia's expansion not only in the steppes but also in the Caucasus and the Crimea by opening a canal between the rivers Volga and Don. For this purpose, the Governor of Kefe and the Crimean Khan were ordered to make the necessary preparations.[4]

In the spring of 1569, a Turkish force, commanded by Kasim Pasha, began to excavate the canal between the Volga and the Don.[5] They met with greater difficulty than expected. Kasim Pasha reported the situation to Istanbul and asked for further instructions.[6] He was ordered to make better preparations in the Crimea and to continue his operations the following spring. He was also ordered to expel the Russians from Astrakhan, if possible, before he returned to the Crimea. Kasim Pasha marched from the river Don to Astrakhan with his troops. Without heavy artillery, he besieged the well-fortified city.[7] But his supplies were running out and the winter was near; he withdrew to the Crimea without achieving anything.

The difficult conditions in the area between the rivers, and the internal events in the Empire, changed the minds of the Turkish authorities about the canal project, and they gave up the idea for the time being. But the Turks never made a second attempt and paid very little attention to Russia's expansion in Asia.[8] On the other hand, the Russians, seeing that their powerful neighbours had given up the canal project, continued to move into Asia.

After several small expeditions against the steppe peoples, the Russians discovered the weaknesses of their opponents: their inferior weapons and their disunity and constant quarrelling.[9] The Russians easily exploited these weaknesses and spread their influence.[10] In this way they brought the steppe peoples under their control without much difficulty.

For the Russians, however, the trouble started when their fugitives began occupying the fertile part of the steppes. The native people of the steppes objected strongly to this invasion and began fighting the Russians. This conflict with the natives led the Russians to establish a series of fortified posts on their frontiers in the steppes. Orenburg was

one of them and later played the key role in the whole of Russia's conquest of Asia.[11] Orenburg was also important to secure the Ural industrial area and that part of Russia against the attack of any Asiatic power.[12] Therefore, the foundation of this fortified town at the mouth of the river Or on the orders of Peter the Great in the early 18th century was one of the important events in Russian history.

Another important event in the history of Russian expansion in Asia was the annexation of the Crimea in the 1780s and the successive victories of Russia over Ottoman Turkey and Persia in the Caucasus in the years following 1810. By these victories, Russia not only controlled the important areas in the Caucasus but also dominated Persia and the Caspian Sea. Russia's domination of Persia and the Caspian Sea gave an opportunity to the Russians to explore the country of the Turkmens and the other parts of Central Asia.[13] From that point, it was not very difficult for the Russians to expand their Empire to the east and the southeast, as there was very little opposition against them in that direction. Between the 1820s and the 1850s occupation of the Kazakh steppes was completed. By the middle of the 19th century the Russians controlled most of the Caucases, and their frontiers reached as far as the northern shores of the Aral Sea and the Far East.[14]

The 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries were Russia's period of expansion not only in Asia but also in Europe and in the Middle East, although her expansion in Asia was almost unnoticed; however, her expansion to the south and the west was much noticed by the European powers. As a result of her growth, Russia's influence over European and Middle Eastern affairs increased. This was the most significant event, particularly in the first half of the 19th century, in Europe and the Middle East. Nicholas I (1796-1855), the Russian Tsar, dreamed of becoming the "gendarme of Europe" and of the Middle East[15] only to be rudely awakened by Britain, France, and Turkey in the Crimean War (1854-1856).[16] The war showed that "Russia's bureaucratic and autocratic government was incapable of competing with European technology."[17] There had been new developments in the Russian economy, in industry, in education, and in military science since the reign of Peter the Great, but now a new impetus was needed. Alexander II (1818-1881), the successor of Nicholas I, and his ministers, particularly N.A. Milyutin, P.A. Shuvalov, and Y.I. Rostovtsev, introduced important reforms, such as the new measures in economic, industrial and educational life, the reorganization of the Russian army on the western European pattern, and later, in 1861, the abolition of serfdom.[18]

By the end of the 1850s and early 1860s, these new reforms promoted a quick recovery in Russia's economic and military life. It was at

this time that two important events, which greatly helped the Russians to conquer Central Asia and Turkemenia, took place in Russia. The first was their discovery of the real situation in Central Asia, the second was their complete subjugation of the Caucasus.

The Russians were defeated in the Crimea but not in the Caucasus. The proposal of the Turkish commander-in-chief, Omer Pasha, to expel the Russians from the Caucasus, was not accepted at the beginning of the Crimean War by the British and French commanders. According to Rawlinson, Omer Pasha's plan was a great opportunity not only to liberate the Caucasus, but also to halt the Russian advance in Central Asia. It seems French jealousy of British influence in the Caucasus caused the opportunity to be lost.[19] It was then too late for Omer Pasha, when he opened a new offensive line in the Caucasus in 1856, to expel the Russians from that area; in fact the war was ended two months later, and the Turks withdrew. However, the Russians continued their war against the Caucasian Muslims with more determination.

Russia's systematic conquest of the Caucasus began during the reign of Catherine II and was almost completed in the 1820s by the ruthless campaigns of General Ermelov, the commander of the Caucasian army, but the very cruelty of his measures drove the Muslims to desperate resistance. The Muslims, under the remarkable leadership of Shamil the Avar, inflicted a series of defeats upon the Russians.[20] Indeed, the outbreak of the Crimean War had created a great chance for Shamil to strike a decisive blow against Russian influence in the Caucasus. Contrary to Russia's worst fears, Shamil remained inactive; later, unaware of the Anglo-French opposition to the Turkish proposal to expel the Russians from the Caucasus, he complained that the Turks had ignored his plea for a joint offensive against the extended Russian lines.[21]

BARIATINSKII'S INFLUENCE

The Crimean defeat had destroyed the prestige of Russia not only in Europe but also in Asia. The Russians wanted to restore their prestige, at least in Asia, by completing the conquest of the Caucasus. To achieve this aim, Tsar Alexander II appointed one of his closest and most faithful friends, Prince Alexander Ivanovich Bariatinskii, an old Caucasian hand, as the Viceroy of the Caucasus.[22] He was also one of the greatest expansionists of his time and a great reformer in the military and administrative fields.[23]

Bariatinskii's first success was to obtain the Tsar's permission to procure reinforcements for the Caucasian Army, and then to re-arm and reform the entire structure. With the help of his chief of staff,

D.A. Milyutin, the future War Minister of Russia, Bariatinskii considered the following principles vital for his reforms: to establish a rationalized chain of command; to give greater initiative to local commanders through a territorial system of army organization; and to introduce combat training in all military units.[24]

In early 1857, when he was still in the midst of his reforms, Bariatinskii wrote to Alexander II that it was necessary for Russia to expand in Central Asia. He urged an active policy to strengthen Russia's moral influence and strategic position in Trans-Caspia by winning over the Turkmen tribes with economic concessions and sending diplomatic agents to the rulers of Central Asia.[25] He said that it was vital for Russia to increase her trade with Persia and to occupy the territory between the Atrek and Gurgan Rivers in order to gain a strategic foothold on the east Caspian shore. If such measures were not taken quickly, then Russia faced the prospect that "the inevitable war with Great Britain will place us in the greatest difficulties".[26]

Having read these proposals "with the most lively interest", the Tsar admitted that "on this matter I share entirely your way of gauging the seriousness of this question for us in the future", but, he added, "the moment to act has not yet come".[27] Six months later, however, the Tsar changed his view of this subject when his aide-de-camp, N.P. Ignat'ev, with the encouragement of Bariatinskii, presented him with a memorandum on the significance of Central Asia. Ignat'ev argued that "in the event of a break with Britain, it is only in Asia that we can fight her with some chance of success and can harm Turkey into the bargain. So long as peace endures, the difficulties created by Britain in Asia and the growth of our prestige in the area separating Russia from British territories will be the best guarantee of our avoiding war". He added that:

> Asia is the only area left to our trade and developing industry, which are too weak to compete successfully elsewhere with Britain, France, Belgium, America and other countries. The exploration of Central Asia, the strengthening of our relations with it and of our influence there, and the weakening of British influence, correspond so closely with Russia's vital interests that it should not be difficult to meet the expense of an expedition. One can expect that many rich merchants and manufacturers will be ready to assist such an undertaking.[28]

On 16 October 1857, having been convinced by this explanation, the Tsar approved his Foreign Secretary Gorchakov's proposal that a mission should be sent to Khiva and Bukhara. For this purpose a

Special Committee was formed. On 4 January 1858, at a meeting of the Special Committee, N.P. Ignat'ev, who had studied Asian affairs and British activities in the region, was appointed head of the mission.[29] Like Bariatinskii, Ignat'ev was a great supporter of a "forward policy", a great pan-slavist, and an Anglophobe.

Ignat'ev was instructed by the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. According to the War Ministry's instructions he was to obtain topographical, statistical and other information of military importance about Central Asia. His instructions from the Foreign Ministry were to study the situation in Central Asia; to strengthen Russian influence in Bukhara and Khiva; and to improve commercial relations with these states.[30]

Ignat'ev implemented his instructions skilfully during his visit to Central Asia. His mission was a great success. He summed up the results of his mission thus: "The chief and essential result of our sending a mission to Central Asia is that the fog is now dispelled which hides the Khanates from the Russian Government. Our eyes have at last been opened to the real value of Central Asia."[31] He recommended to his government that Russia should follow an active policy in Central Asia, as there were good possibilities for expanding Russian power in that area.[32] He advised the taking of immediate military action against Khokand, and the bringing of Turkmen of the eastern shore of the Caspian under Russian control and their use against Khiva.[33] Although the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs were not enthusiastic, his pleading for an active military policy gained a sympathetic hearing from Bariatinskii, General Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenburg, and General Gasfor, the Governor-General of Western Siberia.[34]

Meanwhile in the Caucasus, Bariatinskii continued to execute his reforms. One of his important reforms, as far as this research is concerned, was to establish a sufficient line of communications in the Caucasus in order to keep the transit trade alive and to make Russia's south-eastward expansion trouble-free. It was during this time that he helped Tornau and Kokorev, the leading Russian merchants, to form a Trans-Caspian Trade Corporation, which, despite strong British competition, quickly expanded its activities in Persia and around the Caspian.[35] With the support of his government, Tornau skillfully exploited his growing influence at the Shah's court to improve the communication between Persia and the Caucasus.[36]

Another important event, as far as the Central Asian problem is concerned, took place in Peking in 1860. A Russian mission, headed once again by Ignat'ev, visited Peking. After a series of negotiations, Ignat'ev concluded a very advantageous commercial treaty with the Chinese by taking advantage of the British and the French activities in China at that time.[37] According to this treaty, Russian goods would

enter China free of any duty payment. There can be no doubt that this gave a great opportunity to the Russians to expand their commerce in China.

Simultaneously, in the Caucasus Bariatinskii's reforms began to give good results. The Caucasian army became more effective in its operations against the Caucasians and in the administration of that area. In 1859 and 1860, the Russian forces inflicted a series of defeats upon the legendary Shamil and conquered his followers in the following two years. Thus, the Caucasus became a major base for Russia's southeast expansion.

In the early 1860s, due to the great successes of Bariatinskii's reforms, supporters of the "forward policy" began to gain ground in Russia; moreover, the Tsar's sympathies lay on their side. In 1861, Ignat'ev was appointed head of the Asiatic Department and Milyutin Minister of War. In the following year, Milyutin introduced an army reform project for the entire empire which was based on the Caucasian experience.[38] Thus, the two proteges of Bariatinskii, Milyutin at the head of the War Ministry and Ignat'ev at the head of the Asiatic Department, began to work more closely and successfully to further the Russian advance into Central Asia.

RUSSIA ADVANCES

Here one can still ask this vital question. What were the main reasons for Russia's rapid advance in Central Asia? Clearly there were many reasons, but three stand out. These were:

1. Russia needed to raise her prestige after the Crimean defeat by the new conquests in Central Asia, particularly after Russian successes in the Caucasus, a position openly advocated by Russian authorities including the Tsar.
2. The Russian authorities were smarting over Britain's role in Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. They were also anxious over British influence in Central Asia. Their only winning chance in an inevitable war against Britain, they believed, was in Asia. Therefore, it was necessary for them to conquer Central Asia.*
3. As a result of the new reforms, the Russian economy had

* In fact, the conditions became more favourable for them. As the Russians were forbidden to have naval power on the Black Sea after the Crimean War, their naval activity rapidly increased on the Caspian, and this made the Caucasus more important as a practical base for any military action to the southeast. The Russians hoped that they would be able to destroy British prestige by marching on India through Central Asia.

largely recovered from the damage of the Crimean War but it was still unable to compete with the Great Powers in the European markets. Asia, and particularly Central Asia, was the only area where the Russian economy could compete with the others.

Russia, in fact, had an economic link with Central Asia in which cotton played the most important role. Russia's textile industry had developed to the point where it produced its own yarn and thus depended on imports of raw cotton. Russia was importing most of her raw cotton from the United States before the outbreak of the American Civil War. As the Civil War interrupted the Russo-American cotton trade, Central Asian cotton became a very important source of supply for the Russian textile industry. From 1860 to 1864, Russian imports of raw cotton from Central Asia increased from 174,059 to 459,391 *puds* (from 713,000 to 6,521,000 roubles).[39] Heavy pressure from Russian merchants, who wanted to dominate the Central Asian markets, made the Russian authorities more determined to control Central Asia by conquest.

The Russians, as has been explained, were already on the northern shores of the Aral Sea before the Crimean War. The establishment of Fort Aralsk near the mouth of the Syr-Darya brought them into conflict with the Khokandians and the Khivans, between whom there was no co-operation. In 1853, Russians stormed the Fort of Ak Metchet and destroyed Fort Dzhulek, 60 miles up the river Syr.[40] Alarmed by this Russian aggression, the Khokandian ruler, Khudayar Khan, sent an envoy to India for aid and protection. But this Khokandian appeal was turned down by the cautious British authorities in India.[41]

Owing to the Crimean War, there was a pause in operations in Central Asia until 1861, when the Russians erected a new fort on the site of Dzhulek.[42] Between this fort and Fort Kastek, towards the Chinese frontier, was an area of about 500 miles of barren and almost uninhabited steppe. The Russians thought it vital to connect the fort to secure communications from the Aral Sea to Semipalatinsk, thereby making safe their trade with China. The best route was through northern Khokand. There were three considerable Khokandian fortresses there: Turkistan, Aulie-Ata, and Pishpek.

In November 1861, General Bezak, the new Governor-General of Orenburg, proposed an immediate campaign from Orenburg and Western Siberia to "join the lines" and conquer Tashkent. In St Petersburg, a Special Committee discussed General Bezak's plan with the Tsar in March 1862 and again in February 1863. The Tsar, who had refused

a similar plan, which was presented in 1858 by General Katenin, former Governor-General of Orenburg, authorized the Special Committee to send reconnoitring expeditions to explore the region between the two lines.[43] In June 1863, Col. Cherniaev, General Bezak's chief of staff and a great admirer of Bariatinskii, led a Cossack detachment from Orenburg; Staff-Captain Protsenko of the Western Siberian Corps led another detachment to reconnoitre the area up to Aulie-Ata and Turkistan city. Both were instructed to display peaceable intentions and to use arms only in case of extreme necessity.[44] Contrary to instructions, Protsenko occupied the Khokandian fortresses of Kurtka and Dzhumgal, and Cherniaev stormed Suzak and declared that the place was under Russia's protection.[45]

These unexpected results alarmed the Governor-Generals of Orenburg and Western Siberia. However, contrary to the fears of the Governor-Generals, the Russian government welcomed the new conquests. Both War Minister Milyutin and Foreign Minister Gorchakov were convinced that as there was no special expenditure in these expeditions Russia should keep the occupied places and should continue the unification of the frontier. On 20 December 1863 the Tsar gave permission to Milyutin to proceed during the following year to the unification of the Syr-Darya and Western Siberian lines.[46] In the following months the Tsar's orders were carried out. One detachment advanced from Fort Aralsk and occupied Turkistan; another detachment fromVernyi, under Col. Cherniaev, marched on Aulie-Ata and captured it. On 22 September 1864 Chimkent fell to the combined forces of the two detachments. Now, Russia's aim to unify the two frontier lines (Siberia and Syr-Darya) and to maintain its security was achieved. As a result of his successes Cherniaev was made a major-general and given command of the new Khokandian line, subject to the authority of the Governor-General of Orenburg.[47]

It seemed that the Tsar's government was happy for the time being with these gains. However, General Cherniaev could not control his ambition for glory, and this created new troubles only five days after the occupation of Chimkent. Without authorization from his superiors he marched on Tashkent, the largest city and the economic centre of the Khanate of Khokand. But his attack was not successful and he had to withdraw. When the news reached the Russian capital, Gorchakov reacted strongly and on 31 October 1864 requested the Tsar to order that no future change be allowed in the Russian frontier and that any idea of further conquest in Central Asia be renounced.[48]

Unlike Bariatinskii and his recruits Milyutin, Ignat'ev, and the army commanders, Gorchakov was usually cautious, preferring diplomacy to fighting. He believed that too rapid an advance in the direction of India would alarm the British. Once when he argued this point,

Milyutin angrily replied: "It is not necessary to apologize to the British Minister for our advance. They do not stand on ceremony with us, conquering whole kingdoms, occupying alien cities and islands; and we do not ask them why they do it."[49]

The tension between Milyutin and Gorchakov and their supporters, the generals and the diplomats, "made Russian policies unusually flexible and vigorous!" As one modern historian concluded, "since there was no disagreement about the ends, and since no one questioned the Tsar's power to decide policy, there was little danger from this interdepartmental rivalry".[50]

In Summer 1864, Alexander II called a number of meetings in St Petersburg to discuss the Central Asian problem once again. As the supporters of a "forward policy" were in the majority and had the blessings of the Tsar, it was decided to follow an active policy in Central Asia and to make the necessary preparations for this purpose. For Gorchakov, there was only one alternative, to hide military operations by diplomatic manoeuvres and to give justifications to the other governments. To cover Russia's expansion by laying a smoke screen needed courage, skill and the diplomatic experience, which Gorchakov possessed. On 3 December 1864, before the armies' march began, he sent a circular despatch to Russian representatives abroad asking them to use it as a guide "in any explanations you may give to the Government to which you are accredited, in case questions are asked, or you may see credence given to erroneous ideas as to our action in these distant parts".[51]

The words and the examples were well chosen in this cleverly written despatch. It was a good mirror of the complexity of Russian policy, which often led Western diplomats to the wrong conclusion. Gorchakov wrote:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which are brought into contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization.
>
> In such cases it always happens that the more civilized state is forced, in the interests of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendency over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make undesirable neighbours.
>
> First there are raids and acts of pillage to put down. To put a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission.
>
> The state is bound to defend them against these depredations and to punish those who commit them... If, the robbers once

> punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is soon forgotten; its withdrawal is put down to weakness. It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force. The state thus finds itself forced to choose one of two alternatives, either to give up this endless labour and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, rendering all prosperity, all security, all civilization an impossibility, or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries.
>
> Such has been the fate of every country which has found itself in a similar position. The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies, England in India - all have been irresistibly forced, less by ambition than by imperious necessity, into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know when to stop.[52]

Having said this Gorchakov declared that Russia still respected the independence of the Central Asian Khanates.[53]

Gorchakov's statement on Central Asia was a questionable one. First, he said that the Central Asian people were a "half-savage, nomad population, possessing no fixed organization". If he meant the Kazakh steppes, which were already under Russian control, he was probably right. If he meant the Khokandians, Khivans, and the Bukharans, he was wrong: these people were settled and had their own government and states with fixed frontiers; those of Khokand, Khiva and Bukhara had existed for centuries. Second, Gorchakov's assertion that "it is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force" is demonstrably false. The vital question here is: Did the Russians ever attempt to make a sincere peaceful approach to the Central Asian Khanates to establish a good relationship which could provide an equal opportunity for both sides? The evidence indicates that the Russians never made such an attempt.[54] It is difficult to accept the comparison with the United States, France and England, as the conditions and the problems in the instances quoted were considerably different from Russia's in Central Asia. In giving these examples, it is more probable that Gorchakov was trying to excuse and to justify Russia's conquest of Central Asia.

Meanwhile, the British government, which had been watching the Russian advance in Central Asia with great anxiety, learned about the Gorchakov circular from the Russian ambassador in London, Count E. Brunnov. As Russian activities were contrary to this circular despatch, British authorities became concerned about the sincerity of the document. First, there was the attack on Tashkent. When this was put to Gorchakov by the British ambassador in St Petersburg on 10 June 1865, he said that "the Russian government would not retain

the city, but would act up to their declarations in regard to that country".[55] And he wrote to General Kryzhanovskii, the newly appointed Governor-General of Orenburg: "We must not make new territorial acquisitions; we must not shift our frontier forward."[56] However, new orders were sent to General Cherniaev instructing him to watch carefully for any chance of supporting a separatist party in Tashkent.[57]

As a result of Russia's territorial gains in Central Asia, on 25 January 1865 the Russian administration was reorganized.[58] The new Khokandian and Syr-Darya frontiers of Russia, from the western extremity of Issyk Kul to the Aral Sea, formed a single Turkistan Oblast, within the juristiction of Orenburg. The new oblast would be administered by a military governor with the special powers appropriate to such a remote area.[59] General Cherniaev was appointed the first governor on 26 January 1865.[60]

In Central Asia, in the oases of Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya, and in the Farghana Valley, there were three Muslim khanates - Khokand, Bukhara, and Khiva - which were unable to form a united front against the Russian invader as they were often in conflict with each other. Bukhara was the most powerful of the three with a population of about 3,000,000; Khokand and Khiva each had a population of around 1,000,000.[61] A civil war raged in Khokand when the Russians appeared on the Khokandian frontier.[62] In 1864, as he was unable to stop the Russian advance, Khudayar Khan, the Khokandian leader, sent emissaries to India and Turkey protesting against the Russian aggression on the territory of Khokand and asking for their help and protection.[63] The Turks, who were willing to help but unable to do so, and the British authorities in India, who were unwilling to help, advised the Khokandians to solve their problems by themselves.[64] However, this was not the only trouble which Khokand was facing at this time. An old dispute with Bukhara over Farghana was again raised, with the Emir of Bukhara wanting to take advantage of the Khokandian crises.[65] The Russians did not want Bukhara to occupy Khokand, thereby becoming a more powerful rival in Central Asia. There was yet another opportunistic reason for this Russian attitude: they themselves sought to occupy Khokand and so began to watch the development of events very carefully with an eye towards exploiting them.

The unsettled state of affairs in Tashkent created a good opportunity for Russian attack, and General Cherniaev decided to occupy that city, which in any case was the real aim of his government. Khalfin claims that Chemiaev was perfectly aware that the repeated warnings of the Diplomatic Department to call a halt to the advance in Central Asia were a manoeuvre, a smoke screen, employed through

fear of protests from Great Britain.[66]

At the end of April 1865, Cherniaev marched on Tashkent. After a hard-fought battle on 9 May, he defeated the Khokandian forces. The brave Khokandian commander, Alim Kul, was wounded during the fight and later died.[67] The death of Alim Kul, the only able commander of the Khokandians, lowered the morale of the people, particularly of Tashkent, who were divided into three factions urging respectively independence, Bukharan domination, and Russian domination. The latter faction, according to Anwan Khan, consisted of rich people who did not want to pay extra taxes to the Emir for the purpose of defending Tashkent against the Russian invasion.[68] When Cherniaev learned that the defenders were going to receive aid from the Bukharans, he marched on Tashkent on 29 May to occupy the city before the Bukharan forces could arrive.[69] On 11 June he attacked the city after a long bombardment; Tashkent fell to his army on 17 June 1865.[70]

The occupation of Tashkent put Gorchakov in a difficult position, since he had declared in his circular that Russia respected the independence of the Khanates and "entertains towards them no ideas of conquest". An explanatory article soon appeared in the *Russkii Invalid* of 1 August 1865, which announced the capture of Tashkent, and was attributed to the Russian Foreign Office: "Our troops can only occupy the town for a short time, until its independence from Khokand is no longer menaced. Having given independence to Tashkent, the population of which is distinguished by industry and commerce, Russia, which has no desire to annex the place, will only have to watch over the tranquillity and security of her commercial relations with Central Asia."[71]

The British government was not satisfied with this explanation. It instructed Lumley, the British Ambassador in St Petersburg, to ask for a frank explanation from the Russian government about the new developments in Central Asia. Gorchakov told Lumley: "Your Government really appears to attach too much importance to the question."[72] Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, thought that the moment might be opportune for an agreement with the Russian government on the Central Asian problem. He proposed to Gorchakov that both sides should recognize the present state of possession in Central Asia and respect the independence of Persia. Both powers would "declare that they had no intention to extend their territories in such a manner that their frontiers would approach each other more nearly than they then did".[73]

Gorchakov replied that it was impossible for any one acquainted with the policy of the Imperial Government to suspect it of designs against the independence of the khanates and Persian monarch. He

added that Russia had no intention of violating the independence and integrity of Persia, but that the Turkmen were not the subjects of the Shah, and that Russia found it necessary to punish them for depredations against her commerce.[74]

For a while it appeared that the Russian government, for diplomatic considerations, wanted only to make Tashkent and its outskirts into a self-contained khanate under Russian control, a neutral zone between the Russian Empire and Bukhara. For the first time, both Milyutin and Gorchakov protested against Kryzhanovskii for giving permission to General Cherniaev to place permanent garrisons at Fort Niyaz and Chinaz, the strong points near Tashkent, and to set up military posts along the Syr-Darya to its upper reaches.[75] These moves were tantamount to annexing Tashkent, making the Syr-Darya itself the imperial frontier. However, Cherniaev did not think it was practicable to make Tashkent an independent khanate, and he was confident that once reasonable order had been restored a small administrative staff could run the city efficiently.[76] But Kryzhanovskii, Cherniaev's immediate superior, refused this plan. He thought it better to have a neighbour that was militarily weak but commercially viable and a vassal, rather than to identify such territory with the Empire by posting Russian officials to it. Russia should occupy Niyaz Bek and Chinaz and one more point outside Tashkent in order to prevent encroachments on the city's independence.[77] In September 1865, Kryzhanovskii visited Tashkent but failed in his aim to convert Cherniaev to his idea.[78] At this point the Emir of Bukhara's intervention in Tashkent affairs stopped the argument between the Russian diplomats and generals.

DEALING WITH BUKHARA

Bukhara was the major political power in Central Asia; the neighbouring khanates looked to it for support when threatened. Appeals for help from Tashkent and Khokand for deliverance could not be ignored by the Emir; in fact, the Russian capture of Tashkent stopped the ill-feeling between the Khokandians and the Bukharans and brought the Emir to the aid of his co-religionists. But to the Russians, he was intruding in Russo-Khokandian affairs and encroaching on Khokandian territory.[79]

Learning of the fall of Tashkent, the Emir asked Cherniaev to evacuate it, and when his request was refused, proposed a line of demarcation that the Russians were not to cross.[80] Cherniaev refused this too, saying it was necessary for the defence of Tashkent that he should occupy some of the country in front of it.[81]

The situation deteriorated as Cherniaev ordered the arrest of all

Bukharan merchants in his jurisdiction and the confiscation of their goods in order to force the Emir to drop his claims on Khokand. Moreover, he persuaded Kryzhanovskii to follow suit throughout the Orenburg region.[82] The Emir, still hopeful of reaching a peaceful settlement with Russia, on 25 June 1865 sent a mission to St Petersburg headed by Najmuddin Khoja.[83] Najmuddin Khoja was instructed that he should make a protest against the Russian occupation of Tashkent and request its restoration to Bukhara.[84] The Bukharan mission was halted at Kazalinsk, as the Governor-General of Orenburg had been authorized to conduct the talks, much to the Emir's displeasure. In reply, the Emir arrested the Russian mission which had been sent to Bukhara to demand that he cease his intervention in Khokandian affairs and open up his country to Russian trade.[85] Angered with this Bukharan action, Cherniaev wrote to the Emir, "My messengers were stopped on the way, told that my envoys were detained at Bukhara under guard, and that no one was allowed to come near them", and demanded an explanation.[86] The Emir replied: "My envoys were not admitted to the Tsar, but were detained somewhere on the road, which is not a friendly act, and I have therefore detained your envoys also...Your envoys will remain here until mine appear before your Tsar and obtain an answer."[87]

Kryzhanovskii was worried by Cherniaev's independent behaviour and recalled him to Orenburg. But the order was kept from Cherniaev by his chief of staff, Col. Rizenkampf, who even dared to defend his action on paper. The complexity of the situation, Rizenkampf wrote to Milyutin and Kryzhanovskii later, was such that "only an energetic leader...personally interested in righting the wrongs", a Cherniaev, could conceivably cope with it.[88]

Realizing that time was running out, Cherniaev tried to compel the Emir to free the Russian envoys. As he put it "I am compelled to march until I meet my envoys."[89] He moved a rifle battalion to Chinaz in January 1866 and then, throwing in reinforcements, crossed the Syr-Darya and marched through the Hungry Steppe on Dzhizak. The raid ended disastrously. The fortress resisted, and the Russians had to retreat to the right bank of the river, harried by Bukharan cavalry.[90] The failure of the Dzhizak expedition settled Cherniaev's fate. He handed over command to Major-General D.I. Romanovskii, an experienced officer in Central Asian affairs, in March 1866.[91]

Meanwhile, the clashes in the steppe between the Syr-Darya and Dzhizak continued. Kryzhanovskii informed the War Minister of the unsuccessful action against Bukhara and of his intention to visit Tashkent to take personal command of the operations. The government approved and invited him to St Petersburg for talks. But the skirmishes between the Bukharan and Russian forces developed into a

battle at Irdzhar on 8 May 1866, where the Bukharan troops were scattered by the Russian artillery.[92] General Romanovskii, who was no less ambitious and independent than General Cherniaev, followed up his advantage and took the Khodzhend and Nau (Now) fortresses between 28 May and 7 June.[93]

The Irdzhar episode showed that Romanovskii would carry on the work of his predecessor. At St Petersburg eyes were closed to the inconsistencies in General Romanovskii's communiqué describing the march on Khodzhend and Nau as "in most scrupulous compliance with the government's wish to avoid conquests and restrict itself to such military operations as are of sheer necessity for the tranquillity of the region and the maintenance of Russia's prestige in Central Asia".[94] Next he pressed for the annexation of these places in the Empire on the tenuous excuse that the rulers of Bukhara and Khokand would be renouncing all claims to them under the peace terms. At this point, the Emir released the Russian mission and peace talks opened. Romanovskii's terms were: recognition by Bukhara of all Russia's territorial gains in Central Asia and the alignment of the frontier along the Hungry Steppe and Kizil Kum desert; the equating of dues imposed on Russian goods in Bukhara with those assessed on Bukharan goods in Russia; and the immediate payment of a war indemnity of £50,000 (400,000 roubles).[95]

When Kryzhanovskii returned from St Petersburg to Orenburg with new instructions, he found the situation very favourable for future actions. He immediately took over the negotiations with Bukhara. He was careful to heighten the expansionist tone of the proceedings with a provision for military thrusts against Bukhara and Khokand. While he was conducting the talks, he wrote to Romanovskii on the frontier: "Having beaten the Emir as you have done, you must squeeze him dry and not give in an inch to him." As for Khokand, he advocated "taking a lordly stand and showing your disdain of Khudayar Khan as someone who by his position cannot be other than a vassal of ours. If he takes offence and goes against us - so much the better; it will give us a pretext to be done with him".[96] On 17 August 1866 he went to Tashkent, where he announced the annexation of all the occupied lands, including Tashkent, Khodzhend and Nau.[97] The Emir's envoy accepted all the terms which the Russians demanded except that for the war indemnity for which Kryzhanovskii demanded payment within ten days.[98] It was impossible for the Emir to pay, and on the eleventh day (23 September 1866), the Russians crossed into Bukhara and quickly captured Ura-Tyube and Dzhizak.

APPEALS TO BRITAIN AND TURKEY

In November 1866, the Emir sent urgent messengers to the Turks, British, Afghans, and the Turkmen asking for help against the Russian aggression. His mission to the British and Turkish authorities was headed by Muhammed Parsa Khaja. After explaining the situation in a written statement, Muhammed Parsa handed the Emir's letters to the British authorities in India.[99] In his short and formal letter to the Governor-General, the Emir noted that "with the help and advice of Your Excellency, the Mohammedans may be relieved of the oppressions exercised upon them by the Russians".[100] The Emir's main letter was addressed to the Queen, and in it he explained that

> the Russians disclosed their concealed enmity, and commenced creating disturbances in Tashkent and Khokand as well as in their neighbourhood, and injured the lives and property of the people. Notwithstanding this, an envoy was sent by me to the Russian Emperor in order that the friendly intercourse which already existed might not be stopped; and another object which I had in view in deputing an envoy to Russia was to ascertain their views, and to adopt necessary measures accordingly. It is a longstanding custom that one Prince does not subject an Envoy or Ambassador of another to any kind of trouble and difficulty, but the Russians, in utter disregard of the above custom, placed my Envoy in custody, and thereby rendered themselves an object of reproach to the world. The deceitful Russians acted inimically on every occasion. I have now determined to collect troops and to make necessary preparations to defend my people. According to the injunction of the Koran to 'consult with others and take advice', I deputize Mullah Muhammed Parsa Khaja, who is Chief Mufti of Bukhara, and who is one of the confidential agents of my Durbar, in the capacity of an Envoy to wait upon the Great Sultan of Turkey for assistance and advice, in the hope that the Sultan will be graciously pleased to grant me aid, and that I may adopt all such measures as may be suggested for adoption by the Ministers of the Sultan for the expulsion of the Russians.
>
> As I learn that the officers of the British Government want to promote the welfare of the people in general, and that they are exerting themselves to expel the Russians, and also as I am a friend of the British Government, I hope that Your Majesty will be graciously pleased to take steps for the expulsion of the evil men.[101]

The British government did not bother to answer the Emir's letter to the Queen. However, the British Viceroy of India sent an answer to the Emir in which he said that

> Bokhara is so distant from the confines of India, and the difficulties of communication which the intervening countries present are so formidable, that hitherto they have proved a bar to any freedom of intercourse, not only between our respective subjects, but also between Your Majesty and the Government of India. I am therefore neither sufficiently well acquainted with the causes which have unfortunately produced a state of hostilities between Bukhara and Russia, nor with the present state of Your Majesty's affairs, to be in a position to give Your Majesty useful advice. Therefore, though I am willing to be on friendly terms, and am desirous of the peace of your dominions, and am anxious to hear of the prosperity of Your Majesty's rule, I am not able to render you effective aid either by advice or in any other form.[102]

It seemed that the Viceroy of India was either misjudging, or not worrying about, the Russian advance in Central Asia.

Russia's rapid advance in fact caused great excitement in India. Reports of Russian intentions and strength reached the British authorities there.[103] These were immediately sent to London. But the India Office and Foreign Office misjudged the events in Central Asia. However, on 27 June 1866 Lord Clarendon instructed Sir Andrew Buchanan at St Petersburg to let the Russian government know that, while Britain recognized Russia's right to use force to release her envoys imprisoned in Bukhara

> the proceedings of the Russian authorities at Tashkent and other places beyond limits which, according to the Circular Despatch of 3 December 1864, were henceforth to form the boundary of the Russian Empire, are scarcely consistent with the professed intention of the Russian Government to respect the independence of the States of Central Asia. Russia seems to have made a steady advance in this direction, taking permanent possession of territory not required solely for making a good frontier.[104]

To Buchanan's question about the limits of Russian conquests, Gorchakov, a changed man who preferred not to remember what he had said in his circular despatch, replied that only the military authorities were competent to decide such issues, and added that it was absurd to suppose that Russia's moves could threaten British India.[105] His assurances were apparently accepted by the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, and the commander-in-chief, General W.R. Mansfield.

In a Minute dated 3 October 1867, Lawrence opposed the idea of a British advance into Afghanistan, and argued that the further Russia penetrated into Central Asia, the longer her supply line would be stretched, while the British supply line would remain unchanged.[106] General Mansfield was also confident of British strength in India; "As a military and vast political power, we have literally nothing to fear from Russia, whether she stops at her present limits, or spreads her power even to our own border."[107]

Disappointed with Britain's indifferent attitude to his country's problems, Muhammed Parsa continued his journey to Istanbul where he arrived at the beginning of September 1867. After delivering the Emir's letters during his audience with the Grand Vesir and the Sultan, he explained Russia's aggression against the Muslims in a tragic way and begged for Turkey's immediate help and protection against Russia.[108] The Emir's letter repeated these themes. The Emir further asked the Grand Vesir if His Majesty, the Sultan, could persuade the Russians to withdraw from Central Asia and noted that "this can relieve us and save the lives of many Muslims. The Caliph (the Sultan), as the head of Islam, will be remembered with a good name among the Muslims if His Majesty can persuade the Russians to withdraw from Bukhara. There is only one hope for the Muslims to realize the expulsion of the enemy, that is the Caliph, who can help them".[109]

Turkish authorities considered the Bukharan requests quite seriously and discussed them at the meetings of special committees. At the end, the Grand Vesir reported the results of these discussions as follows:

> It is impossible to give material aid to the Emir since it is a long distance and there are some countries between Bukhara and Turkey. There is rivalry between Bukhara and its neighbouring countries, Khiva and Khokand. It would be possible to make a stand against the Russians if they cooperated among themselves instead of quarrelling. I told the emissary this and delivered a letter explaining the facts to the Emir of Bukhara.
>
> After the Russian capture of Tashkent the Emir sent two new envoys asking for the protection of the Ottoman Empire in order to expel the Russian invaders. We have discussed their requests with a special committee. We thought that it would be necessary to assist Bukhara, as a Muslim country, with material aid against the Russians. However, we realized that it would be difficult to do this, since there were countries and long distance between Bukhara and Turkey. We also noticed regretfully, that our advice and words about the unity of the Khanates and the need to reach a peaceful agreement with Russia have not been taken seriously

> by the Khans of Central Asia. Now, the new emissary of the Emir is requesting the Turkish Government to act as a mediator between Bukhara and Russia to persuade the latter to reach a peaceful agreement. It is rather difficult to expect (any guarantee) from the Bukharans that they will not violate this peace agreement since there is no sign of unification among themselves. On the other hand, the possibility of moral support from Britain has diminished since the Russians assured the British that they have no intention of marching towards India, only of settling their problems with the Khans of Central Asia, in order to secure their trade. There is, therefore, no alternative for the Bukharans but to reach a peaceful agreement with the Russians by themselves. It will be advisable to write to the Bukharans to come to terms with the Russians with as few sacrifices and losses as possible.[110]

Keeping his Grand Vesir's advice in mind, the Sultan wrote to the Emir: "It is our sincere concern, as the head of Islam, to safeguard the welfare and security of the Muslims of Central Asia. However, I must regretfully admit that it is impossible to send any material aid for these Muslims since there are countries and long distances between Bukhara and Turkey".[111] Turkish authorities took a long time to come to this decision. With Muhammed Parsa in Istanbul and the Emir in Bukhara waiting for the Turkish reply, new developments concerning the fate of the Central Asian Muslims began to unfold in the Russian capital.

CAPITULATION AND CONSOLIDATION

Early in 1867, Milyutin presided over a Special Committee in St Petersburg to decide how best to administer the conquered areas.[112] The Special Committee recommended the withdrawal of the Central Asian dominions from the jurisdiction of Orenburg and the formation of a separate Turkistan Governor-Generalship consisting of the two oblasts, Syr-Darya and Semirechye. The Tsar gave his sanction to this on 11 July 1867.[113] General K.P. Kaufman, a close friend of Milyutin and a successful soldier-statesman who had been a departmental head in the War Ministry, was appointed its first Governor-General and given a free hand. He was to become the uncrowned king of Turkistan, 'Yarim Padshah'.

On 1 January 1868, after his arrival in Turkistan, General Kaufman told an assembly of the representatives, who were mostly merchants of Tashkent: "By order of the Tsar, I have been appointed Governor-General of the Turkistan district which contains the two oblasts, Syr-

Darya and Semirechye. In order to keep the peace in the lands entrusted unto my care, the Tsar has given me in case of need, the right to make war and peace with the Kingdoms adjacent to this side of Russia".[114] He observed that there were bloody revolutions and violence in Khokand and Bukhara and that necessary steps were taken by the Russians to put an end to the raids of the Khokandians on the *volosts* of Russian Khirgiz. In order to restrain the pretensions of neighbouring states, the Russians were forced to conquer the right and left banks of the Syr-Darya as far as the town of Khodzhend. "Generals Cherniaev and Romanovskii have executed the will of our great Emperor, by busying themselves with the construction of a new oblast; but they were forced to defend the country from the attacks of the Bukharans and Khokandians...The Tsar has seen fit to let me consider here, in this place, how exactly to institute those laws laid down in St Petersburg for all inhabitants of the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan. These laws are compiled in such a way as to give you happiness so long as you desire it."[115] However, immediately after this speech, Kaufman made some political changes which created new troubles in the area.

General Kryzhanovskii's determination and his further conquests forced the Bukharans to accept his peace terms. In return, the Russians would withdraw from the newly occupied town, Yeni Kurgan. Kaufman was against any concession to Bukhara and therefore he refused to recognize this agreement and put a new draft to the Emir.[116] The situation in Bukhara became extremely tense, the Emir being undecided on the best way to handle the situation. However, some of his fanatic Beks were not undecided, and they led an attack on one of the Russian posts. This created a perfect excuse for Kaufman to march on Bukhara. The Emir led his army out to the banks of the river Zaravshan to meet the enemy, and Kaufman advanced from the east to the same point. The Emir demanded the return of Dzhizak; Kaufman insisted on the withdrawal of all territorial claims, and on the payment of a contribution. Kaufman was not prepared to argue, and on 1 May 1868 crossed the river.[117] The Bukharans retreated from the area including Samarkand, which the Russians entered without opposition. The Russians took Urgut on 11 May and five days later Katta Kurgan.[118] Not until they reached the Zirabulak did the Bukharans stand against the Russians. A fierce battle was fought on 2 June, and the Emir's troops were routed.[119]

The Khanate of Bukhara capitulated, and within three weeks a peace treaty was signed. The Russians imposed severe terms. Bukhara recognized the incorporation of Khodzhend, Ura-Tyube and Dzhizak into the Russian Empire, paid an indemnity of 500,000 roubles, admitted Russian trade agencies, guaranteed the safety of persons and property

and offered a thoroughfare to travellers in transit. Also, the Russians announced the temporary occupation of Samarkand and Katta Kurgan as security for the payment of the indemnity, and put them into a single administrative unit, the Zaravshan Circuit.[120]

British authorities were alarmed by the fall of Samarkand, as they had been by the fall of Tashkent, and the British Ambassador again "tried to ascertain how far the conquests of Russia were likely to extend".[121] Gorchakov told the Ambassador that Bukhara had forced the war on Russia, and again assured him of Russia's peaceful intentions in Turkistan.[122]

Lord Clarendon tried to get Gorchakov to commit Russia not to annex the independent khanates of Central Asia. They met in Heidelberg on 3 September 1869.[123] Gorchakov began by expressing satisfaction that England and Russia had no conflicting interests anywhere in the world. When Clarendon pointed out that they had such a conflict in Central Asia, Gorchakov said that the Tsar had no intention of advancing further south. Clarendon replied that events of the last five years made it clear that the Russian armies were "impelled forward either by direct orders from St Petersburg, or by ambitions of generals in disregard of the pacific intentions of the Tsar".[124] Gorchakov promptly agreed and blamed the military, "who had all exceeded their instructions in the hope of gaining distinction".[125] And then he assured Clarendon that Russia would restore Samarkand to Bukhara.

In the following years, the Emir in Turkistan and the British Ambassadors in St Petersburg appealed to the Russian authorities for the restoration of Samarkand to Bukhara, but their appeals were denied. The Russians told them that both Russia and the inhabitants of that province had gained great advantages from the conquest and now were getting on well. Therefore, they abandoned the idea of restoring Samarkand to Bukhara.[126]

Meanwhile in Istanbul the Turkish authorities and the Emir's special envoy, Muhammed Parsa, received the news about the war and the peace between Bukhara and Russia. Learning of his country's complete defeat, Muhammed Parsa requested the Turkish authorities to send some officers to train the Bukharan army and twenty or thirty technicians to manufacture rifles and cannons in Bukhara.[127] He also requested that Turkey should send an emissary to Bukhara to explain the Sultan's advice to the Bukharans. Turkish authorities rejected the sending of officers as they feared this might bring a protest from the Russians, but they agreed to send an emissary to Bukhara.[128] The Sultan's envoy was Sheyh Suleyman Efendi, who originally came from Bukhara and had been teaching at the *medrese* (the religious school) and was also the leader of the *Uzbek Tekke* (a religious club) in Istanbul.[129]

Sheyh Suleyman Efendi arrived in Bukhara in late 1870 and explained the advice of the Sultan to the Bukharans. The Bukharans were very impressed and excited by the talks of Sheyh Suleyman Efendi. They immediately sent a memorandum suggesting a solution to their problems to Istanbul by Sheyh Suleyman Efendi and Abdul Hayy Efendi, their special emissary:

> As a result of Turkey's advice and friendly warning, the crisis in the state of affairs in Bukhara is now over. The Bukharans want to develop and advance their country by adopting the same method and system as Turkey. Such effective development in Bukhara can only be possible with the help and advice of the Caliph. Sheyh Suleyman Efendi has explained to us all the recent developments in Turkey, especially existing laws and the ways and means necessary for international relations. We were deeply impressed by this statement of Suleyman Efendi. Now, we have decided to make necessary reforms in the state and among the people. But it is not possible for the Bukharans to find the necessary machinery for such reforms. As Muslims of Bukhara, we have no alternative to acquiring this machinery but by obtaining it from the Caliph and Turkey.[130]

After requesting qualified teachers, administrators and officers in different fields from Turkey, the Bukharan memorandum continued:

> Such an achievement would depend upon the Sultan. It is for that reason that we are requesting Turkey's direct help and guidance for the development of our country and its liberation from foreign domination. The country and the people will obey the Ottoman State in whatever she says and will put any orders into practice. The government of our country is under the Ottoman sovereignty and her advice will be followed and obeyed without fail.[131]

Bukhara's requests were declined by the Turkish authorities, who considered that the international situation would not permit such assistance.[132] However, Turkish authorities did offer to educate Bukharan students at the Turkish military colleges and then to send them back to Bukhara.[133] Thus, the Bukharans in their belated attempts failed to obtain the help and protection of an outside power against the Russian invaders.

In the diplomatic field, negotiations, exchanges of notes, reminders, pledges, and expressions of dissatisfaction from the British had not the slightest effect upon the Russians and their plans for the conquest of Central Asia. The indecision among British authorities and their conciliatory attitude and the acceptance of Gorchakov's version of

the causes of Russian expansion in Central Asia no doubt encouraged the Russian advance in Turkistan. Now, with more than half of the khanates annexed and the rest turned into vassals of Russia, the Russians began to prepare for the conquest of Khiva and Turkmenia.

APPENDIX 1

Memorandum to the Turkish Grand Vesir from the Bukharan emissary and Sheyh Suleyman Efendi, the late Turkish ambassador to Bukhara.

20 Zilhicce 1288 (February 8, 1871).

As a result of Turkey's advice and friendly warning the crisis in the state of affairs in Bukhara is now over. The Bukharans want to develop and advance their country by adopting the same method and system as Turkey. Such effective development in Bukhara can only be possible with the help and advice of the Caliph. Sheyh Suleyman Efendi, the emissary of His Majesty, the Sultan, to Bukhara, has explained to us all the recent developments in Turkey, especially the existing laws and the ways and means necessary for international relations. The Emir of Bukhara and the leading personages of the country were deeply impressed by this statement of Suleyman Efendi. As a result of this, Bukhara has reached an agreement with Russia, and now intends to make necessary reforms in the state and among the people. But it is not possible for the Bukharans to find the necessary machinery for such reforms. As moslems of Bukhara, we have no alternative to acquiring this machinery but by obtaining it from the Caliph and Turkey. The afore-mentioned Sheyh Suleyman Efendi and I (Abdul Hayy Efendi) were sent here for this purpose. I am most greateful for the kindness and hospitality which has been shown to me since I arrived in Istanbul. Before I have the honour of laying the Emir's requests and need of assistance before the Sultan, I would like Your Highness to consider these requests which are as follows:

1. For the reorganisation of the civil administration of Bukhara we need qualified teachers for *Idady* (secondary schools), *Rushtiye* (lycees), *Harbiye* (High Military Colleges) and *Tibbiye* (Medical Schools) as well as qualified technicians in the manufacturing of guns and rifles.
2. Qualified teachers, technicians and experienced administrators in the above-mentioned sciences together with the necessary equipments are urgently requested, particularly in the fields of geology, mathematics, and mining.
3. After being granted these requests, we would also like to have a Turkish ambassador, who must be well educated and qualified, and through him the foundation of civilization will be laid by practising the new Ottoman administration in Bukhara.
4. As some of these states regard Bukhara as a strong barricade for their own territory, they would like to help us. As this is a matter for your esteemed consideration, therefore, it would be greatly appreciated if the Sultan would write them the necessary requests for their help.
5. We have a common border and language with Afghanistan; therefore, we must protect one another. It will be most beneficial therefore, if Your Highness would write to the Emir of Kabul proposing the strengthening of friendship and co-operation with Afghanistan.
6. It will be necessary to write to the leading personages in Bukhara to

obtain their full support for the success of the coming Turkish ambassador.

7. The real aim is to solve the problems of Bukhara and promote the success of the Emir. Such an achievement would depend upon the help and guidance of the Caliph. It is for that reason that we are requesting Turkey's direct help and guidance for the development of our country and its liberation from foreign domination.

The country and the people will obey the Ottoman State in whatever she says and will put any orders into practice. The government of our country is under the Ottoman sovereignty and her advice will be followed and obeyed without fail.

In short, we request that the above-mentioned points be communicated to the Caliph. We are sure that Your Highness will do your utmost in ensuring your valuable assistance.

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51. Correspondence, from 1864-1868, regarding the movements of Russia in Central Asia and her relations with Afghanistan, p. 4, FO 65/1150. Hereafter cited as Correspondence.
52. *Correspondence*, pp. 2-5, FO 65/1150.
53. Ibid.
54. In 1842, the Russians sent a mission to Khiva and signed a Friendship and Commercial Treaty with the Khan of Khiva. For two reasons the Khan was suspicious about the Russian approach. First, the Treaty was signed after the Russian expedition of 1839 and the British mission of 1839 and 1840 to Khiva. Second, the Khan did not trust the Russian merchants as some of them were always military agents. For these reasons, the Russo-Khivan Treaty of 1842 did not work well. The Russian mission of 1858, which was headed by Ignat'ev, was purely a spying mission. As a result of this mission the Russians began to prepare for the conquest of Central Asia.
55. *Correspondence*, p. 7, FO 65/1150.
56. Cited in Khalfin, p. 64.
57. Ibid; MacKenzie, p. 53; Hayit, p. 80.
58. Ibid, pp. 59-60.
59. The formation of this new Oblast was approved by the Tsar on August 6 1865. *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiskoi imperii, po volye i ukazaniiam. Gosudaria imperatora Nikolaya Pervogo prodolzhaemoe. Zakony 1867 g.* Sobranie vtoroe, Tom XL, pp. 876-881, St Petersburg, 1867.
60. Terent'ev, I p. 306; *Correspondence*, p. 5, FO 65/1150.

61. M.A. Holdsworth, *Turkistan in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1959, pp. 1-6; Becker, pp. 3-11.
62. Hayit, pp. 74-76; Anwar Khan, p. 39.
63. Cited in Anwar Khan, p.43; *Cevdet, Hariciye, No. 1098*, Basbakanlik Arsivi, Istanbul.
64. Ibid, pp. 44-46; Cevdet, Hariciye, No 1098, Ibid.
65. Becker, p. 5; Hayit, p. 78.
66. Khalfin, p. 65.
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68. Anwar Khan, pp. 51-53; Hayit, pp. 81-82.
69. MacKenzie, pp. 56-57.
70. Romanovskii, p. 162; Terent'ev, I., p. 314; Hayit, p. 81; MacKenzie, pp. 55-56; *Correspondence*, p. 6, FO 65/1150.
71. *Correspondence*, p. 7, FO 65/1150.
72. Lumley to Russell, St Petersburg, July 23, 1865, *Parliamentary Papers, 1878*, LXXX, Central Asia, No. 1., p. 171.
73. *Correspondence*, pp. 7-8, FO 65/1150.
74. Ibid, p. 12.
75. According to Khalfin, Milyutin and Gorchakov's protests against the occupation of Tashkent were a diplomatic manoevre. Khalfin, p. 69.
76. Romanovskii, pp. 171-175.
77. Terent'ev, I, pp. 326-328; Romanovskii, pp. 34-35.
78. A.I. Maksheyev, *Istoricheskiy obzor Turkistana i nastupatel'nogo dvizheniia v nego Russkikh*. St Petersburg, 1890, p. 238.
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81. Maksheyev, pp. 236-237.
82. Terent'ev, I, p. 323.
83. S.H. Singh, *A History of Khokand*, (Ed) C.E. Bates, Lahore, 1878, p. 13.
84. Buchanan to Russell, St Petersburg, October 25, 1865, FO 65/868.
85. Maksheyev, pp. 238-239; Terent'ev, I, p. 324.
86. Romanovskii, p. 181.
87. Ibid.
88. As quoted from *Turkistanskii Krai*, by Khalfin, p. 73.
89. Romanovskii, p. 186.
90. Maksheyev, pp. 239-40; Terent'ev, I, pp. 331-333. General Cherniaev's retreat from Dzhizak was not well received at St Petersburg. Retreat, as the Russians thought, was taken as a sign of weakness by Asiatics. This was not the fact. The fact was that the Russian authorities were very worried that a failure in Central Asia would damage their prestige.
91. Terent'ev, I, pp. 334-335. After his return to St Petersburg, Cherniaev's salary was raised, honours were bestowed on him and his policy in Central Asia was kept very much alive. Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, p.268.
92. Romanovskii, pp. 63-64.
93. Ibid, p. 67; Terent'ev, I, p. 354.
94. Ibid, p. 73.
95. Romanovskii, pp. 74-76; "Russian Advances in Central Asia", *The Quarterly Review*, CXXVI, 1874, p. 412.
96. Romanovskii, p. 91; Maksheyev, pp. 246-247.

97. Ibid, p. 97-98.
98. Ibid, p. 99.
99. In his written statement Muhammed Parsa said that 10,000 men from the Turkmen tribes would come to the aid of the Emir. Translation of a letter from Muhammed Parsa, Sudur Mooftee and Vakeel of the Ruler of Bokhara, to the Governor-General, May 25, 1867. *Enclosures to Secret Letters from India, Political and Secret Memoranda*, 5/60, India Office.
100. *Translation of a letter from Amer Muzaffar, Shah of Bokhara, to the Governor-General - dated Rabee-us-sanee, 1283, H.*, Enclosures to Secret Letters from India, Political and Secret Mem. 5/60, India Office.
101. *Translation of a letter from the Shah of Bokhara to Her Majesty the Queen of England and India.* Enclosures to Secret Letters from India, Political and Secret Mem. 5/60, India Office.
102. *From the Governor-General of India, the Viceroy of Her Majesty the Queen of England and India, to His Majesty the Amer of Bokhara, Fort William, January 24, 1867.* Enclosures to Secret Letters from India, Political and Secret Memoranda 5/60, India Office.
103. p. 15, FO 65/1150.
104. *Correspondence*, p. 16, FO 65/1150.
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107. Minute by the Commander in Chief of India, suggested by Sir H.C. Rawlinson's Memorandum on the Questions connected with Central Asia December 24, 1860. No. 11, Foreign Department, Political, India Office.
108. *İrade, Hariciye, No. 13271, Başbakanlık Arşivi*, İstanbul.
109. *From the Bukharan Meclis (including the Emir) to the Grand Vesir of the Sultan, 13 Sevval 1284, H. (February 7, 1867), İrade, Hariciye*, No. 15065, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul.
110. *The Grand Vesir's report to the Sultan on the events of Central Asia and aid to the Emir of Bukhara, 8 Zilhicce 1285 (February 20, 1869), İrade, Meclis-i Mahsus, No. 1510*, Başbakanlık Arşivi, İstanbul.
111. *The Sultan's Name-i Humayun to the Emir of Bukhara, 9 Zilhicce 1285, (February 21, 1869), İrade, Mecklis-i Mahsus, No. 1510, Lef. 4*, Başbakanlık Arşivi, İstanbul.
112. Romanovskii, p. 113. The President of the Committee was Milyutin, and the members were: Gen. Kryzhanovskii, Governor-General of Orenburg; Gen. Count Heyden, Chief of the staff; Privy Councillor Stremoukhov; Gen. Romanovskii; Counts Vorotsov and Dashkov, both of the Tsar's Suite; Gen. Cherniaev; State Councillor Mansurov; State Councillor Galkin; and four members of the Steppe Commission.
113. *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiskoy Imperii, Sobranie vtoroe, otdelenie pervoe*, 1867, St Petersburg, 1871, XLII, pp. 1150-1151; Romanovskii, p. 11.
114. K.K. Palen, *Otchot po revizii Turkistanskogo kraia, proizvedennoi po Vysochaishemu poveleniyu K.K. Palenom. 19 Parts, Part 10 Kraevoe upravlenie*, St Petersburg, 1910-1911, pp. 14-15.
115. Ibid, pp. 13-15.
116. Popov, pp. 216-218.
117. Palen, p. 18; Terent'ev, I, p. 418.
118. Terent'ev, I, pp. 426-429.
119. Terent'ev, I, pp. 458-460; Maksheyev, p. 268.
120. Terent'ev, I, pp. 474 and 488-89.

121. *Correspondence*, p. 21, FO 65/1150.
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123. *Correspondence*, p. 29, FO 65/1150.
124. Ibid, p.30.
125. Ibid.
126. E. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, London, 1876, II, p. 307; Loftus to Granville, St Petersburg, No. 72, February 19 1873, FO 65/876.
127. *İrade, Meclis-i Mahsus, No. 1510*, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul.
128. *İrade, Meclis-i Mahsus, No. 1510*, Başbakanlik Arşivi, Istanbul.
129. Ibid.
130. *Memorandum to the Turkish Grand Vesir from the Bukharan emissary and Sheyh Suleyman fendi, the late Turkish envoy to Bukhara, Irade, Hariciye, No. 15065, 20 Zilhicce 1288 H. (February 8, 1872)*, Basbakanlik Arsivi, Istanbul. The full text of this memorandum can be found in the Appendix. The mission of Sheyh Suleyman Efendi to Bukhara was described as the Turkish intrigues in Central Asia by the Russians. *Otnoshenie Orenburgskogo General-Gebernetora Turkestanskomu General-Gubernatoru a prigotovleniiakh Khivinskogo Khana protiv Rossii i antirusskikh proiskakh Turetkoi agentury v Srednei Azii, 13 Mart 1870* Il'yasov, pp. 47-48.
131. *Bukharan Memorandum*, Ibid.
132. *İrade, Hariciye, No. 15225, 6 Sefer 1289 H. (March 24, 1872)*, Basbakanlık Arşivi, İstanbul.
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The Islamic Community of China

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER

ETHNO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been very reticent about demographic data for its population as a whole. Prior to the census now being conducted there had been only one other official census, in 1953, and the media typically use the same well-rounded figure for several years without change - for example, 600 million during the entire period of the Cultural Revolution and one billion at present. In addition, the PRC maintains that, in keeping with its policy of freedom of religion, no registrations are made of believers and no records kept on them.[1] Despite this claim, a *Beijing Review* article of December 1979 stated that China has ten million Muslims.[2] However, this is almost certainly inaccurate, and was probably derived by adding population statistics for the eight largest ethnic groups known to be consistently Muslim in faith. The PRC has not updated many of these figures since 1965 and, where it has updated, has sometimes done so by adding the same, seemingly arbitrary percentage increase each year.[3] Moreover, a count based solely on ethnic groups who are consistently Muslim neglects to include members of other groups in which a portion are believers. Though a recent *Congressional Record* puts the number of Muslims in China at 50 million,[4] this writer would estimate the figure at no more than 12 million.

Muslims are found all over China, reflecting the variety of paths by which their forbears reached the celestial kingdom: via trade routes to the south and east and via invasion routes from the north and west. There are Muslim colonies in most of the major cities, including the large eastern metropoles of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Rural Hainan Island, far to the southeast, has a sizeable Muslim community, as does Tibet's Lhasa, the holy city of Lamaist Buddhism. There are so-called Panthay Muslims in Yunnan province in the southwest. The largest concentration of Muslims is, however, in China's northwest,

where their influence, and even their numbers, were predominant for many centuries. This is particularly true of the four northwestern "Muslim belt" provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia.

Eight ethnic groups of some size are virtually wholly Muslim in faith: the Turkic Muslims (Uygurs, Kazakhs, Uzbekhs, Tatars, Salars and Sibos) and Persian Muslim Tajiks of Xinjiang, and the Hui, who have their largest concentrations in Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia. So-called "scattered Hui" are also found in most Chinese cities. Since their original Arab strain has been considerably diluted through intermarriage with the dominant Han Chinese, and since the Hui speak Han, one might argue that on strict anthropological grounds they should be considered a religious rather than an ethnic group. However, the Hui consider themselves ethnically distinct, and both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its Guomindang (GMD) predecessor government have acceded to this view. While some Hui are indistinguishable from Han, others maintain the more heavily bearded, sharper-featured visages of their Arab ancestors. This plus slight peculiarities of speech - for example, the use of sinicized Arabic and Persian words - and dress may set them off from the Han. They are basically a northern Chinese group.

The Miao of South China, the same group known in Indochina as Meo, have had a substantial number of converts to Islam.

Save for the Shi'ite Tajiks, the overwhelming majority of China's Muslims are Sunni. However, Sunni and Shi'ite differences have been muted. A 19th century explorer noted that although a certain mountain pass served as a dividing line between Shi'ite Tajiks and Sunni Jagatai Turks, the two groups were in constant communication across the line, and intermarriage was not infrequent.[5] Differences among ethnic groups were similarly submerged, with several groups claiming some common ancestors and individuals able to successfully cross ethnic lines. Clan and religious loyalties were traditionally more important than ethnic distinctions.[6] Under normal, peacetime conditions, clan groups were rather loosely organized.

The term "Hui" is often used interchangeably with "Chinese Muslims", as distinct from Turkic or other Islamic groups in China. However, since this article deals with all Muslim believers in China, it would be misleading to refer to the Hui alone as Chinese Muslims. Hui will be used in its narrower sense, to refer to those Muslims whose first language is Han Chinese and whose anthropological background is basically Han Chinese. The term Chinese Muslims will designate all citizens of China who follow the Islamic faith, regardless of ethnic group.

Muslims are found in a variety of professions, Ekvall noting "a tendency...to follow the more adventurous of the subsidiary callings,

or those which require more hardihood and daring". Such occupations as innkeeper, trader, muleteer, carter, soldier and the like attract many more Muslims, proportionately, than Chinese.[7] Many Muslims, including the Uygurs, Hui and Miao, are engaged in sedentary agriculture, while the Kazakhs and Kirghiz are nomadic herders. Popular professions for urban Hui are, in addition to trade, the butchering of cattle and ownership of "pure and true" restaurants which conform to Islamic dietary strictures. These last two callings enjoy a reputation for high sanitary standards among non-Muslim Chinese, as well, and are well patronized by them. All of China's Muslims are reputed to be excellent soldiers. Each Islamic group save the Chinese-speaking Hui uses its own language. Before 1949 those who were literate - an estimated 20 per cent of the population, though most males had had some training in the Koran - read in Arabic.

Birthrates, particularly for the Turkic Muslim groups, were high, though Ekvall, speaking of the Gansu-Qinghai-Ningxia Muslim belt, notes that the Hui birthrate was lower than that of the Han.[8]

The socio-political organization of Islamic communities in the Muslim belt was cohesive, with whole villages tending to be either Muslim or Han and their inhabitants having little to do with one another. In the urban coastal areas where Muslims were a minority, they tended to cluster together on certain streets, forming Muslim enclaves within the city. The largely Turkic Muslim groups of Xinjiang were more decentralized around local clan and lineage groups, but overlapping ancestral connections provided links among the groups, as did their common Muslim faith.

Muslim leaders were powerful individuals, able to mobilize large numbers in battle on very short notice. When organized around such a strong leader, different clans and ethnic groups were welded into a formidable fighting force. This was particularly true when the cause was a holy war, which most Muslim grievances quickly escalated into.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Traditionally, China's Muslims were a problem for the state. Seeking to remain independent of it, they refused to accept certain important tenets of the Confucian ideology that formed the basis of the Chinese state. Instead they adhered to a value system which sharply contrasts with Confucianism in several fundamental areas.[9]

One area of disagreement concerned the matter of loyalty. Confucianism conceptualized the emperor as the link between heaven, earth, and the beings that dwelt thereon. He was considered the ruler of *tianxia*, all under heaven, and as such was owed the loyalty of all under heaven. Muslims, by contrast, gave their loyalty to Allah.

Another area of divergence concerned the locus of values. Confucianism fostered the belief that China was the fount of civilization - indeed, the very word China means "middle kingdom", with connotations of centrality in importance. Those who refused to acknowledge this superiority were *ipso facto* barbarians, to be looked down upon. China's Muslims in turn looked down upon their non-Muslim countrymen because they were infidels. They regarded Islamic, not Chinese, civilization, as the repository of ultimate value, and looked beyond China's borders to Mecca as the symbol thereof. Their schools sought to impart the wisdom of the Koran and other Islamic classics and not, as in Chinese schools, the works of Confucius.

Islam and Confucianism also had very different conceptions of the family. The concept of filial piety was central to Confucianism, and involved rites of reverence to deceased ancestors. Ancestral tablets were carefully kept, with prayers offered in front of them. Confucianism envisaged the state as an extension of the family, with reverence due to the local magistrate (often referred to as the "father-mother official") and on upward through the administrative hierarchy to the emperor, who was regarded as simultaneously the father of his people and the son of heaven. Village rule was an extension of filial piety; if the village were run properly so, by extension, the empire would be peaceful and prosperous as well.

One's native village took on an almost mystical significance. It contained the graves, and therefore the spirits, of one's ancestors. The very soil was the repository of local deities who must be placated. Thus, Confucian temples with their ancestral tablets and altars to local gods were community-supported. So were local festivals. These community efforts were undertaken for reasons which were believed important not only for the welfare of the village, but for that of the empire as a whole.

To Chinese Muslims, however, the local community was of no particular concern. They felt themselves to be part of the *umma*, the community of believers. They celebrated their own Islamic festivals, and refused to contribute to the upkeep of local temples, whose gods they regarded as false. They validated their membership in the *umma* through practising the five pillars of the faith, and not through reverence to ancestral tablets. Their prayers were not directed south toward the emperor, but east toward Mecca. From the point of view of the non-Muslim Chinese, this constituted gross heresy.

Yet another divergence between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities of China concerned the matter of diet. The Chinese have traditionally been very proud of their cuisine, and taking meals together with one's comrades and associates has formed an important part of social relations. At these occasions, contacts were made and a

sense of trust built up. While Chinese cuisine is quite varied, a significant part of it involves pork dishes. Because Muslims are forbidden to eat food prepared in kitchens where pork has been used, or served on dishes which may have contained pork, they have been excluded from an important form of social interaction.

As might be expected, these fundamental differences in belief caused tensions between the two groups. The Chinese language is rich in homonyms, and Chinese who wished to taunt Muslims could amuse themselves with elaborate puns on the word for pig. They might also tie pigtails and snouts to mosque doors or devise other, similar pranks.

Such behaviour was not lightly regarded by the Muslim community, and risked provoking a furious reaction. Sven Hedin, a Swedish explorer who visited China in the late 19th century, came upon the ruins of the once-thriving city of Ningxiafu. Reacting to a chance disparaging remark by the local Han Chinese mandarin, Muslims camped outside the city of 60,000 had massacred all but 2,000 of the inhabitants. Those few who survived did so by going over to the side of their attackers.[10] More fundamental economic and social grievances were the causes of a larger revolt which affected the entire northwest of China in the late 19th century. Cooperation among different ethnic groups of common Muslim faith produced an uprising that took over 12 years and millions of lives before being put down. The population of one province, Gansu, was reduced from 15 million to one million. Meanwhile, the Panthay Muslims of the southwest were in revolt as well. One of their leaders, Du Wenxiu, maintained a separate Muslim state in Yunnan from 1856 through 1873.

Muslim rebellions or the threat thereof allowed the northwest to remain largely autonomous of central government rule in the 1920s and 1930s, with Muslim warlords in three provinces and a Muslim governor briefly in a fourth. A popular saying ran "every ten years a small (Muslim) rebellion; every thirty years a large one".[11]

This pattern of confrontation should not be exaggerated. Particularly in areas where Muslims were relatively few, accommodations were made to local norms. It was possible for a Muslim to be conformist in the outward manifestations of Chineseness such as speech, dress, and the exterior design of his dwelling. Yet when he stepped into the walled courtyard of a mosque he could reaffirm his Muslim heritage. For example, he might remove his footwear, don a white cap, and greet his co-religionists in speech borrowing many words from Arabic and Persian. While outwardly Chinese in style, the inside of his home would contain Arabic calligraphy and ritual bathing facilities. Such acculturated Muslims might attain positions of respect within the local community, and several became nationally prominent. One of the great Ming dynasty explorers was a Muslim, as were two of Chiang

Kai-shek's leading generals.[12] In general, however, the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in China was characterized by distrust and wariness.

The infant Chinese Communist Party, on its celebrated Long March to escape decimation by Chiang Kai-shek's GMD government was nearly wiped out by Muslim cavalry just before reaching its destination at Yanan.[13] The CCP, at that time weak and desperately in need of allies, worked hard to win the favour of the local Muslim population. It downplayed, and frequently even ignored, the anti-religious component of Marxist ideology, made significant concessions to Islamic customs, and even promised Muslims a vaguely defined independence.

Although the party did win over a number of people who would later prove useful as both symbols and administrators, the CCP's pre-1949 efforts to convert Muslims to communism were relatively unsuccessful. Most Muslim areas were either conquered after bitter fighting, or went over to the communist side only when CCP victory was a foregone conclusion.[14] In sum, with a few exceptions, communist ideas and organizations had little impact on Chinese Muslim communities before the CCP came to power in 1949.[15]

TREATMENT OF ISLAM BY THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES

In general, the treatment of Islam in post-1949 China has closely followed the party line at any given time, swinging from being relatively tolerant when moderate pragmatists were in power to being quite repressive when radical ideologues held sway. Although these changes in party line have been dictated by concerns transcending Islam, they reflect an underlying ambivalence within the CCP élite on the proper policy toward religion.

Initially, despite the outspoken atheism of its Marxist ideology, the CCP government approached China's Muslims with caution. Party rule was tenuous in many other parts of the country beside those inhabited by Muslims, and the new government's international position was not yet well established. The party was mindful of the economic and political consequences of a Muslim rebellion when its authority in the country as a whole was still to be consolidated, and wary of the international ramifications of cooperation between Chinese Muslim dissidents and foreign governments hostile to the CCP.

Tactically, a policy of toleration of religion was called for, and such a promise was indeed contained in the Common Programme of 1949.[16] China was declared to be in a transition period in which the form of government would be the People's Democratic Dictatorship - a united front of all patriotic elements in Chinese society led by the

CCP in its role as vanguard of the proletariat. As long as they did not oppose socialism, religious leaders as well as upper class persons and representatives of various other groups were encouraged to participate in the building of a new China.

The Common Programme's promise of religious freedom was repeated verbatim when a formal constitution was ratified in 1954. According to Article 88 thereof

> Every citizen of the People's Republic of China shall have freedom of religious belief.[17]

The new constitution which went into effect in 1975 changed the focus of its predecessor only slightly, by guaranteeing the freedom not to believe as well as the freedom to believe. As enunciated in Article 28

> Citizens...enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism.[18]

This same wording was used in Article 46 of the 1978 constitution.[19]

The consistency of these statements obscures both differences in the party's attutide toward different religions and shifts in the party's attitude toward religion in general. CCP leaders tended to look most benignly on faiths which were decentralized and indigenous to China, and most suspiciously at those which were highly centralized and had their centres of direction outside the country. Thus Daoism, Confucianism, and certain Buddhist sects were felt to have the least potential for serious harm, while Catholicism was regarded as most dangerous. Chinese Muslims did, of course, look on Mecca, far beyond their country's borders, as the centre of their faith, but the degree of political control exercised from the holy city of Islam could in no degree be compared to that emanating from Rome. Moreover, the Middle East was an area in which communism itself had aspirations. These factors combined with the party's genuine fear of provoking a Muslim uprising meant that Islam fared considerably better than Catholicism under CCP rule.

Initially it was announced that religious observances might go on as before, with customs to continue as long as they did not interfere with production. Which practices were actually inimical to production would later be the subject of differing interpretation, but apparently was not a serious issue in the early years of the PRC. A government decree of September 1952 ordered that Muslim customs must be respected by schools, the army, work places and government organs. Ridicule was forbidden. Special cook stoves were to be set up where there were sizeable numbers of Muslims. Subsequently, a joint decree by the ministries of finance and labour and the Nationalities Affairs

Commission allocated funds for this purpose.[20]

Many *mullahs, ahron* (prayer leaders) and others who professed Islam were absorbed into government at all levels. In some cases, those who had been leading administrators under the GMD were permitted to stay on. In others, Muslims who had actively opposed the CCP until actually defeated in battle, at which point they acknowledged the legitimacy of the party, were given positions of some importance. Burhan, a Tatar who was governor of Xinjiang under the GMD and was confirmed in this position after his defection to the CCP in late September 1949, is the outstanding example of the former category. Ma Hongbin, a close relative of the fanatically anti-communist Hui warlords of the Muslim belt is an example of the latter group. After surrendering the majority of Ningxia's troops to the CCP, he was made a deputy governor of that province and a member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Committee set up by the party.

Following the Soviet example, so-called autonomous areas were established in areas where ethnic minorities lived in concentrated groups. Muslim ethnic groups were included in this allocation: the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region was founded in 1955 and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 1958, each equal in status to a province. Other autonomous areas existed at prefectural *(zhou)*, county *(xian)*, and township *(xiang)* levels. The practice of giving political recognition to one's ethnic group rather than to religion would later also become an issue between the party and Muslim groups. Muslim schools, as with schools in general, came under the jurisdiction of the ministry of education, but continued to operate. Muslim "pure and true" restaurants and other trades also continued to function. In accordance with the 1952 decree mentioned above, Muslim factory workers who worked with Han and Muslim children who attended Han schools were given separate stoves to conform to their dietary strictures. Muslims in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were granted special facilities for ritual bathing. All Han who might come in contact with Muslims were warned not to use or even allude to words such as "pig" or "pork", and to respect Muslim customs. Muslims were permitted to slaughter cattle for major festivals without payment of the customary tax, and received special food allocations at these times. Other customs, including circumcision, polygamy and early marriage, were also permitted.

Mass organizations oriented toward religion were founded by the party, allegedly to show its solicitude for Chinese believers. The best-publicized of these was the Chinese Islamic Association, founded in 1953. Among other activities, the Association issued two separate editions of the Koran and several additional works of Islamic theology. It also organized pilgrimages to Mecca. In 1955, the Chinese Institute

of Islamic Theology was established, to train *imams* and Islamic scholars. Moreover, "to foster intellectuals highly learned in Islamic theology, the institute gave special research classes where students from all parts of the country took courses in the Koran, the *Hadith* (the doings and saying of Mohammed), the *Figh* (Islamic law), Chinese Islamic history, world Islamic history and the Arabic language."[21] The Chinese Institute of Religious Studies was also sponsored by the party; scholars were permitted to use its modest 100,000 volume library to study Islam as well as other religions.[22]

Party propaganda tended to stress the benefits of its policies to believers. However, substantial numbers of Muslims were less than pleased by this vaunted special treatment. Numerous uprisings occurred in the 1950s, all of them, insofar as can be ascertained, localized in area and without a coordinating centre. There was the "5-8" (probably 8 May) uprising of 1950, and the "4-2" (2 April) rebellion of 1952.[23] 1953 saw rebellion in Henan province's Taikang county, and in Shandong several persons were arrested for developing counter-revolutionary organizations and collecting weapons. They were also accused of collaborating with GMD elements to bring Chiang Kai-shek back to the mainland.[24] In view of Shandong's location on the east coast of China not far from Taiwan, and of the GMD's claims of support there,[25] the charges are plausible. In 1957 there was again unrest in Taikang.[26]

Muslim grievances with the new government abounded. Food shortages were frequent in the early 1950s, with tight rationing in effect. This made it difficult for Muslims to believe the party's claims to have improved living standards. Indeed, since many Muslims had previously been economically better off than their Han neighbours, the levelling effect of rationing meant that their living standards declined not only absolutely but relatively as well. From the Muslim point of view, the animal slaughter tax should never have existed in the first place, and the government-granted exemption from it during limited festival periods was not regarded as any particular favour. Meanwhile, Chinese cadres (bureaucrats) received preferential treatment in food and clothing allocations.[27] Some mosques had had their property confiscated, and in other places, Muslims who complied in good faith with a registration order were subject to interrogation, torture and prison sentences because of real or fictive ties with the GMD.[28]

Another point of contention was the Korean War, with Muslims resisting on grounds that since this was not a holy war, they did not wish to participate.[29] Clear instances of discrimination against Muslims were alleged, and in fact several had been reported in the official Chinese press. According to the *Gansu Daily* of 1 October 1950, one county in that province which had a high percentage of Hui did not

have a single Hui cadre, and the local government did not even permit Hui to enter the county seat. In a neighbouring county, which had a Hui majority population, the government had decided that they could form no more than one-third of the militia - despite the fact that they were better soldiers. Other Hui had been "arbitrarily" killed.[30]

The Muslim-oriented mass organizations also had disadvantages from the point of view of their constituencies. "Youth Study" clubs which the government ordered mosques to set up to provide political, Islamic and general education to educated Muslim youth of the area proved insufficiently Islamic and overly political for the *mullahs* and were unpopular with the students. Several infiltrators were found to be among the study club members: they were tasked with communist propaganda work, disruption of mosque administration, and with reporting back to the party on the attitudes of religious leaders.[31] And the Chinese Islamic Association seemed more designed to give the government control over China's Muslims than to foster the growth and development of the faith. For example, one may surmise that only those who cooperated with the party were chosen to go abroad on the pilgrimages organized by the Association.

Others of the party's supposedly respectful gestures toward Islam proved quite distasteful in fact. In 1952, *mullahs* in Henan province were invited to a meeting called by the government. When it had closed, they were invited to bathe in a very dirty pool. Those who refused were criticized as "too stubborn to accept new ideas".[32]

The socialist education classes that religious leaders, teachers in Muslim schools and others had to attend contained heavy doses of Marxism and materialism which were offensive to the beliefs of many in their audiences. Muslims were also annoyed by didactic speeches on atheism and similar subjects delivered by Chinese cadres in railway cars or other public places to their captive audiences.[33] Other awkward situations were created, such as elderly *mullahs* being ordered to attend meetings held long distances from their homes where no form of transportation existed and when the weather might be inclement.[34] Failure to attend might mark one as hostile to socialism or even as harbouring counter-revolutionary sentiments.

Economic policies which infringed on both Muslim customs and incomes were also annoyances. The relatively mild degree of collectivization introduced in the early 1950s had unwelcome repercussions for Muslim farmers and shopkeepers. The government's control over their lives and livelihoods was worrisome, as was the increasing presence of Han Chinese and the threat of having to accommodate their lifestyles still more as larger, more advanced forms of collectivization were introduced. The transfer of more than 30,000 Hui from Henan, Shandong, Anhui, Hebei, Beijing and Tianjin to the Muslim

belt area during the winter of 1955-56 to engage in agriculture apparently also occasioned difficulties, although officially they were said to have been welcomed by the provincial governments of their new areas.[35]

In short, party policy during the 1949–1956 period could be regarded as overtly tolerant while covertly there was harassment and a progressive narrowing of Islamic autonomy and its sphere of activities. Muslim leaders were not unaware of the steady diminution of their powers, and some resisted. Those who did so openly were generally removed on grounds that they were "counter-revolutionaries operating under the cloak of religion". Those who cooperated with, or at least acquiesced in, this narrowed scope of activities were deemed progressive and could hope to stay on or even to be promoted into positions vacated by persons who had been declared counter-revolutionaries. In one such step Burhan, the Tatar governor of Xinjiang, was named president of the Chinese Islamic Association in 1955. At the same time, he was removed from the position of governor of Xinjiang he had held since Guomindang days and replaced by Seypidin, a Uyghur and party member. These moves coincided with a change in Xinjiang's status from province to autonomous region, with the new status also being portrayed as an example of the party's largesse. Also, not coincidentally, a formerly powerful person had been eased out of his position of authority to make way for someone regarded as more politically reliable. Burhan, who had so far been politically unobjectionable if not actually reliable, received the largely honorary presidency of the Islamic Association, while the less cooperative incumbent thereof was removed.

DISSENT BASED ON ISLAM

When in 1956 and 1957 the party asked the masses to criticize it, in the so-called Hundred Flowers Campaign, the pent-up grievances of Muslims and others poured forth. The long list of complaints included protests that

All Muslims everywhere are one family (and not separate nationalities).
The religious interest is the nationality interest.
The CCP wishes to abolish both nationality and religion.
Muslims fight for religion and not for country.
The *ahron* and not cadres are the leaders of Muslims.
Religion and the CCP cannot stand together any more than fire and water can mix.
Muslim cadres are anti-religious.
Muslim cadres are traitors to their people.

The policy of nationality autonomy is meaningless.
Muslims should have a separate state without Han.
Muslim stoves are too few and dirty.
One must not kill sparrows (one of the party-designated "four pests"; there had been an eradication campaign directed against them).
Muslim women rolling up their trousers (to work in the fields) is anti-religious.
Participation in cooperatives is forbidden by religion.
As the cooperatives become larger, the Muslim way becomes narrower.
The cooperatives are a good way to abolish religion.
Before, the few were poor and the rich many. Now, the rich are few and the poor are many.[36]

The party appears to have been genuinely shocked by this outpouring of grievances from its Muslim population, as indeed it was shocked by unexpectedly harsh criticisms from other groups in the PRC. Retribution was swift, beginning with the launching of an anti-rightist campaign in mid-1957.

As it concerned Islam, the campaign allegedly aimed at separating progressive from right-wing Muslims - as previous campaigns had actually done. However, the effects of the anti-rightist movement were more far-reaching in their effects, amounting in fact to an attempt to destroy the institutional basis of the faith, and to discredit religious leaders personally as well.

Mass meetings were held to denounce various Muslim counter-revolutionaries, with the accusations including graphic details of the sordid practices religious leaders were said to have indulged in. Some were said to have suppressed culture among their people by forbidding them to sing certain songs, attend theatrical performances (possibly because of unacceptably political or anti-religious themes which were part of the plot) or dance the *Yangge* (a traditional north Chinese Han folk dance). Other *imams* were said to have treated their family members cruelly, raped Muslim women, sodomized young boys, and beaten those who sang party songs. Many *imams* and *ahron* had also emphasized the differences between believers and non-believers, and had indulged in black-marketeering, the illegal slaughter of animals, and other violations of law. Exploitation was found to be widespread, with unreasonable fines and taxes levied for religious or quasi-religious purposes. Those Muslims who resisted their corrupt leaders were allegedly brutally beaten or killed.

As if to signal the end of such unreasonable and inhumane practices, at least one mass meeting was said to have been punctuated by group

singing, with verses such as

> The clouds have disappeared from the sky
> And the sun shines all over the earth
> The feudal system is overthrown
> No more shall we be oppressed by the reactionary *imams*.

or, more explicitly,

> Imam Ma Chengbiao of Zhuankouzhen
> Is charitable in deed but vicious at heart
> He killed his son to get his son's wife
> And sold her after half a year.[37]

Struggle meetings and denunciation sessions generally took place under the supervision of the party's United Front Work Department, which had responsibility for nationalities work, or of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, which was the governmental counterpart of the UFWD. This was in line with the party's attitude that nationality, not religion, was the primary category for classification and differentiation. Where the persons attacked were officers of the Chinese Islamic Association, that organization was used to attack them. In particular, it was employed in denunciations of two of its vice-chairpersons, Ma Songting and Ma Zhenwu. In the case of Ma Zhenwu, a special meeting of 407 delegates representing at least nine provinces was convened to discuss his crimes. After a lengthy recitation of Ma's misdeeds, other Association vice-chairpersons announced that his term of office in the organization had ended. The Muslim vice-chairperson of the preparatory committee for a Hui autonomous region then announced Zhenwu's expulsion from that committee and from his other administrative posts, and even suggested that the government confiscate his money and property.[38]

The sense of high drama created by this emotional revelation of crimes was doubtless the focal point of such meetings. Yet the party also took pains to refute the criticisms the accused rightists had made against it. Judging from the amount of attention devoted to it, the party was particularly concerned to convince people of the absurdity of the statement "All Muslims under heaven are one family" *(tianxia huihui shi yijia)*. Though propaganda tended to present the slogan as evidence of Islamic Association vice-chairperson Ma Songting's counter-revolutionary plots against socialism and the state, it was actually a very common statement among Chinese Muslims. The party-controlled media responded that more than 10 of China's nationalists were believers in Islam. Some had mutually unintelligible languages and most had varying customs. Moreover, there were also 10 different sects of Islam in the country. Obviously, then, it was ridiculous to

speak of Islam as one big family. For similar reasons, it was erroneous to equate nationality interests with religious interests. While some persons might make these mistakes simply because they were not thinking clearly, this could hardly excuse the conduct of such a well-informed and prominent person as Ma Songting. His intent was believed to be the deliberate muddling of distinctions between religion and nationality to "throw a foreign religious cloak over his political greed".

Other allegations were also refuted, with official media arguing, for example, that claims of the incompatibility of religion and communism were self-evidently fallacious; one need only look at the constitution's guarantee of religious freedom.[39]

Despite the barrage of propaganda designed to prove that Muslim complaints were the work of a small number of counter-revolutionary malcontents, the party appeared to make efforts to improve some of the conditions the "malcontents" had complained about, at least in the early stages of the anti-rightist movement. A July 1957 speech to the National People's Congress confirmed the allegation that Muslim cook stoves had not been set up in some places and stated that because Muslim workers were forced to eat cold food, their attitudes toward work and study had been adversely affected. In other places, Muslim kitchens were found to be "cold, cramped and dirty".[40]

The same National People's Congress voted to create the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR), thereby giving a significant proportion of China's Muslims political recognition on an administrative level equal to a province. This decision was implemented in 1958, in the face of significant opposition from Han Chinese. No less a personage than Premier Zhou Enlai explained to Han critics that creation of the NHAR would undercut the slanders of reactionary instigators using religion as a cloak to stir up anti-Han feelings, and would help to reduce the strained relations between Hui and Han.[41] And two other prominent Chinese leaders, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, made separate visits to the Muslim belt during 1958, with the obvious intent of investigating conditions there.

One segment of the account of State Council Vice-chairperson Zhu De's visit is particularly interesting in this regard. Zhu, visiting a cooperative near the capital city of Qinghai

> ...came upon a Hui national. So he asked all present, 'Do you, people of the Hui and Han, cooperate? Are there still problems?' Ma Zhengfu, a Hui, and others who are Han, all replied enthusiastically, 'We now cooperate well. There are no more problems. We are well united in attending to production.' Then, in the midst of the cheers of the crowd, Vice-chairperson Zhu waved

his hat and boarded his car to leave the place.[42]

The newspaper account of Zhu's visit then described a joint Han-Hui forum held by the cooperative after his departure. The same Hui who had told Zhu that there were no more problems between Han and Hui pointed out that Zhu's visit demonstrated the personal concern of the party for them. "In the old society, officials under the bandit (Muslim warlord governor) Ma Bufang had done so much harm that we did not know what to do in our own villages. The new society is truly different." Hui and Han then "expressed their determination to make a good job of unity...today the Hui and Han people are one family. This is a great event for joy."[43]

Zhu then journeyed on to Xinjiang, where he laid wreaths on the tombs of Uygur and Han revolutionary martyrs and was told that the new society, with its freedom of religion and equality of nationalities, was eliminating inter-group tensions there too.[44]

The unity of the nation was a major theme of party propaganda on religion during 1958. A forum held in Henan province at this time was told that

> ...rightists are isolating the minorities by creating dissension under the guise of protecting the interests of minorities and their religion. Such actions not only endanger the solidarity of the nation, but also the peaceful development of the minority nationalities.

As a solution,

> ...the conference decided that the solidarity of the nationalities must be strengthened by giving every minority nationality family a thorough socialist education and by organizing them to learn advanced experiences from the Han so that the great unity of all nationalities will be consolidated around the Han.[45]

The theme of unity based on or consolidated around the Han Chinese took on increasing momentum, and had escalating action consequences as the party geared up for a massive social and economic transformation known as the Great Leap Forward.

With those persons who might be in opposition either purged or cowed into silence by the anti-rightist campaign, radical changes were introduced which had tremendous effects on Muslim lifestyles. Communes were introduced in August of 1958, with Muslims being included with Han in the same communal mess halls - where pork dishes were prepared. Special accommodations for Muslims, such as ritual bathing facilities and pure food restaurants, were also abolished. There was increased encouragement of intermarriage, which Muslims

had previously been the chief opponents of. A letter to the editor of the official organ of the Young Communist League, *Zhongguo qingnian* (Chinese Youth) posed the question "Is intermarriage between Han and Hui young people permissible?" The editor naturally said that it was, explaining that opposition was due to "outdated views". Such persons "must be helped to understand that a happy marriage should rest on common political aims and true love".[46] Progressive Muslims were also said to be demanding that their exemption from the provisions of the marriage law of 1953 be ended; they now wished monogamous marriage and legal sanction of divorce. They had also come to know the dangers of early marriage, and now wished to have the same minimum age qualifications applied to them.[47]

The Chinese Islamic Association was formally abolished in October 1958, at almost the same time as *imams* began "spontaneously" to work in the fields. Women, too, were reportedly eager to throw off the fetters of feudal superstition and were abandoning their restrictive clothing and household chores to join men in the fields. There was a large-scale confiscation of lands owned by the mosques, with the masses again allegedly demanding an end to this feudal exploitative custom.

The economic disasters and social disruptions wrought by the Great Leap Forward are too well known to bear repetition here. Party and government leaders strove to revitalize their badly shaken country, and many of the policies introduced during the Great Leap Forward were either rescinded or passed quietly into oblivion. On 16 December 1961, the official New China News Agency (NCNA) announced that the much-pilloried former vice-chairperson of the Chinese Islamic Association, Ma Songting, had been relieved of the designation rightist in accordance with a joint party Central Committee and government State Council decision of more than two years before.[48] The Chinese Islamic Association also quietly reappeared, with Burhan again its chairperson. A reorganization of the communes allowed smaller mess halls with special separate provisions for Muslims.[49] There is no evidence, however, that confiscated property was returned to the mosques or that those mosques which were closed during the Great Leap Forward were allowed to re-open. Given the acute shortages of food and other commodities which followed the Leap, it is unlikely that many religious leaders would have been allowed to leave full-time production. And the regulations against polygamy were not rescinded, although it is possible that cadres ignored its existence.

The author of a two-volume work on religion was criticized in a major monthly magazine for failing to disentangle religion from feudalism. His statement that persons could not be good Muslims unless they did the "five merits" (five pillars) of the faith, including giving a

portion of their incomes as alms, would cause readers to feel they were not properly observing the principles of their faith. He had failed to show the exploitative nature of the levy, and had even "prettified" it. This was said to be "completely wrong" and "could create a very bad impression on the masses".[50] Despite the reappearance of official statements on freedom of religion, it is obvious that Muslims were not being encouraged to practice the five pillars of the religion, and were clearly being discouraged from contributing any significant portion of their incomes to the faith.

Still, there is no doubt that party and government were far more tolerant of the Islamic faith from 1959 on than they had been in 1957 and 1958. Official media again announced the observance of major Muslim festivals, and at least some mosques were being maintained by the government.

This new tolerance was motivated partly by a desire to avoid rebellion and a deepening of the economic crisis, and partly by foreign policy considerations. The Sino-Soviet dispute, smouldering quietly for years, had become increasingly evident. Anti-Chinese Muslim minorities in Xinjiang province were believed to be colluding with Soviet authorities, and indeed there had been an unpleasant incident in Ili prefecture in 1962. The Chinese authorities attempted to halt a mass exodus of tens of thousands of Muslim minority peoples from the PRC to the Soviet Union, which called forth a demonstration of protest by many of those who had hoped to cross the border into the USSR. Han Chinese soldiers fired on the group, killing and wounding several dozen members thereof. This touched off sympathy demonstrations and rioting in other areas of Xinjiang. Soviet propaganda made much of the incident, and radio broadcasts beamed from stations in Soviet Central Asia to China emphasized how much better Muslim minorities were treated in the Soviet Union than in the PRC.[51] China's tolerance, therefore, was partially the result of its desire to refute these accusations.

Another foreign policy consideration which attended the PRC's decision for tolerance was a desire to win friends among the Islamic countries of the Middle East and Africa. The Chinese Islamic Association sponsored groups from these countries on tours to China and groups of Chinese Muslims made return visits abroad. Visiting dignitaries from Muslim countries were met on their arrival in the PRC by delegations which included members of the Chinese Islamic Association, and the Association generally hosted a banquet for them as well. Those few mosques still open were made available for the visitors to worship in.

This decision for greater leniency toward the practice of the Islamic faith, together with other decisions which were pragmatic in nature,

was associated with a particular group in the Chinese élite which assumed leadership when the Great Leap Forward's deficiencies became evident. Their policies were not pleasing to those who held more radical views. As time went on and living standards began to improve again, there was a recrudescence of many practices which radicals felt were attributable to these pragmatic policies and which became increasingly unpalatable to them.

In 1966, Chinese students were organized into so-called Red Guard groups and told by Mao to "bombard the headquarters" (of established conservative authority) and "destroy the four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs and habits). Wall newspapers, often crudely printed or hand-lettered in large characters, expressed the Guards' attitudes and frequently echoed the views of radical leaders. One which was seen in Beijing during the autumn of 1966 dealt with religion, demanding that the authorities

1. Close all mosques.
2. Abolish religious associations.
3. Abolish the study of the Koran.
4. Abolish marriage within the faith.
5. Prohibit circumcision.[52]

A second poster outlined a ten-point programme for the eradication of Islam, including

1. Immediate abolition of all Islamic associations in China.
2. Muslim priests must work in labour camps.
3. Muslim burial practices must be replaced by cremation.
4. Abolition of observance of all Muslim festivals and holidays.[53]

Some mosques were apparently vandalized by Red Guard groups early in the Cultural Revolution, but this seems to have been a result of youthful overreaction rather than an action encouraged by the small group within the Chinese Politburo which was responsible for the Cultural Revolution. Unintended vandalism aside, the mood of those who guided the Cultural Revolution was definitely anti-religious. The Chinese Islamic Association again disappeared, and the official NCNA excoriated "Soviet revisionist renegades" for "zealously fostering the forces of the Church and encouraging religious and supersitious activities in the country".[54]

Muslim resistance apparently was encountered, though there is no first-hand evidence to confirm it. The PLA's 21st army was moved from Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu into the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and the two leading Muslims in the NHAR party apparatus, first secretary Yang Qingren and his leading deputy, Ma Yuhuai, were both purged. They were accused, among other crimes, of having toler-

ated counterrevolutionary Muslims such as Ma Zhenwu, who had been one of the principal targets of the anti-rightist campaign of 1957-58.[55]

In neighbouring Gansu province, first party secretary Wang Feng was charged, *inter alia*, with consorting with "reactionary religious leaders of the nationalities and spreading the theory that religion is eternal".[56] Pre-Cultural Revolution policy was castigated as a "policy of surrender to the enemy, because it did not exterminate religious and feudal leaders".[57]

In Xinjiang, unrest was reported frequently during the Cultural Revolution, though it is unclear how much of this resistance was based on religion. A former resident of the province, interviewed in Hong Kong in 1972, felt that the minorities there did not like the Chinese government largely because it forbade the practice of their religion. He reported savage fighting - though he had not personally witnessed it - between Muslim minorities and the PLA in 1967. The uprising ended after the PLA captured and shot its leader.

Despite the generally hostile climate of the Cultural Revolution, some manifestations of Islam continued to survive. In February 1969 NCNA confirmed the continued existence of Hui middle schools by noting that the students of one in Shanghai had organized more than 100 Mao-thought study groups.[58] However, the report gave no details on the status of religious instruction in the schools, or on whether special dietary provisions were being observed. Bairam and Corban festivals were also observed in 1968 and 1969, with NCNA noting that Muslims from Asian and African countries, including ambassadors and diplomatic officials, attended Corban services at Beijing's Dongsi Mosque and sent greetings to fellow Muslims in China.[59] These officials may have been the main reason that the mosque continued to function. One index of the importance the PRC attached to good relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East may be seen in the PRC's recall of all its ambassadors save one during the Cultural Revolution. That individual was posted to Cairo, and was one of the few diplomatic representatives Peking had in the area at that time. During 1970, the Chinese Islamic Association reappeared.[60] Though Burhan, its previous director, had been purged, the new head was also a Muslim.

Attitudes toward religion moderated further with the fall of radical leader Lin Biao and China's decision to seek new international allies. However, there was a violent protest from Yunnan Muslims in 1975 against a government call to give up the observance of Friday as a religious holiday.[61] And a *People's Daily* article of approximately the same time warned against "counter-revolutionaries operating under the cloak of religion" in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,[62] indicating that a similar policy may have been tried there.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF ISLAM

Official attitudes toward Islam became still more tolerant after the death of Mao and subsequent overthrow of the chief remaining radical leaders, the so-called Gang of Four, in later 1976. For the moment, at least, dissent based on Islam seems to have abated.

Two major factors seem to have influenced the new leadership's decision for toleration. First, they perceived the country's economy to be on the brink of ruin as a result of their predecessors' misguided policies. Liberalization of attitudes toward those who had been discriminated against by the previous regime because of their religion, class background, or political views would, the leadership hoped, encourage the former outcasts to work harder - to "arouse their socialist enthusiasm". This would in turn encourage the growth of the economy.

Second, a combination of oil diplomacy and a resurgence of militant Islamic sentiments gave the Middle East increased weight in the world balance of power. The Chinese leadership's conviction that the PRC's arch-enemy, the Soviet Union, had designs on the Middle East made it imperative that China seek to counter growing Soviet influence there. Clearly, a country which treated its Muslim population well could more easily win friends in the Middle East than one which did not.

Numerous policy changes followed from this change in attitude. Leaders who had been purged because of their religious beliefs, or because of alleged capitulation to believers, reappeared. Burhan, then 84, attended the opening session of the Fifth National People's Congress,[63] his first public appearance since the Cultural Revolution. "Representatives of Religious circles" constituted an entire category of delegates to the Congress, as reported by NCNA.[64] Hui leader and former NHAR First Party Secretary Yang Qingren re-emerged as head of the Nationalities Affairs Commission;[65] his former deputy, Ma Yuhuai, was elected a secretary of the NHAR party committee.[66] Ma Songting, originally removed from his position in the China Islamic Association during the antirightist campaign of 1957-58, regained his status.[67]

In September of 1979, those Hui of Yunnan province who had been implicated in the July 1975 uprising there were rehabilitated. It was explained that the Gang of Four's policies had "abominably insulted" the Hui, who had developed "profound resentment", leading to the 1975 unrest.[68] Muslims in Lhasa were also rehabilitated, and given government aid to build schools, run restaurants, and facilitate normal religious activities.[69]

Institutions concerned with religion in general and Islam in par-

ticular were revived as well. In April 1980, the China Islamic Association held its first meeting in 17 years, electing, among others, the venerable Burhan honorary chairperson and Ma Songting a vice-chairperson.[70] Local Islamic Associations resumed their activities as well, including those in the major cities of Tianjin, Shanghai, and Beijing.

Among the associations' activities were denouncing the discredited Lin Biao-Gang of Four leadership and protesting Soviet actions in Afghanistan in accordance with the party line. More importantly, the national association organized groups of Chinese Muslims to visit other countries with powerful Muslim communities. During the closing months of 1979 and in early 1980, delegations toured Pakistan, Iran, Bahrein, Oman, Kuwait, and the Yemen Arab Republic.[71] Typical schedules included visiting holy places, saying prayers with local Muslims, and attending Islamic conferences. The delegations served to create goodwill for the PRC, and to show foreign countries that China treated its Muslims well. Clearly, then, they functioned as adjuncts to Chinese foreign policy.

Another institutional change relevant to Islam was the restoration of the name "Hui People's District" in Huhhot, the capital of Inner Mongolia. The name, originally approved in 1951, had been changed to "Red Flag District" during the Cultural Revolution, to the chagrin of its 17,000 Muslim residents.[72]

The existence of mosques and their activities began to be publicized by official media. A foreign visitor to Beijing in May 1978 was told that the Dongsi mosque was open only on Fridays - with her itinerary having been arranged so that she was not in the capital on that day.[73] Just a few months later, however, groups of tourists were being guided through its premises, and holiday services, which included foreign guests, received television coverage.[74] Qinghai provinces's renowned Dongguan mosque was reopened,[75] and the Niujie mosque in Beijing received government help in carrying out needed repairs.[76]

A group of journalists who visited several cities in Xinjiang in October 1978 was told that the capital, Urumqi, alone had 22 mosques, and that in Turfan, to the south, each production brigade had its own mosque. They personally witnessed a *muezzin* calling the faithful to daily prayers. The journalists were told that "some" *ahron* were paid by the state, but that believers contributed to the upkeep of the mosques.[77] The government apparently maintains some others, partly as evidence of the PRC's tolerant attitude toward religion.

As further evidence of the government's increasingly benign view of Islam, the 20th anniversary of the founding of the NHAR in October 1978 was celebrated with great fanfare. A large delegation of high-ranking party and government officials attended the festivities, which received sustained attention by the media. As a spinoff of the celebrations, numerous articles appeared in the press intending to show the

party's great solicitude for Chinese Muslims, their customs, and the economic progress they had achieved since 1949.

China Reconstructs, for example, published an interview with an *imam* in the NHAR. While attending study courses sponsored by the party, he had realised there could be a basis for the coexistence of Islam and communism in their common love of country and desire to take the socialist road. Although admitting that his mosque had suffered some damage while the Gang of Four was in power, he "felt that this was not according to policy". Local government leaders too were being treated badly and "the people who wanted to destroy the mosque would not listen to them".[78]

According to official media, the items of clothing associated by different Muslim minorities with the practice of religion are supplied to them. Factories in Shanghai and Beijing as well as those in areas more heavily populated by Muslims produce traditional Uygur skullcaps and the white caps, black scarves and leggings favoured by Hui.[79] Houses in Ningxia are reportedly designed to accommodate the special washing facilities traditionally required by Muslims.[80] In Beijing, an *imam* of the Dongsi mosque pledged that one of his first acts after being elected to the municipal people's congress would be to press for more ritual bathing facilities for the city's 160,000 Muslims.[81]

In other concessions made by the government to religion, Muslims are allowed to marry at 18, whereas the minimum marriage age for Han Chinese is 25 for women and 28 for men.[82] Muslims, as well as all Chinese minority ethnic groups, are also exempt from birth control measures designed to limit families to two children. Traditional burial practices are retained. Although the government encourages cremation since it is "more economical, hygenic, and saves valuable land", Muslims are buried according to tradition, in white shrouds and in graveyards. Circumcision is still widely practised.[83] Arabic signs in Muslim homes and traditional motifs in art, music, and dance continue to survive,[84] though the latter are tailored to suit current propaganda themes.

Muslims are allowed time off from work at two festivals a year, and are granted extra food coupons at these times. Ramadan fasting is observed mostly by the elderly, and by those whose jobs do not entail heavy labour. Workplaces where there are a number of Muslim employees will generally provide them with separate dining facilities; where there are only a few Muslims or it is otherwise not feasible to establish separate facilities, a cost of living allowance may be offered to cover the expense involved in providing their own food.[85] Communes and other enterprises, including the model Tajing oil field, may have separate production teams for Muslims "because it is most convenient that way".[86] Muslim butchers and Muslim "pure and true"

restaurants do a thriving business. Perhaps most importantly, most Muslims do not eat pork, referring to it as "majority meat" to avoid using even the name.

An early 1970s push to get Uygurs and Kazakhs to write their languages in the roman-letter *pinyin* alphabet used by most of the rest of China seems to have lost momentum; visitors have noted that many residents continue to use Arabic script. The government is sponsoring research which will lead to the publication of a history of Chinese Islam, and the April 1980 meeting of the Chinese Islamic Association listed among its future tasks the publication of the Koran and other Islamic classics,[87] and resumption of publication of the periodical *Muslims in China*. It announced its intention to supervise the revival of the Chinese Institute of Islamic Theology.[88]

While Muslims indisputably enjoy a greater amount of religious freedom now than in the recent past, one must not conclude either that the government's special provisions for religion are motivated by altruism, or that it espouses true freedom of religion in the western humanist sense of that term. For example, the government's subsidies to *imams* and mosques give it some degree of leverage over them. Similarly, the production of religious items by state-run factories may be seen as one means of strengthening the Muslim community's dependence on the PRC government.

Moreover, the government's definition of freedom of religion is bound to differ from that of true believers. The director of China's Institute for Religious Studies has said explicitly that "religion cannot be separated from politics". Its deputy director asserted that "God arises from fear", adding that the Chinese no longer need religion, but that it is valued for its historical and educational role.[89] These attitudes are certain to be reflected in the curriculum of the religious schools and in the research work the government has proudly announced it will resume sponsorship of. Friction between the government and believers on these matters is inevitable, and indeed the official media have railed against those who seek to misuse the government's policy of freedom of religion to bring back feudal superstitious practices. It has emphasized that the observance of religion must not be allowed to interfere with productive labour, and that "counter-revolutionaries operating under the cloak of religion" will not be tolerated. In late 1979, a province with a large Muslim population decreed that those who wished to practice religion

> . . . must not violate state laws, decrees and fundamental discipline; they must not interfere with administrative matters, education and public interests; they must not obstruct collective production and social order; they must not do anything harmful to

> national unification and unity among the nationalities; they must not restore religious priviliges or the system of oppression and exploitation which has already been abolished . . . they must not use collective funds to carry out religious activities.[90]

Given these restrictions on religious practice and the discrepancy between officially sanctioned Islam and orthodox Islam, it is entirely likely that some sort of unofficial Islam exists. Hard evidence is lacking. However, a foreigner who spent several years studying at Chinese universities recounts a story which is relevant.

Visiting the capital of Shaanxi with fellow students in 1975, the year in which government policies caused Muslim uprisings in at least two other provinces, he asked his guides to take him to see the mosque. One of them, a local resident, said he thought it had been converted into office space. The students, incredulous, decided to investigate. With the aid of a guidebook, they located a Muslim neighbourhood, but were bewildered by the maze of alleys running between innumerable mud-plastered walls. A local Muslim, mistaking the group for fellow believers, led them to an unprepossessing door in one of the walls. Stepping through, they found themselves in a large, impressive mosque dating from the early 8th century. In one courtyard, repair work, done by the members with their own time and money, was in progress. In another, over a hundred men ranging from 12 to 80 in age, knelt on prayer mats. The elders, however, perhaps feared official sanctions if too many outsiders learned of their presence. When the young men returned two years later, a "no visitors allowed" sign had been hung outside the door.[91]

In 1978, official attitudes changed again. Believing that China's Four Modernizations programme would be aided by an attitude of toleration toward religion as well as by the increased foreign exchange reserves generated by tourists, the government opened the mosque to both worshippers and tour groups. Guides' speeches praise the government's benificence in repairing and preserving the mosque. However, this author noted during a summer 1982 visit that many of the interior paintings of the mosque were badly in need of attention, and that large quantities of furniture were stacked rather haphazardly on top of each other along the sides of the prayer area. It should also be mentioned that the government's assumption of responsibility for maintenance of the mosque re-introduces some degree of official control over the faith.

Clearly the faith has been maintained through a long period of repression. How widespread the unofficial practice of Islam is, and what specific forms it takes, are unknown.

ISLAM AND NATIONAL CULTURAL IDENTITY

Unlike Catholicism in Poland or the Orthodox church in Russia, the Muslim faith in China is in a minority position with regard to numbers of believers, and cannot serve to bolster a Chinese national identity. In that the centre of the Muslim faith is located in Mecca, far beyond China's borders, Islam might even be considered inimical to the strengthening of a Chinese national identity. Though Islam's 12 million adherents certainly constitute a sizeable group, it is dwarfed in comparison to the billion-person total population of the PRC. Therefore it is unlikely that any future evolution of Chinese national culture will include any significant Islamic component.

To bring Islam as closely as possible in line with a unified Han Chinese national identity and with the country's economic development model, the PRC had attempted to isolate hard-core Muslim dissidents from their followings and to strengthen the hands of those of Muslim origin who are amenable to reform measures. In the process of co-option of the amenable, the independent institutional basis of the faith was destroyed. Party policy has also encouraged attachment to one's ethnic group rather than one's religious faith as a basis of identification. In that these separate ethnic groups are smaller than the community of believers in Islam as a whole, the emphasis on ethnic rather than religious identification would further reduce the possibility of unified Muslim resistance to PRC policies.

Despite the restricted environment in which Chinese Islam now functions, the government of Deng Xiaoping is more tolerant toward Islam than any in two decades. The more liberal policies of this post-Mao leadership have, however, engendered a good deal of resentment from many quarters. Several areas have reported with obvious distaste the re-emergence of "feudal superstitious practices" associated with religion and, despite massive government efforts to discredit Lin Biao and the Gang of Four's repression of religion, there must be many Chinese who believe that Lin and the Gang were right to do so.

Thus, it is highly unlikely that a change in régime would result in greater freedom of religion. The odds are that any new government would be less, rather than more, tolerant. Any sharp changes away from tolerance of Islam would be tempered by China's need to maintain friendly relations with the Middle East. A Muslim rebellion could also play into the hands of the Soviet Union, as had happened in Xinjiang in 1962. Still, as the PRC's behaviour during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution shows, pragmatic policies may under certain circumstances be abandoned in favour of more ideologically pure policies.

The changes that the communist government has made in the ambience of Chinese Islam are substantial. Yet, more than 30 years after the founding of the PRC, it is evident that even the urban Muslims of the northeast, who are surrounded by Han and greatly outnumbered by them, continue to regard themselves as separate. This remained true even during the periods when mosques were officially closed and without an organized, independent priesthood to guide the faithful. Where the concentration of Muslims is greater, Muslim communities are still more cohesive.

One important component of the perception of apartness is, of course, tradition. Another is dietary. The present government's support of separate dining arrangements for Muslims serves to reinforce this component. Intermarriage, though more frequent than in the pre-communist period, is still quite unusual. A Han resident of Xinjiang, interviewed in Hong Kong in 1965, had not heard of any intermarriages, adding that he felt it was "unnecessary", since male and female residents of his area were approximately equal in numbers. Where intermarriage does take place, the couple must decide to "follow Islam" or "follow Han". A visitor to northeast China in the spring of 1978 was told by her (Han) guides that most Han parents do not care which the couple does, while most Hui parents do.[92] The implication is that in most intermarriages the couple will follow Islam. Intermarriage is not perceived as diluting the common Islamic blood pool. As explained by a Taiwan Muslim:

> It's like a big, broad river flowing from its source. Small side streams enter, but they are nothing. Their water just merges, and the big river keeps flowing along.[93]

In conclusion, Islam in China seems to be healthy despite losing its independent institutional base. Though perhaps not as decentralized as some Muslims claim, Islam is not as dependent on hierarchy and organization as many other faiths. The loss of structures which permitted free interaction of Muslim leaders to discuss topics chosen by themselves and to convene at times and in places of their own choosing was undoubtedly a blow. But it has not been a fatal one.

Chinese official sources stress that it is mostly the elderly who still believe in Islam. While confirming the basic truth of this, foreign visitors to mosques in 1975[94] and 1978[95] also observed worshippers ranging from 12 years through middle age. Moreover, it is not unlikely that, as often happens in the West, those who do not now attend services will feel drawn to do so in their later years.

Nor can lapses in observance of dietary laws be taken as evidence of a weakening of Islamic consciousness. Han Chinese occasionally allude to the existence of "false Muslims" who may eat pork and

drink wine when out of sight of fellow Muslims, but do not do so when with them. Just as many Jews who no longer keep kosher continue to regard themselves as Jewish, the Chinese Muslim who does not adhere strictly to dietary laws may yet hold fast to his or her Muslim identity.

The present government's relative tolerance of Islam facilitates the practice of the faith. Yet even if a new radical leadership were to come to power, and in the unlikely event that good relations between China and the Muslim states of the Third World were no longer valued, Islam might well survive. The example of Christianity's survival in Japan despite several centuries of complete isolation from outside contact, and with its believers risking slow death by torture if the authorities discovered their faith,[96] is a case in point. It is unlikely that any Chinese régime would resort to such extreme measures. However, it is conceivable that Chinese Islam, due to its newly expanded contacts with the outside world, will develop an attraction for militant Islamic nationalism, or that it will try to establish links with fellow Muslims which are not sanctioned by the Chinese government. This is likely to pose real problems for the PRC leadership. Despite its desire to maintain good relations with Middle Eastern countries and to present an image of toleration to the world in general, the leadership is likely to restrict the practice of Islam in China in an effort to reduce outside influence on its Muslim population.

It is difficult to tell how effective the government's policy of giving priority to recognition of ethnic over religious identification has been in eroding the sense of Islam as a community. It is possible that, contrary to the hopes of the party, increased ethnic identification may ultimately reinforce Islamic loyalties. Given the examples of the USSR and Yugoslavia, it is conceivable that ethnic identifications will be strengthened over the course of time, and that the common Muslim faith of various minorities, newly trained in technical and administrative techniques, will facilitate their banding together to rid their areas of the Han presence. At this point Islam would assume an integrative role, reinforcing their common interest in opposing the Han. Thus the government's encouragement of ethnic over religious ties will not necessarily diminish the importance of the latter.

As for the faith itself, if present trends are any indication, it appears that it will be the folk aspects of Islam which survive - a shared sense of separateness based on the mutual observance of certain rituals and possession of a common culture different from that of the Han Chinese - rather than on religious faith in the orthodox sense of that term.

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Ethnicity and the Uses of History: The Case of the Volga Tatars and *Jadidism*

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During the past twenty-five years, through literature, art, song, language, and historiography, the Volga Tatars have articulated a developing ethnic consciousness. They have done so in reaction to Stalin-era tribulations and an official nationalities policy that, despite its initial Leninist promise, has manipulated and eventually destroyed many Tatar traditions for the sake of a new "Soviet" culture. Their reaction has been possible, of course, owing largely to the partial de-Stalinization of Soviet society that Nikita Khrushchev inaugurated in the mid-1950s. For the moment, Tatar ethnicity has involved neither public nor *samizdat* demands for change in all-Union social, economic, or political policies. Rather, its advocates have used the phraseology and dicta of the Marxist-Leninist canon to forge and justify a reappraisal of Tatar cultural achievement, to question the Russian contribution to it, and to suggest that the achievement would have been greater were it not for Russian meddling. Furthermore, implicit in the emphasis on *miras* (the search for roots, or respect for heritage) that has dominated Tatar thinking is both a critique of contemporary Soviet life as lacking a "human face" and the suggestion that ideological concern for humanity is not limited to Marxism but can be found in the best of each people's traditions.

I have discussed elsewhere this subject and some of the ways in which Tatar historians have struggled patiently over the past several decades to promote a renaissance of their ethnic culture in the face of continued official resistance.[1] In this article I will analyse recent changes in the study of 19th century Tatar intellectual history – above all, *jadidism* – so as to further reveal what some Tatar historians are attempting and underscore the ways in which history and ethnicity are intimately connected. The subject is especially appropriate for several reasons:

1. It is crucial not only to modern Tatar history but also to the histories of virtually all of the other Turco-Muslim peoples of the USSR;

2. It has been the object of continual official attention for five decades;
3. It is politically dangerous on two counts: first, the most radical current thinking about *jadidism* hearkens to the more sympathetic pre-Stalinist and non-Marxist Soviet interpretation, and secondly, it recalls the unifying principles of pan-Turkism/pan-Islamism that suffused both the *jadidist* phenomenon and one of its offshoots, the national communism of Mir-Said Sultan Galiev.

In 1901, as a supplement to that year's fortieth number of his newspaper *Terciiman/Perevodchik*, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, the Crimean Tatar social activist, published a modest essay entitled "Mebadi-yi temeddün-i Islamiyan-i Rus" (*First Steps Toward Civilizing The Russian Muslims*).[2] In it he asserted that a Russian Islamic "revival" was under way whose proponents (clerics as well as secularly trained men and women) were appealing to reason and the test of utility to call into question obscurant assumptions and outmoded socio-economic habits. Their goal was social and institutional reform leading to the creation of a "modern" society better able to contend with the technical, economic, intellectual, and political challenges of the West in a world defined in social-Darwinian terms. Applying the adjective *jadid* (new) to the revival's numerous manifestations, Gasprinskii commended it as "the beginning of progress and civilization". Contemporaries, whether in praise or disparagement, endorsed the use of *jadid* in various forms for both the phenomenon as a whole and its adherents in particular.

Over the decades since 1923, when the first extended treatment of *jadidism* as part of modern Tatar intellectual history was published in the USSR,[3] Soviet historians have had to tread cautiously while attempting to define the movement and to interpret its historical role. This has been particularly true of Tatar historians who have developed out of sad experience an acute sensitivity to charges of ethnic chauvinism, insufficient awareness of the class nature of social phenomena and the role of the labouring masses in history, and idealization of the past. The relative liberality of the 1920s did permit both non-Marxist as well as Marxist studies treating *jadidism* to appear, with the former, furthermore, evincing little of the dogmatism and hostility that commonly permeate writings from the Stalin years.[4] But the general politicization of society that accompanied the triumph of Stalinism and that was well under way by 1930-31 produced debilitating consequences for Soviet historiography. By stripping the historical profession of its little remaining autonomy, the state was able to control the choice of research topics and

methodologies, restrict access to printed as well as archival sources, and, most important, dictate the results of analysis.

For those hoping to pursue independent study of *jadidism* and related topics, opportunities vanished rapidly. To be sure, a few – such as A. Arsharuni, Kh. Gabidullin, and K. Kasymov – managed to squeeze out several more works at the beginning of the 1930s before having to cede the field to the likes of the notorious L. Klimovich.[5] The latter's book, *Islam v Rossii*, represents one of the most flagrant examples of history-as-politics to have received the Stalinist imprimatur. Reflecting decisions made in party meetings and not state archives, its analytical portions were scurrilously antagonistic toward *jadidism* and all but a very few persons and developments in Tatar history. Yet out of such pseudo-scholarly contributions to disinformation came a set of dogmas to which all who would work in the area were expected to adhere. These dogmas, in force with little change until after Stalin's death and serving to anathemize *jadidism*, may be summarized as follows.

First, toward the latter part of the 19th century, Tatar society was dominated by a disreputable alliance of reactionary clergy and bourgeois liberals: the former, shackled by traditional teachings and methods and possessed of an anti-rationalist bias; the latter (or *jadidists*) imbued with reformist ideals typical of the European liberal bourgeoisie. Both were attracted to pan-ideologies out of a desire to mask the socio-economic causes of misery in Tatar society and deflect the natural class antagonism of the masses. Both, therefore, merit little analysis. Secondly, a small number of men and women drawn from among the *raznochintsy*, identified variously as revolutionary-democrats, "enlighteners" (*prosvetiteli*), or left-*jadidists*, managed to separate themselves from their reactionary environment to lay the foundation for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism among the Tatars. Contribution to that triumph justifies intensive study of their activities and ensures their place in the small pantheon of cultural heroes. Finally, the most important factor in understanding 19th century Tatar intellectual history was the "Russian connection"; that is, the personal and institutional conduits by which progressive Tatars acquired the education, ideas, and values that they would need to participate in the unfolding Russian revolutionary process.

In the early 1940s, as if to confound the outside observer, V. M. Gorokhov published a book which treated *jadidism* in a surprisingly unorthodox manner: as a progressive phenomenon encompassing the activities of *all* reformist types in Tatar society.[6] We must view this book, however, as one of the many aberrations reflecting the period's temporary shift in Stalinist demands on historiography for the sake of stimulating patriotism during the great international conflict of

the decade. Once the Second World War ended, we quickly find authors reverting to the dogmas established in the 1930s, disagreeing with one another only over the question of whom to call the heroes and the villains among Tatar intellectuals. Thus, for G. M. Khalitov and E. I. Chernyshov, *jadidism* was little more than a general term for a heterogeneous reform movement with right and left, or bourgeois-liberal and revolutionary-democratic, wings.[7] For Kh. G. Mukhametov and M. Gainullin, *jadidism* was to be applied only to the bourgeois-liberal tendency, while *prosvetitel'stvo* (enlightenment) would designate the truly democratic, popular tendency.[8] However these historians manipulated their terminology, the results were the same: arbitrary separation of basically indistinguishable reformers into reactionaries and progressives. In view of later efforts by colleagues to reject such irrelevant conclusions, their formulation must have been unconvincing even at the time. The strained logic, questionable use of information, and selective quotation that characterized these final products of Stalinist historiography only emphasized the depth of political intrusion into scholarship.

We all realize the liberating effect upon Soviet society of Stalin's death in 1953, an effect enhanced by Khrushchev's subsequent attacks on the excesses of the "personality cult". Soviet historiography, as many have long noted, derived much benefit from the relaxation of political controls that opened the door to new research and experimentation with new interpretations of old subjects. When in October 1956 the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Mukhitdinov, called upon historians to take a fresh look at *jadidism* and not be fearful of rendering it a more positive assessment, the response was apparently immediate and, if still cautious, clearly inclined toward rejecting some of the harsher Stalinist indictments.[9] However, like the one hundred flowers blooming in China at nearly the same time, the enthusiasm of some outran that of the authorities, prompting the latter to use a series of articles in *Istoria SSSR* from 1963-1965 to proclaim guidelines for continued research.

The official standard-bearer was M. G. Vakhabov, Director of the Institute of History of the Uzbek Republic, who warned that some recent attempts to study *jadidism* anew had produced erroneous interpretations.[10] Failure to observe a "strict Party approach" had led certain researchers to conclude mistakenly that:

1. The rehabilitation of many victimized during the Stalin era for their association with *jadidism* somehow justified their earlier nationalist errors;
2. The *jadidists*, like the bourgeois nationalist parties in non-Western countries, had been a progressive force leading the struggle for national liberation from colonial exploitation.

Specialists, insisted Vakhabov, ought to remember that *jadidism* was essentially a reactionary, anti-popular movement that emerged fully in the years 1905-1907 as an expression of national bourgeois ideology. What was called jadidism *before* the early twentieth century, however, was often something quite different: a democratic, popular, reformist tendency with close ties to the Russian revolutionary-democratic movement. To avoid confusion, so-called early or left *jadidists* ought to be identified as *prosvetiteli. Jadidism* and *prosvetitel'stvo*, then, represent parallel developments divided along class lines and performing diametrically opposite historical roles.

Vakhabov's lead article was followed in subsequent issues of *Istoria SSSR* by three others which reiterated his main themes uncritically. Whether it was S. G. Batyev's study of Tatar *jadidism*, a multi-authored analysis of national liberation movements in various ethnic regions of the tsarist empire, or I. S. Braginskii's discussion of Central Asian *jadidism*, virtually nothing of substance was added to the discussion.[11] When the series ended, the message from party to researcher was plainly stated by Braginskii: despite the justifiable rehabilitation of *some jadidists* as a result of closer and fairer examination of their careers, "there are no grounds for rehabilitating the *jadidist* ideology itself".[12]

Among Tatar historians, the response to this official reaffirmation of a hard line against *jadidism* has not been unanimous. On the one hand, in the writings of those who tend to research topics that look ahead to the triumph of the October Revolution and seek to find a place in the unfolding of that event for some Tatar contribution, we discover a general acceptance of the principles enunciated by Vakhabov and company. Books and articles by M. Gainullin, Kh. Kh. Khasanov, Ia. I. Khanbikov, I. Tagirov, K. Faseev, and R. Nafigov, among many others, invariably strike no discordant notes.[13] To be sure, these publications are often valuable in other respects, particularly in their use of primary sources inaccessible to the non-Soviet historian; but in the matter of *jadidism*, they are notably unimaginative.

On the other hand, some of the best and younger historians have increasingly pursued subjects residing deeper in Tatar history than the final decade or two of the Russian *ancien regime*. A number of such scholars have devoted their attention to intensive investigation of Tatar intellectual/cultural problems of the late 18th through to the mid-19th centuries, including the roots and early evolution of what has come to be called the Tatar Enlightenment.[14] While these works seldom treat *jadidism* directly, their authors have constructed a complex of arguments about the emergence of a Tatar

bourgeois nation and the *embourgeoisement* of Tatar society, the history of Tatar book printing, and the role of Islam throughout Tatar history that lends formidable support to a revised interpretation of *jadidism.* In a volume as solidly defended as it is audacious, Ia. G. Abdullin, who holds a director's position within the Kazan branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, offered the fullest formulation to date of the revisionist position.[15]

To do justice to his monograph, so rich with challenges to hoary truths, would require an article much longer than the one presented here. For our purposes, however, we can extract and paraphrase several key arguments that contribute to establishing his basic view of *jadidism* and *prosvetitel'stvo.* First, intellectual developments within 19th century Tatar society must be set against the background of that society's evolution during the whole of its Islamic phase, with consideration given to *all* of its national peculiarities. In fact, Islam (including sufism) as a religion and culture must be examined with an open mind so as to appreciate its positive as well as negative contributions. Second, the role of Russian influence has been exaggerated to the exclusion of other even more important influences on the development of Tatar culture. What must be studied alongside the "Russian connection" are what Abdullin calls the "oral creative work of the Tatar people" and their progressive national traditions, the wealth of ideas that penetrated Tatar life from other Islamic lands, and centuries of influence from Western Europe, both ancient and modern. Third, the 19th century was a period of extraordinary complexity in Tatar intellectual life that makes easy distinctions between progressive and reactionary, democratic and feudal especially difficult. The theme of a Tatar Enlightenment, if pursued objectively, can reveal much about an important period of Tatar history. Finally, the emergence of progressive Tatar thought in the 19th century went hand-in-hand with the development of the Tatar nation and the emergence of a national bourgeoisie. Therefore, what was bourgeois was progressive, with *jadidists* as well as *prosvetiteli* working in common to defend national interests against the real enemy: the tsarist bureaucracy, with its police and russifying policies. Under conditions of national-colonial oppression, one ought not to be surprised that the *prosvetiteli* encouraged the *embourgeoisement* of society as a solution to the satisfaction of material and spiritual needs. If they criticized capitalism it was on ethical, not socio-economic grounds. In the end, then, for Abdullin both *prosvetiteli* and *jadidists* contributed significantly and positively to all aspects of social advancement. In fact, although he does not assert outright that the two were essentially one and the same, his line of argument surely warrants

just such a conclusion on our part. A list of the beliefs, ideals, and interests he attributes to the *prosvetiteli* and discusses at great length are, to bolster my point, precisely applicable to the typical *jadidist*:[16]

1. Commitment to rationalism;
2. Defence of science and philosophy as independent of religion;
3. Belief in science as a necessary precondition of progress;
4. Pantheistic, even deistic, form of religious belief, if not outright atheism;
5. Opposition to superstition and prejudice
6. Commitment to humanism, individuality, free will, the honour and dignity of the individual, and the right to earthly happiness;
7. Optimism and a faith in human capability;
8. Preeminence of political freedom over material sustenance;
9. Criticism of social injustice and inequality;
10. Advocacy of expanded educational opportunities, secularization of schools, reform of all aspects of pedagogy;
11. Dedication to Tatar national culture, language, and history that if not chauvinistic is patriotic;
12. Support for emancipation of women;
13. Advocacy of *sblizhenie* (rapprochement) with the Russian people.

In Abdullin's book Soviet historiography has been brought nearly full circle with regard to *jadidism*. He has rejected the legacy of basic Stalinist assumptions that continues to plague most writing on the subject, and has thereby expressed views that compare favourably with those in studies from the 1920s.[17] He has declared *jadidism*, as well as other previously ignored or misinterpreted historical subjects, to be a legitimate part of the Tatar past that deserves forthright, balanced treatment and critical analysis. He has certainly adopted a more consistent and honest Marxist perspective than have most of his colleagues or the CPSU. For his effort, however, he has received no public attention outside of the Tatar ASSR and very little inside that addresses his monograph directly. For the moment the expected official response has simply not materialized. Only lame efforts to reiterate the consensus of the mid-1960s inform some of the recent works that deal with *jadidism*, although even here one can discern evidence of some movement in the direction that Abdullin has charted.[18] From the regime's perspective, the issue may not be worth tackling at the moment given its entanglement in the broader phenomenon of Tatar ethnicity. By comparison with other Soviet minorities, the Tatars have caused few headaches. If ethnic demands can be limited to cultural issues, then the provocations of an Abdullin may under current conditions be of little consequence.

NOTES

1. Edward J. Lazzerini, "*Tatarovedenie* and the 'New Historiography' in the Soviet Union: Revising the Interpretation of the Tatar-Russian Relationship", *Slavic Review*, Vol. XL, No. 4 (December 1981) pp. 625-635.
2. For an English translation with accompanying introduction and critical notes, see Edward J. Lazzerini, "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View From Within", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (April-June, 1975), pp. 245-277.
3. Dzh. Validov, *Ocherki istorii obrazovannosti i literatury tatar do revoliutsii 1917 g.* (Moscow, 1923).
4. In addition to Validov's study, the list of publications appearing during the decade includes: A. Gubaidullin, *Iz istorii torgovogo klassa privolzhskikh tatar* (Baku, 1926); *Idem.*, "K voprosu ob ideologii Gasprinskogo", *Izvestiia vostochnogo fakul'teta Azerbaidzhanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta im. V. I. Lenina*, IV (1929), pp. 179-208; A. Saadi, *Tatar edebiyati tarihi* (Kazan, 1926); I. Ramiev, *Vakitli tatar matbuati* (Kazan, 1926); A. Rahim and G. Gaziz, *Tatar edebiyati tarihi* (3 volumes; Kazan, 1922-1925); and G. Ibragimov, *Tatary v revoliutsii 1905 goda* (Kazan, 1926).
5. A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii* (Moscow, 1931); K. Kasymov, *Ocherki po religioznomu i antireligioznomu dvizheniiu sredi tatar do i posle revoliutsii* (Kazan, 1932); and L. Klimovich, *Islam v Rossii* (Moscow, 1936).
6. V. M. Gorokhov, *Reaktsionnaia shkol'naia politika tsarizma v otnoshenii tatar Povolzh'ia* (Kazan, 1941).
7. G. M. Khalitov, "Dooktiabr'skaia tvorcheskaia evoliutsiia Madzhita Gafuri", Kand. diss., Kazan, 1947; and E. I. Chernyshov, "Tatary v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka", in *Istoriia Tatarskoi ASSR* (Kazan, 1950), p. 511.
8. Kh. G. Mukhametov, "Prosvetitel'skie idei v tatarskoi literature poslednei chetverti XIX veka", Avtoref. kand. diss., Kazan, 1953; and M. Gainullin, *Kaium Nasyrov i prosvetitel'skoe dvizhenie sredi tatar* (Kazan, 1955).
9. "Jadidism — a Current Soviet Assessment", *Central Asian Review*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1964), p. 30.
10. M. G. Vakhabov, "O sotsial'noi prirode sredneaziatskogo dzhadidizma i ego evoliutsii v period velikoi oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii", *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 2 (1963), pp. 35-56.
11. S. G. Batyev, "Tatarskii dzhadidizm i ego evoliutsiia", *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 4 (1964), pp. 53-63; "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'nye dvizheniia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veke", *Istoria SSSR*, No. 2 (1964), pp. 56-77 and No. 3 (1964), pp. 45-66; and I. S. Braginskii, "O prirode sredneaziatskogo dzhadidizma v svete literaturnoi deiatel'nosti dzhadidov", *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 6 (1965), pp. 26-38.
12. I. S. Braginskii, "O prirode", p. 38.
13. M. Gainullin, *Tatarskaia literatura i publitsistika nachala XX veka* (Kazan, 1966); Kh. Kh. Khasanov, *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. v Tatarii* (Moscow, 1965); Ia. I. Khanbikov, *Iz istorii pedagogicheskoi mysli tatarskogo naroda* (Kazan, 1967); K. Faseev, *Na putiakh proletarskogo internatsionalizma* (Kazan, 1971); R. I. Nafigov, *Formirovanie i razvitie peredovoi tatarskoi obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli* (Kazan, 1964); and I. R. Tagirov, *Revoliutsionnaia bor'ba i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Povolzh'e i na Urale* (Kazan, 1977).
14. See Edward J. Lazzerini, "*Tatarovedenie* and the 'New Historiography",

passim.

15. Ia. G. Abdullin, *Tatarskaia prosvetitel'skaia mysl'. (Sotsial'naia priroda i osnovnye problemy)* (Kazan, 1976).
16. To compare the list of attributes with the life and thought of the man most associated with *jadidism*, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, see Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1973, especially Part Two.
17. Abdullin is generous to these writers, citing their works and excusing their inadequaces and mistakes. In contrast, he fails even to include in his bibliography any of the articles by Vakhabov, Batyev, and others that formed the mid-1960s consensus.
18. See Kh. Kh. Khasanov, *Formirovanie tatarskoi burzhuaznoi natsii* (Kazan, 1977), pp. 145 ff.; and Ia. I. Khanbikov, "Pedagogika dzhadidizma", *Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogicheskogo Instituta*, Vol. 193 (1979), pp. 52-71.

Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghanistan Perspective

AUDREY C. SHALINSKY

The forced migration of Uzbek- and Tajik-speaking peoples from their "homeland" in Soviet Central Asia[1] during the 19th and 20th centuries intensified hostility to Russia. Their subsequent experience in Afghanistan also led to hostility toward the Pashtuns, an ethnic group perceived as politically and economically dominant there. Recent political developments in Afghanistan, particularly the 1979 Soviet invasion, are likely to occasion further hostility from the Uzbeks and Tajiks. The form such hostility is likely to take can, however, be understood only if the nature of the complex network of responses to past repression is first established.

This paper will explore the historical background of the Uzbek-Tajik experience to demonstrate a long and continuing tradition of resistance toward dominant groups in both ideological, specifically religious, and ethnic terms. The analysis proceeds from a consideration of the historical response to the Russo/Soviets in Central Asia to the recent native interpretation of that response and modern attitudes toward the Soviet Union. The Uzbek-Tajik response to the Pashtuns is similarly approached for the light it sheds on the sharply focused response that is evident currently. Data for the interpretation developed here, including ethnohistoric and sociological materials, were collected during 1976-77 in Kunduz, a provincial capital in northern Afghanistan.

The population under study was primarily of Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan origin. Most were settled in the Afghan towns of Imam Sahib, Khanabad, Kunduz, Baghlan, and Kabul, the Afghan capital. As Slobin (1976:12) has noted, these emigrants are known as *muhajerin*, a term sometimes translated as "refugees". My informants generally agreed that it was technically correct to call some Turkmen, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Arabs, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, *muhajerin*, since all these groups included some who had come into Afghanistan in the past 35-100 years. However, the consensus was that except for a

particular Uzbek-Tajik sub-group, other groups should be called by their appropriate ethnic names. This analysis, while restricted to the Uzbek-Tajik sub-group, is nevertheless likely to be relevant to other immigrant populations.

HISTORICAL RESPONSE TO THE RUSSO/SOVIETS

The autonomous Central Asian state of Kokand surrendered to the Russians in 1876. That khanate, which included the Fergana Valley, was abolished and renamed Russian Turkestan. Russian Turkestan was constituted a governate-general and placed under military administration. Beginning in 1885, the local population expressed hostility for their conquerors through sporadic uprisings. Usually led by religious leaders, the revolts were couched in the idiom of "holy war" against the "infidels" (Carrere d'Encause, 1967:163).

The American traveller Schuyler's visit to a sufi meeting in Samarkand indicates the millenarian and messianic role these religious orders played in native uprisings against the Russians. At that time sufis were forbidden to give public sermons.

> When I was about to go the chief addressed me a petition saying that this establishment of dervishes had been founded long ago for pious uses; that it was devoted to the reception of the poor, the sick and the blind, and of persons who had no other refuge and that the only means they had to support it was by taking contributions from the faithful throughout the city. They begged me therefore to represent to the authorities the religious and charitable objects they had in view and to request that they might be allowed as before to recite their prayers and to preach their sermons in public . . . I told the prefect afterwards of the request . . . which he was not at all astonished to hear; but he said, that however they might deny it, instances of their treasonable language were only too well proved because officers, frequently in passing by unobserved, had heard parts of their sermons which usually consist of the narration of some old legend where the people were enslaved by the infidel on account of their irreligious life and practices; and end with an appeal to repentances saying that thus the infidel may be driven away . . . (Schuyler, 1877, 1:258).

While the prefect complains about the use of religious ideology for political purposes, thus separating the two, the content of the sermon he reports indicates that for the sufis and their followers, there is no such division. Religious activism is political activism.

The connection between religion and nationalism remained firmly

established as the report of Kukhovsky, governor-general of Russian Turkestan after the 1898 Andijan revolt, shows:

> I am forced to the conclusion that this area is far from peaceful; that the embers of religious and national hatred for their conquerors, skillfully concealed by gratitude for the material benefits brought into the area, were ready at the first opportunity to burst into flames . . . Our widespread lack of interest in Islam which is a very stable and certainly hostile force should be considered harmful to Russian interests . . . (in Wheeler, 1964:89).

Islam is thus explicitly linked with politics – "national hatred" – in the hostility toward the Russians and their policies.

Although Russian Turkestan, the homeland of the population under study, had few Russian settlers, it was still liable to economic exploitation as a colonial territory. A monocrop economy in cotton was set up. The area under cotton cultivation grew from 13,200 hectares in 1886 to 597,200 hectares in 1914 (Rywkin, 1963:29), with disastrous results for other types of agricultural production. Russian Turkestan then had to import grain from other parts of Russia. In 1916 the Tsarist government decided to draft Muslims into labour units to aid the World War I effort. However, a revolt flared in Kazakhstan and spread quickly to the area around Samarkand and to the Fergana Valley, the heaviest cotton-growing area. Evidently, the uprisings were seriously disrupting the economy, and following a conference held by Kuropatkin, governor-general of Russian Turkestan, natives who were taking part in the revolt were expelled and their lands opened to immediate Russian settlement. Although the number of refugees who came to Afghanistan will never be known, substantial migration had begun.

Similarly patterned local guerilla uprisings in Central Asia continued after the downfall of the Tsarist government and during the period of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. The Russians called the native participants Basmachis, which meant bandits or brigands. This word, supposedly from the Turkic verb *basmak*, to raid, was said to be used in the area (Rywkin, 1963:51).[2] However, the Basmachis were more than a bandit organization; they were, in modern terms, a movement of national liberation. The struggle took on even broader significance with the use of a pan-Turkic and sometimes pan-Islamic idiom.

In East Bukhara where the former Emir and his Basmachis supporters gathered, the situation was dramatically heightened by the arrival of Enver Pasha (still remembered in northern Afghanistan as Anwar Pasha, the Central Asian form of his name). Enver had

been the leading figure in the Young Turk triumvirate in Turkey. Condemned to death by the government of Kemal Ataturk, he escaped to Germany, and in 1920 went to Moscow hoping the Bolsheviks would prove allies in a personal campaign against British imperialism. The Bolsheviks hoped to use Enver's prestige in the Islamic world to win over Central Asian Muslims. A closer acquaintance with the Bolsheviks, including the Soviet treaty with Ataturk in March 1921, made Enver switch allegiance to the Basmachis. Early in August, with a group of 25 men, he came upon a Russian force of 300. After hand-to-hand combat, he was killed by a machine gun bullet fired by a Russian from a rock above the gorge. It is reported that 15–20,000 people gathered at his funeral (Caroe, 1967:125). Enver's alliance with the Basmachis indicates that a local uprising had begun to take on wider political importance. However, the pan-Turkic alliance died with Enver.

By 1922, Soviet authorities understood that military measures were most effective when connected to political and economic concessions. In the Fergana Valley, Soviet forces prevented contact between town and countryside. Food was imported into the towns, but the Basmachis and the peasants suffered famine. The Basmachis were forced to extort food from the peasantry, thereby, losing one of their strongest weapons, the support of the local population. Many of the local Basmachi leaders together with small groups of followers fled across the Afghan border. From Afghanistan they periodically continued to raid Soviet territory. Stories about these groups, including the legendary Ibrahim bek who had been captured in 1931, were still told in the late 1970s.

During the period of the Basmachi movements,[3] Bolshevik authorities sought to introduce a number of major economic and social programmes which would have fundamentally altered traditional Central Asian society. Because of the chaotic situation that prevailed until the late 1920s, collectivization of agriculture, educational and legal reform, and anti-religious agitation were postponed. The period 1928–38 marked the resurgence of these activities.[4]

A two-stage process of sovietization of Central Asia emerges from the preceding discussion. Stage one, from 1917–28, is basically a continuation of Russian colonial rule and native reaction to it. Although there was economic chaos because of guerilla warfare, Muslim society as a whole had not yet been disrupted. Stage two, the period of rapid change, complete collectivization, secularization of education and the courts, the increasing pressure against Islam, and finally, the liquidation of all remaining pre-revolutionary Turkestani intellectuals, began in the late 1920s and ended with World War II.

Corresponding to this two-stage sovietization process, people

who fled across the Soviet borders may be divided into two groups. In the earlier period, Basmachi sympathizers, dispossessed peasants, and victims of famine formed the majority of those seeking refuge in Afghanistan and Chinese Turkestan. Some of these people returned to the Soviet Union when the war-related disruption was over. Although Soviet sources do not acknowledge the existence of groups that stayed behind in Afghanistan, some obviously did stay.[5] They generally founded new villages or joined old ones, becoming agriculturists as they had been before. They retained tribal names by which they identified themselves, generally *not* using the term *muhajerin.*

After 1928, those who crossed the Afghan border were usually of urban origin. They moved to the Afghan towns near the border, but they say they did not seek to become landowners in Afghanistan. One informant expressed the failure to acquire land as the result of conscious decisionmaking. "We did not want to buy land; why take the risk." The implication that the land might have to be abandoned again points to continuing remembrance of forced removal from the "homeland". It is also post-1928 arrivals in Afghanistan who generally use the term *muhajerin* in referring to themselves.

While the collectivization campaign in Central Asia may have played some role in convincing these people to leave, their own perception is that they left for the sake of maintaining their religious traditions. One old man said, "As a boy one day the police stopped me on the way to the mosque, and took me to the station. Finally, I couldn't stand the life there anymore." In fact, the Soviet war against Islam began in the late 1920s (Bennigsen, 1967:165), reinforcing the increasing role religious-based ideology played in decisions to leave Soviet Central Asia. The story of Turcologist G. Jarring's informant Ahmad Jan is relevant here. Ahmad Jan was from the village of Qilich near Kasan in the Fergana Valley. In 1934 at age 20 he ran away from his village, spent some time in Afghanistan, and then made his way to Kashmir where Jarring met him. Though a peasant himself, his father was a *mullah* who, according to Jarring, five years earlier "had left his native country owing to the persecution of the Mohammedan clergy by the anti-religious leagues" (1937b:5). Thus, the anti-religious policy of the Soviets increased the number of emigrants.

In examining social forces that work toward success or failure of particular social movements, the indigenous response in Central Asia offers a complex yet illuminating example of partial success and ultimate failure. Eisenstadt, in dealing with social reform movements in regard to Islamic groups throughout the world, notes that they are most often successful when operating as political minorities working

against a colonial oppressor (Eisenstadt, 1967:446). There is no question that the focus on a particular oppressor group gave the Basmachi movement much of its strength. Chokaev, the leader of the short-lived Kokand autonomous government in Russian Turkestan states, "For the Soviet Power appeared at first in Turkestan as a Power whose 'colonial' severity was exceptional, and in fact, unprecedented in history . . . In this . . . (is) the only and undisputed cause of the birth of the Basmachi movement among the Muslims" (1928:275). In addition, this analysis has shown that the response to Russian policies in the Tsarist and Soviet periods was expressed in religious as well as nationalistic terms.

In the late 1970s, there were many who remembered the life in the Central Asian "homeland". Their experiences were known to all ethnic groups across northern Afghanistan, and resistance to the Russian presence in Central Asia was widely celebrated in sayings and tales.

The response to the Russians by each Central Asian ethnic group involved some variation on the pattern of local revolt and escape across national or geographical boundaries. The response should be viewed as an adaptive pattern carefully attuned to the changing economic, social, and ideological circumstances of individuals and groups. Social change emanating from Russo/Soviet policy and practice was perceived as a threat to traditional lifestyles. Response to this threat developed from traditional population movements and traditional raiding/guerilla tactics.

MODERN RESPONSES TO THE SOVIET UNION

When asked about their history, informants gave two different types of responses. Younger Afghan-born men would speak of the Basmachis as heroes, citing a few old men in the community who had actually been with the Basmachis and even Enver Pasha. Conversely, older informants sometime referred to the Basmachis as bad Muslims who did not repent of their behaviour and rely on God's will. There may well be two different ethno-historic interpretations of the collective past, split, at least partially, along generational lines. (For discussion of the transformation of the *muhajerin* religious identity to a political and ethnic identity, see Shalinsky 1979a).

Clearly, at least a portion of the Uzbek-Tajik immigrant group had engaged in some kind of anti-Russian or anti-Soviet activity before coming to Afghanistan. Direct participation in armed conflict was not the only response perceived as anti-Russian. Particularly in the 1930s, continued religious observance, mosque attendance and prayer were also perceived as political acts. In fact, these immigrants

believe their fellow ethnics who remained in the Soviet Union even today continue to make this type of response to Soviet authority.

Many older informants were reluctant to talk about their own pasts. Perhaps increased fear of strangers and governments arose during the years of World War II when there was a final attempt to regain the lost homeland. Allegedly financed by the Germans, a network of couriers was set up from Andkhoi to Badakhshan through which people passed information and were prepared to reinvade the Soviet Union. The plan was that with the aid of a huge potential fifth column of relatives, friends, and fellow ethnics, the homeland could be retaken. The Germans promised arms, which were not delivered. The *muhajerin* were deeply involved in the planning and operation of this movement. High level leaders of this underground were imprisoned by the Afghan government after the war, because, they believe, of pressure from the Soviet Union. No source contains any mention of these events apart from a cryptic statement by Caroe, "There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941" (1967:101).

Families in Afghanistan had very little contact with relatives in the Soviet Union until the early 1970s. Since that time, letters have been exchanged and visits also have taken place. The few honored visitors who have come from the Soviet Union to see relatives in Afghanistan have been elderly though they were accompanied by younger middle-aged kin. They were lavishly entertained by the community and received numerous gifts including prayer cloths and Saudi Arabian wall hangings, a prestigious item. Some Afghan-born men, including one man selected as a scholarship student to an engineering institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, had the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union. The visits by these young men were deprecated by elders in the community who pronounced the return to the Soviet Union a sin.

The young men brought back records, tapes, and books in the Uzbek language. They spoke of the material progress in Uzbekistan mentioning hospitals, schools, and universities, but the major topics of conversation dealt with the similarities and differences of Uzbek customs north and south of the Amu. It seems that the visits by young men to the Soviet Union fostered Uzbek nationalism rather than Soviet politicization. Still, the elders were not convinced that the visits were good for the individuals or the community. The mother of the engineering student asked for help in attempting to dissuade her other son, who wanted to visit his brother and gain materials for his radio repair shop.

Later this man obtained permission to visit his brother in Tashkent,

and one day the Tashkent brother returned to his room to find him murdered. No one in the emigrant community believed he was killed by a thief. The feeling was that, for some reason, the Russians murdered him. This inexplicable incident deepened the fear and hatred felt towards the Soviet government. Approximately nine months after this event, the Soviet-backed Khalq revolution took place.

In spite of the immigrant generation's reluctance to speak of the past and their view that returning to the Soviet Union is a sin, their attachment to their *watan*, or homeland, remained strong. When asked about *qawm*, or ethnic identity, *muhajer* individuals of the immigrant generation identified with relatively small groups such as Namanganis, Kokandis, Andijanis, after towns of origin in the Soviet Union. These town labels were attached to the personal name as an identifying feature. Members of the first Afghan-born generation did not differ from their parents in their use of Central Asian towns as personal names. Never did anyone indicate that he was to be called after an Afghan town. Occasionally, a young person, usually under 20 years of age, would vehemently insist that Afghanistan was the *watan*. But their parents would correct them and say that the *watan* was *Shurawi*, the Soviet Union. Sometimes, the reference made was to Tajikistan which is used to mean all Soviet Central Asia (Slobin, 1976:9). The most common response given when identity questions were asked the *muhajerin* was the simple explanation "from the other side" which refers to the other side of the Amu river.

The above examples indicate that attachment to the "homeland" in the Soviet Union remained strong as did feelings for fellow ethnics and relatives who remained behind. However, it was wrong to return, because the Soviets themselves were still usurpers and the Soviet government was hated and feared for its actions past and present.

HISTORIC REACTION TO THE PASHRUNS

The *muhajerin*, and perhaps, the pan-northern, attitude to the Pashtuns is based on two different factors; the movement of the Pashtuns to the north part of Afghanistan and their local-dwelling descendants, and the perceived Pashtun dominance of Afghanistan's national culture. These two factors are fused by informants who lump all Pashtuns into one category at the ideological level.

In the second half of the 19th century, Amir Dost Mohammed firmly established Kabul's control of the area to the north of the Hindu Kush Mountains. Simultaneous with the influx of *muhajerin* in the 1920s, the province of Kataghan, including the modern provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan and Takhor, entered a period of great

economic development based on cotton production. In 1925, a young Pashtun, Abdul Aziz, discovered that the Soviet Union needed cotton. Realizing that Kataghan had a similar climate to the cotton lands in Soviet Central Asia, he bought land in the Kunduz area which he cleared, drained and planted with cotton. The conversion of swampland to one of the most agriculturally productive areas in Afghanistan was aided by Nadir Shah who took the Afghan throne in 1929 and discovered an empty treasury. He induced many Pashtun landlords to buy land in the Kunduz area at about a dollar an acre (N. Dupree, 1966:101-2). The governor of Kataghan, Shir Khan Nashir, even decided to move his capital from Khanabad to Kunduz.

The growth of the new Kunduz attracted many of the *muhajerin* from Khanabad. They bought shops in the new bazaar and were able to get prime locations. The central circle in the bazaar mentioned by Jarring (1937a), contains the *chapan*[5] -selling shops, and all but three of these 25-plus shops[6] are still owned by a *muhajer*. At first, many lived on bandar-i Khanabad, the section of town along the route to Khanabad. While at that location, three from the town of Kasan in the Fergana Valley decided to form their own *mahalla* or neighbourhood.

The initial local conflict with the Pashtuns arose from the desire to buy land. Surveying the grassland surrounding new Kunduz, the Kasanis decided on a particular portion near a canal owned by a kinsman of Shir Khan. Reluctant to sell his pasture, this man dismissed the Kasanis with the offer to sell at one thousand afghanis a *jerib* (a *jerib* = approximately half an acre). According to informants, the price asked was about five times the going rate, but to the man's surprise, the Kasanis eventually agreed to the first price and bought 14 *jeribs* for their *mahalla*. The official land deed is still held by the Kasani founders of the neighbourhood.

This action might seem to contradict the previously cited opinion that *muhajerin* generally did not seek to own land. However, the financial difficulty arising from this small purchase may simply supply the event that led to later rationalization in ideological terms. Furthermore, informants cited land disputes between Pashtuns and Uzbek villagers which included pitched battles.

MODERN REACTION TO THE PASHTUNS

Among the younger male segment of the *muhajer* community, the response to the perceived Pashtun dominance has been the development of Uzbek nationalistic feeling. *Muhajer* informants who used the Uzbek label when asked their *qawm* were Afghan-born men frequently with a high school education. The broader experience in

interaction with outsiders led to a heightened political consciousness in many cases. It was these men who formed study groups and literary groups for Uzbek language work. They purchased records and tapes of classical Central Asian music, originally obtained in the Soviet Union. Probably only these men had significant knowledge of the Khalq-Parcham parties before the 1978 revolution.

One of the men who identified himself as an Uzbek told me that during the period he attended Kabul University, 1967-71, he and other Northerners would never openly state that they were Uzbeks.[7] However, in 1971-77 he did so. As a high school teacher, he made the point of speaking to his Uzbek and Turkmen students informally in the Uzbek language after class when these students came for help. He said that the Pashtun students did not like this practice, but he felt he could make an open point about linguistic discrimination.

Once in the used clothing bazaar, this man was asked his ethnic group by a Pashtun shopkeeper. The shopkeeper was confused because the man was dressed in western-style clothes, with a foreign woman, and yet was speaking fluent Pashto. Responding to the shopkeeper's question, he replied simply, "I am an Uzbek." In this situation, the identity response, Uzbek, indicates pride in minority status in a direct confrontation.

The native Afghan versus immigrant distinction[8] has significant political implications which are readily commented on by informants. Discrimination in property disputes and other difficulties in dealing with government bureaucrats were laid at the door of Pashtun indifference and/or hostility to non-natives. However, this response comes from native Tajiks and Uzbeks as well as immigrant Uzbeks and Tajiks. The native/non-native distinction has been fused with the Pashtun/non-Pashtun distinction by most politically aware men. The fusion of the two distinctions is strengthened by the fact that to the overwhelming majority of all ethnic groups in Afghanistan including Pashtuns, Afghan means Pashtun. As one *muhajer* succinctly put it, the very name of this country Afghanistan (land of the Afghans), is an insult to us.

Since their arrival in Kataghan, the Pashtuns have dominated local government. By the 1960s, there was general opposition to continued Pashtun political dominance. Certain men of the immigrant community became political leaders of the anti-Pashtun coalition of various local Uzbek and Tajik groups. The most prominent was the *mawlawi* of one of the two *muhajer* mosques in Kunduz. This man gained political influence by serving as advisor to local non-immigrant Uzbek groups in land settlement disputes. Eventually, he was the elected representative to the national assembly during the constitutional period. Leaders of the Uzbek, Tajik and *muhajer* communities

requested that he run. His major opponent was a young Pashtun. Trucks were hired and sent to bring village Uzbeks and Tajiks to vote. The voters were housed in the immigrant community mosques and households.

Thus, in the 1960s, the political fortunes of the immigrants in Afghanistan appeared to be improving. Informants proudly recalled the visit of the former king to Kunduz as further evidence the situation was changing. While in town, the king visited the larger of the two immigrant mosques and commented positively on the surrounding neighbourhood. Several informants felt that this visit was a symbol that Pashtuns would no longer be so favoured in the political arena. However, the régime of Daud[10] did not fulfill their hopes.

Informants also cited the short-lived radio Kabul programs of Uzbek and Turkmen music which began in 1972. Both local Uzbek and Transoxanian Uzbek-style music were played (Slobin, 1976:104). This programming was taken as a sign particularly by the educated intelligentsia that Northerners were to be a recognized part of the Afghan nation-state. This programming ended in 1974 and thus was seen as another unfulfilled promise.

From the time of their arrival in Afghanistan to the present, the *muhajer* community have not been integrated into the Afghan nation. In their view, the Pashtuns at the local and national levels have kept them in a subordinate position. They have reacted by stressing their own ethnic background particularly their experiences in resisting the Russian advance (Shalinsky, 1979a and b). However, indications that at least part of the *muhajer* community has been developing links with other local non-Pashtun ethnic groups lead to the supposition that a regional-based ethnicity is developing.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to analyse the ideology that is likely to govern the reaction of Uzbek-Tajik-speaking immigrants to the new Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. The pivotal issue for the *muhajerin* is their conviction that the abandoned land in Soviet Central Asia has remained the homeland. The emigrants entered Afghanistan with a profound resentment of the Soviet government, especially its anti-Islamic policies. Additionally, even the Afghan-born generation has denied allegiance to that country because of the perceived Pashtun dominance. Thus, the past experiences in the Soviet Union and the more recent experiences in Afghanistan have led to the development of an ideology with its roots in Islam and ethnic consciousness. It is from this perspective that the *muhajerin* in Afghanistan view their current situation and make it likely that

resistance to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be conducted independent of, rather than in collaboration with, Pashtun resistance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Field research was conducted in 1976–77 with funds from a Foreign Language Area Studies fellowship (formerly called National Defense Foreign Language fellowship) administered by Harvard University. Most data presented in this paper was originally presented in the doctoral dissertation, *Central Asian Emigrés in Afghanistan: Social Dynamics of Identity Creation* which was approved for the Ph.D. degree by the Harvard University Department of Anthropology in June 1979. For additional information on related subjects, see Shalinsky 1979a and 1979b.

Dr. Nazif Shahrani of the Department of Anthropology, UCLA, and Dr. Robert Canfield of the Department of Anthropology at Washington University–St. Louis offered helpful editorial comments on the original version of this paper. Dr. Anne Slater of the University of Wyoming Department of Anthropology provided extensive assistance on the revisions of the paper. The contributions of these individuals were greatly appreciated; of course any shortcomings remain the author's.

NOTES

1. Soviet Central Asia is a fairly arid region lying between the Caspian Sea and the Chinese frontier: to the north is Siberia, to the south, Iran and Afghanistan. The region has long been characterized by ethnic diversity. Through linguistic criteria, the population may be classified into two language families, groups speaking Turkic languages and those speaking Iranian languages. The major Turkic speaking groups are Turkman, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz, whose traditional lifestyle involved some kind of pastoralism; and Uzbeks, primarily an agricultural and urban group. Persian-speaking groups included Tajiks, villagers and town dwellers like the Uzbeks, and Arabs, a pastoralist group.
2. As Shahrani (1979:39) points out, the term "basmachi" and its associated meaning, bandit, was the name given to the rebels by the Russians. The native peoples refer to this uprising as *Beklar din Qozghaleshi*, the Beks' Revolt.
3. Results of the sustained warfare were devastating. The population of the Fergana Valley city of Kokand which was 120,000 before the Revolution was only 69,300 in 1926 (Pipes 1964:176).
4. For a similar formulation of the historical and ethnohistorical data presented here, see Shalinsky 1979b.
5. Lorimer, who relied on Soviet accounts for his study of Soviet demography, states that the population who fled across the border from 1914–26 either perished or returned to Soviet territory (1946:40). This is inaccurate.
6. *Chapans* are silk or cotton striped cloaks worn by men of all ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan.
7. Two of these exceptions were actually *muhajerin* also – two brothers and the son-in-law of one of the brothers. The brothers settled in a Badakhshani village after leaving Soviet Central Asia. They lost contact with the *muhajerin* community and were thus considered village Tajiks by the community.

8. Shahrani (1981:personal communication) has indicated that for many Northerners, open avowal of non-Pashtun identity began some years before the time stated by this informant.
9. For an earlier formulation of these concepts, see Shalinsky 1979a where a complete analysis of *muhajerin* identity labelling is given.
10. *Mawlawi* refers to a religious official and teacher who has completed the highest level of Muslim religious education.
11. In July 1973, Mohammad Daud Khan, first cousin and brother-in-law of King Mohammad Zahir, declared Afghanistan a republic. His Central Committee in turn named him founder, president and prime minister of Afghanistan. Daud was then overthrown in the Revolution of April 1978.

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Brève information sur les réfugiés kirghiz

RÉMY DOR

Fuyant le régime communiste et les menaces soviétiques, la plus grande partie des Kirghiz du Pamir afghan est allée dès le mois d'août 1978 chercher refuge au Pakistan sous la conduite de son chef providentiel et charismatique, Rahman Kul. Je ne reviens pas sur les causes et les conséquences de cet exil dont j'ai déjà parlé dans deux articles publiés dans *Afghanistan Journal*: "Nouvel exil pour les Kirghiz?" *AJ* VI (1), 1979, pp. 24-27, et "Nouvelles des réfugiés" *AJ* VIII (1), 1981, pp. 24-29.

Il me semble toutefois utile de porter à la connaissance du public une information nouvelle intéressant cette petite ethnie turcophone.

J'avais eu l'occasion en 1972 et 1973 d'aborder avec Rahman Kul le problème du rôle de la Turquie en ce qui concerne les minorités türk d'Asie Centrale. Depuis l'épopée d'Enver Paşa, mais surtout depuis l'émergence de la Turquie comme un état moderne après la révolution kémaliste, elle apparaissait à certains leaders traditionnels comme un recours possible, en tout cas comme la seule puissance susceptible d'intervenir pour les aider à préserver leur culture (ce dernier type d'argument ayant également cours chez les Tatars de Finlande, ainsi que j'ai pu le constater).

Rahman Kul a toujours professé une grande admiration pour la Turquie. Il était de plus au courant de la réussite de la réinsertion des émigrés kazak du Xinjiang, qui ont fondé en Turquie un artisanat et un commerce du cuir florissants. Il avait eu aussi, à ce qu'il m'a raconté, l'occasion, lors du pélerinage à La Mekke, d'entrer en contact avec des Uygur réfugiés à Istanbul et qui en étaient fort heureux. Bref, c'est donc tout naturellement qu'il s'est tourné vers les autorités turques à son arrivée au Pakistan pour leur demander d'accorder l'asile politique aux Kirghiz.

Malheureusement pour lui, une campagne d'informations tendancieuses, orchestrée par l'URSS, visait à le faire passer pour un chaud partisan du colonel Türkeş. C'est ainsi que le correspondant des

Izvestija à Kaboul écrivait dans l'article *Krovavye tropy udel'nogo xana* (15 Septembre 1978):

> (. . .) Rahman Kul a l'intention de passer du Pakistan en Turquie. Dans ce pays, pour attirer l'attention sur sa personne, il se fait activement passer pour un défenseur de la "renaissance" d'un soi-disant Grand Turan (. . .), idée que propagent les nationalistes turcs avec à leur tête le leader fascisant Alparslan Türkeş.

Or, n'oublions pas qu'à l'époque la Turquie vacille sur le bord du gouffre de la guerre civile. Le terrorisme fait chaque jour des victimes, et les bandes armées du colonel Türkeş sont sans conteste à l'origine de nombreux attentats sanglants qui vaudront à leur chef une réputation sinistre. Que, dans ces conditions, les autorités turques aient jugé urgent d'attendre avant que d'apporter une réponse à la demande de Rahman Kul, présenté comme un activiste d'extrême-droite, cela ne surprendra personne. Ajoutons-y que la brusque évolution de la situation intérieure turque a fait provisoirement perdre au sujet toute actualité.

Le retour au calme, consécutif à l'instauration du régime militaire en Turquie, est à l'origine de la réactivation du projet d'accueil des réfugiés turcophones et de son réexamen par les actuelles autorités d'Ankara. Au mois de mars 1982, en effet, le porte-parole du ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Nazmi Akïman déclarait (*Milliyet* 24 mars 1982):

> Un groupe d'environ quatre mille cinq cents, personnes parmi les familles afghanes d'origine turque qui se sont réfugiées en République du Pakistan en raison des événements survenus en Afghanistan sera transféré et installé en Turquie. A ce sujet, une délégation est actuellement en train de mener des négociations au Pakistan, avec l'appui bienveillant des autorités en place.

En résumé, le gouvernement turc offre aux réfugiés Türkmen, Özbek et Kirghiz la possibilité – dans un délai de six mois – d'aller s'installer en Turquie. Une fois terminées les discussions préliminaires, le ministère des Affaires Etrangères mettra en place un "Comité Supérieur de Coordination pour l'Emigration des Réfugiés Afghans" (*Afgan Mültecileri Göç Koordinasyon Üst Komitesi*) qui sera chargé de résoudre les problèmes pratiques. Très rapidement, des crédits vont être débloqués par le ministère des Finances afin d'assurer la couverture des frais non seulement du transport des familles et de leurs biens, mais aussi de leur installation en Turquie, où le gouvernement mettra à leur disposition les moyens leur permettant de poursuivre leurs activités d'élevage et de tissage: dans l'un et l'autre cas ce n'est pas un mauvais choix, car les tapis des turcophones du Nord de

l'Afghanistan sont célèbres dans le monde entier autant que la proverbiale habileté de ces derniers en ce qui concerne l'élevage du mouton *karakül* dont la peau fournit l'astrakan (c'est d'ailleurs pourquoi le sous-directeur de l'Institut de Recherche et de Contrôle Vétérinaire de Pendik a été envoyé au Pakistan avec la délégation turque). Les réfugiés seront établis dans des régions dont les conditions climatériques se rapprochent de celles qu'ils connaissaient dans leur milieu d'origine en Afghanistan.

On s'en doute, d'ores et déjà les candidats sont nombreux. Une jeune journaliste turque, Mme Pïnar Türenç, a rencontré les principaux leaders traditionnels en exil, dont le chef türkmen Abdul Karim Maxtum, l'ex-député özbek Abdul Qayum, et naturellement le khan kirghiz Rahman Kul; elle a publié dans *Milliyet* du 24 au 28 mars 1982 une série d'intéressants articles où se fait jour l'espoir qu'a soulevé chez les réfugiés turcophones l'initiative de la Turquie.

Rahman Kul, par contre, se trouve plongé dans un cruel embarras. En effet, à force d'attendre pendant des mois une réponse de l'ambassade turque d'Islamabad, réponse qui n'arrivait jamais, il avait fini par se tourner vers les USA. Un beau jour du printemps 1980, le jeune consul américain, frais émoulu de son école de formation, avait vu arriver – non sans consternation – l'impressionnant chef kirghiz qui venait lui réclamer 1200 visas pour l'Alaska. Pourquoi l'Alaska? Parce qu'un jeune spécialiste américain de l'écologie du Pamir, connaissant bien les Kirghiz, et qui est originaire de cet Etat, avait soufflé à Rahman Kul que les Kirghiz pourraient y retrouver des conditions de vie pas trop différentes de celles du Pamir. Grâce à l'appui diligent du Professeur L. Dupree, les choses avaient fait leur chemin aux Etats-Unis et une société philantropique était même prête à supporter les frais du voyage. Restait que les autorités avaient réservé leur réponse. Les dernières barrières viennent d'être levées et les Kirghiz sont à présent autorisés à émigrer en Alaska: *şimdi onlar istiyorlar bizi* "maintenant ils nous réclament", dit R. Kul à P. Türenç (*Milliyet* 28 mars 1982). Le choix est délicat et se résume à l'alternative suivante: soit la continuité culturelle avec une émigration en Turquie, soit la sécurité maximum avec une émigration en Alaska.

Il semble qu'il ait finalement opté pour la dernière solution. Un quotidien pakistanais en langue anglaise faisait en effet état de la décision du chef kirghiz d'émigrer aux USA avec ses contribules (24 March 1982). Cela me paraît s'expliquer sans peine. C'est la deuxième fois en une trentaine d'années que R. Kul se voit obligé de quitter l'Afghanistan à cause des Soviétiques: il a désormais perdu tout espoir de retourner dans son pays et ne souhaite plus qu'une chose, mettre un maximum d'espace entre les envahisseurs et lui (le Pamir afghan ayant été annexé par l'URSS, voir "Russia amputates

an Afghan finger", *The Economist*, Vol. 276 no. 7145, 9 août 1980). En outre, il est sans doute intimement convaincu que les facilités économiques de réinsertion des Kirghiz seront plus intéressantes aux USA qu'en Turquie, ce en quoi on ne saurait lui donner tort. En revanche la rupture culturelle risque d'être irrémédiable, et je suis sûr que le khan kirghiz en est conscient et le regrette. Dans la steppe anatolienne, les Kirghiz n'auraient pas été dépaysés et l'assimilation linguistique se serait effectuée rapidement et sans heurt.

Tout choix implique un déchirement. Le destin des Kirghiz est désormais tranché. Je me réjouis pour eux de la fin prochaine de leurs actuels tourments: tout en reconnaissant l'aide indéniable, inappréciable, que leur a fourni le Pakistan en leur accordant asile, j'ai pu constater de mes yeux leur dénuement. De nouvelles perspectives s'ouvrent devant cette petite population exsangue, souhaitons qu'elles lui permettent un nouvel essor.

POST-SCRIPTUM

L'histoire est perpétuellement à refaire. Plusieurs semaines après la rédaction de cette note, M. S. Enders Wimbush me communiquait aimablement un article du *Los Angeles Times* (4 mai 1982) intitulé "Nomads of Central Asia almost made it to Alaska" qui jette un jour nouveau sur la question. En effet, alors même que R. Kul et ses fils avaient obtenu toutes les autorisations et visas pour se rendre en Alaska afin d'inspecter les differentes aires où les Kirghiz seraient susceptibles de s'installer, soudain, coup de théâtre à la veille même de leur départ, l' *Institute of Alaskan Affairs* qui sponsorisait le voyage déclare forfait sans la moindre explication et sans qu'aucun de ses dirigeants accepte de fournir le plus petit éclaircissement. Il faut que d'importantes pressions – dont il ne m'appartient pas de démêler le purquoi ni le comment – se soient exercées sur la présidente de cet institut, pour faire capoter au tout dernier moment une opération qui semblait en si bonne voie . . . Cela dit, les raisons invoquées à l'encontre du projet par les spécialistes US de la réinsertion des réfugiés me paraissent spécieuses et peu convaincantes.

Dans le même temps, un ami turc m'écrit qu'il a vu Rahman Kul à la télévision le samedi 12 juin – en bonne forme et le regard voilé par ses traditionnelles lunettes noires (voir la photo que j'ai publiée dans *Afghanistan Journal* VI (1), 1979) – lors d'un reportage sur les réfugiés qui s'apprêtent à partir en Turquie: les Kirghiz seraient parmi les premiers candidats au voyage et devraient arriver fin juin début juillet. Un article de *Milliyet* daté du 9 juin fournit même des précisions supplémentaires: 310 familles kirghizes comptant en tout 1137 personnes seront installées dans la zone montagneuse de Gürpïnar

dans le district de Van. Près de deux mille Özbek – le plus gros contingent – iront dans les régions d'Urfa, Gaziantep et Antakya, cependant qu'un millier de Türkmen se fixera à Tokat et quelque 300 Kazak à Kayseri. Par contre, les Uygur qui avaient également demandé à émigrer n'ont pas été autorisés à le faire en raison de leur nationalité, chinoise pour certains, pakistanaise pour d'autres. Les premiers réfugiés – attendus à Adana à partir du 28 juin – ne seront pas mis en quarantaine, une équipe sanitaire fera tous les contrôles dans l'avion! . . .

Je me réjouis égoïstement de ce rebondissement, (la Turquie étant considérablement plus proche de mes pénates que l'Alaska), et je crois que tout est bien qui finit bien: goutte d'eau dans l'océan, les Kirghiz se fondront bien vite dans la population turque qui sortira enrichie de l'apport de ces lointains cousins d'Orient.

Sir Olaf Caroe (1892–1981)

PART II

GEORGE CHOWDHARAY-BEST

Sir Olaf took up his appointment as Governor in Peshawar early in 1946, after a three-month spell of home leave. The first important event of his period as Governor was the kidnapping of J. O. S. Donald, in mistake for an assistant garrison engineer, and as a result of an intra-tribal dispute among the Mahsuds.[1] The Governor took a strong line, threatening air action, and Donald was released. Afterwards he came up to see Sir Olaf at Nathiagali, and begged to be allowed to return to his old stamping-grounds. "A little unwillingly", wrote Sir Olaf, "I agreed, adding that after a few months we would think again". Two months later it was learnt that Donald had shot himself. This was a tragedy that recurred to Sir Olaf in dreams, or when half asleep; and it had widespread implications.

The subject of air action on the Frontier is a very vexed one which aroused, and continues to arouse, strong feelings, although it was the innocent Hindus, especially, who in the settled districts of the Frontier suffered most terribly from the tribal raids for which bombing of villages which were harbouring and sheltering the raiders was sometimes the only reprisal available. In the particular case of Donald, the ransom demanded for his release was 110,000 rupees (about £10,000) which was advanced to the Mahsud jirga, who in turn paid it to the Shabi Khel. Sir Olaf then proposed, in July 1946, that the return of that money together with 250 rifles and hostages should be demanded. In the event of non-compliance it was proposed to proscribe a certain area and after due warning destroy certain villages by bombing. After careful and anxious consideration the Viceroy, Wavell, decided to approve the scheme, but he had his misgivings, and Mr. Nehru, who had become Member for External Affairs in the Interim Government, not only shared them, but felt that he should come up to the Frontier to see for himself.

The political situation in the Province was that the elections of 1945 had returned a Congress Government led by Dr. Khan Sahib;

but that there was evidence of a swing of electoral opinion in favour of the Muslim League.[2] This was partly because of Jinnah's visit after the elections and his persuasion of the Faqir of Ipi to adopt, for the present at least, his cause, but also because the prospect of independence had led to a general fear among the people that the new Government, Hindu-dominated as it must inevitably be, would act in such a way as to curb their freedom. Sir Olaf's view was that Nehru's visit (which was preceded by one from Wavell) would have precisely the opposite effect to that which was intended. It would weaken Khan Sahib's position as premier, stimulate communal feeling, and make the task of officials in trying to keep the peace that much more difficult. We now know that Nehru received the same advice from Maulana Azad, President of the Congress Party, and even from Gandhi himself.[3] Sir Olaf even went to the length of visiting Delhi himself to try to dissuade Nehru from coming, but to no avail. His later judgment was that this visit

> more than anything else, made partition inevitable. Pathan allegiance shifted, the power of the Khan brothers waned, the banners of Islam were unfurled. Nehru was stoned and attacked: the establishment, and by implication the Governor himself, were charged with seeking the murder of the Foreign Minister. A state of near-civil war resulted, causing the Governor to press for fresh elections to disclose the real feelings of the people. Nehru would not have it and Mountbatten took over with the Frontier in turmoil.

The most important incident concerning stoning occurred as the Nehru party were leaving the Malakand Fort, and this was the subject of a judicial inquiry which completely exonerated the Political Officer concerned. But Mr. Nehru had by then taken against the Governor, and on 6 November 1946 Weightman remarked to Wavell that "Congress are 'gunning for' Olaf Caroe and will have him out if they can".[4]

The trouble foreseen by Sir Olaf duly occurred, and there were attacks on Hazara in December, on which Mr. Nehru, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, commented that no government could tolerate "raids, murder, kidnapping and the like".[5] Mountbatten then took over from Wavell as Viceroy, and in April came up to Peshawar to see for himself. A crowd perhaps 100,000 strong had assembled on the airfield on the morning of his visit. To enable him to land they were with difficulty persuaded to withdraw to an open space a mile away, between the city and the cantonment where the main railway line passes the Peshawar fort on an embankment. On his way from the airfield to Government House after meeting the Viceroy, Sir Olaf

advised him strongly that he should go as soon as possible to show himself to the crowd, or they would try to force a way into the Government House grounds. Mountbatten agreed, subject to the views of Dr. Khan Sahib. "Khan Sahib", Sir Olaf wrote afterwards "was in some disarray and excitement, but gallant as ever. He had been at odds with elements of the mob in the morning – it was partly his efforts that had moved the crowd from the airfield – and as the Viceroy told me later with wry humour, had been inclined to blame me personally for the assembly of so many League supporters! But he did not gainsay my advice that Mountbatten should meet the challenge offered. 'Go if you must', he said in effect, 'but if you want to know, it is the Governor who has collected them!' What a Governor, what a sway over multitudes, might have been the Viceroy's reflection. We therefore proceeded, the Viceroy – accompanied typically by his lady – the General, the Chief of Police and myself, and mounted the railway embankment on the far side of which the huge murmuring crowd was gathered in an open space beneath the high battlements of the Fort. We stood, a small group, upon the embankment, a target for any *agent provocateur*. The Viceroy, not resplendent in stars and orders, but a fine figure always, wearing a green bush-shirt of Burma provenance – there were not wanting those who noted that this was the right colour for a Haji – brought his hand to the salute, and stood facing the crowd. The moment was dramatic, the gesture superb. The atmosphere changed. Cries of *Pakistan zindabad* died away, and I heard more than one voice of admiration. There was too much clamour for speaking, but honour had been satisfied, and after a minute or two the small party on the railway withdrew, the crowd began to melt away, and we went home – to my wife and lunch".

Agitation against Sir Olaf's continuance as Governor continued, and there is a large file on this subject in India Office records, now numbered 1450 GG 43. Last year, some of the documents in this and other files of the period were published in the Transfer of Power series, edited by Mansergh and Moon. From documents held in India it is clear that on 1 May 1947 Mr Nehru hinted at resignation if Sir Olaf were not removed.[6] On 6 May Mountbatten himself declared in a telegram to Ismay (then in London) that although he was not prepared to yield to force, and "so long as the agitation continues I would not think of suggesting a change of Governor in the N.W.F.P. . . . Nevertheless I still consider Caroe must be replaced as soon as possible after excitement has died down and still wish you to clear Lockhart with Secretary of State and Auchinleck". On the same day he wrote to Nehru again making it clear that he was not prepared to yield to duress, "and unless and until this whole agitation dies down

I shall take no further action in this matter any more than in the case of Dr. Khan Sahib".

The reference to Khan Sahib arose from the fact that the Viceroy had become convinced by his visit to Peshawar that "fresh elections at the earliest possible moment were absolutely necessary".[7] But the Ministry headed by Khan Sahib refused to dissolve, and fresh elections could only be held therefore by the Governor, with the Viceroy's agreement, overruling it under section 93 of the Goverment of India Act. Mountbatten had decided that this was unwise because of Congress opposition, which could have led to "an impasse on the many problems in other provinces", and he therefore resolved to organize a referendum on the one issue of whether the Province should accede to India or Pakistan. This he announced in a telegram to Sir Olaf of 4 May.[8] Nehru was willing to concede the general principle that "the will of the Frontier people" should be ascertained before a final decision was taken, but declined to agree that this should be done while Sir Olaf remained in charge. On 11 May Sir Olaf telegraphed agreeing that "option of independence for Frontier province is out of the question. Any such suggestions apart from other considerations (e.g. finance) would stimulate ideas of Afghanistan *irredenta*".

Meanwhile behind the scenes moves were continuing to provide for Sir Olaf's supersession. On 7 May Mountbatten telegraphed to Ismay that "It would perhaps be preferable to invite him to resign. If he does not agree to this, we could put his removal down to ill-health which indeed in a way is true as he is obviously suffering from strain and is very tired". To this Ismay concurred; but in the event this course was not adopted and in June, after a further demand from Nehru for his resignation, it was announced that Sir Olaf was going on leave and that General Sir Rob Lockhart would take over from him in order to administer the referendum, as Acting Governor. In a letter to Mountbatten Sir Olaf wrote: "I say this very firmly and finally – I am not a partisan. On the other hand I have steadfastly resisted authoritarianism and maliciousness in high places". *The Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore summed up the reasons for his supersession as follows:

> The resignation – for that is what leave in present circumstances appears to connote – of Sir Olaf Caroe . . . is a sorry commentary on the power of the Press. Day in, day out for weeks together the Nationalist Hindu newspapers of Northern India (that is, the majority) conducted a campaign of innuendo and open abuse of Sir Olaf, alleging that he was using his office in order practically to demonstrate his sympathy for the (Muslim)

> League and antipathy towards the duly-constituted Congress Ministry. We have asked, in the name of justice, that these vague generalisations should be withdrawn or substantiated.

The editorial then went on to refer to an earlier one in the same paper on 6 May in which it was pointed out that the "Congress Government of the Frontier Province has failed, and is failing, effectively to cope with the lawlessness organized and implemented in the name of the Muslim League", going on to ask "whether the Governor had done all in his power to facilitate maintenance of law and order by the provincial government. This is the crux of the Frontier political situation, and although those who should know have indulged in wild generalisations in their allegations against His Excellency, there is nothing in their charges to indicate that the question should be answered in the negative". The 20 June leader went on to state that in the absence of substantiation following their earlier leader,

> it must be assumed that the allegations against Sir Olaf Caroe were insupportable. The deduction is not unfair that they were made with the purpose of concealing Congress weakness in the Frontier Province in the face of the League onslaught. . . . Unfortunately, in the slinging of mud, some sticks; and as a provincial governor is peculiarly defenceless against a concerted attack by a large section of the press, the good faith of Sir Olaf is suspect among a considerable section of the literate but ignorant population. It would obviously, therefore, be unwise for the referendum to be held under his auspices since a result unpalatable to the Nationalist view would be readily explicable in terms of already deliberately tainted gubernatorial influence. A governor's administration, like justice, must not only be pure; it must appear to be pure and there must be public conviction of its purity. Nationalist allegations have undermined that conviction, and so Sir Olaf has to go – by no means the first distinguished administrator to be sacrificed on the altar of party politics.

Lockhart duly arrived on 24 June and took over on 26 June. Mountbatten wrote: "all good wishes and many thanks for the splendid work you have done. I hope you will enjoy your leave and very well-earned rest".

In his last messages as Governor, Sir Olaf had had to report on 23 June the Congress decision to boycott the referendum, announced by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in a speech the previous evening. Two days later he added: "Ministers in body paid farewell visit to me today

and we parted with expressions of mutual personal regard". In the event, the boycott campaign had very little success: over 289,000 votes were cast compared to 376,000 at the previous election, and the majority for Pakistan was overwhelming – under 3,000 votes were cast for the Indian option.

It will be clear from the above account that Sir Olaf was driven out of office by Mr. Nehru and by the press agitation got up by Congress newspapers. Could, or ought Mountbatten to have resisted this pressure? This is not a question that can be answered definitively but it is clear that Sir Olaf, as an official, was expendable, and regarded himself as such. Afterwards he wrote:

> In retrospect, I am glad I went when I did. The acceptance of my advice to consult the people had in my judgment averted war. I had succeeded too in damping down any tribal disturbances during a critical period; after I left the tribes interfered, disastrously, in Kashmir, and I might have been as powerless to prevent this as was Cunningham, who was persuaded to take over from Lockhart at the request of Jinnah and was Acting Governor at the time of the actual transfer of power. Had I stayed, my health might well have succumbed; this has been the fate of so many rulers in Peshawar.
>
> Better, as I have done, to go back to the old scene many times after 1947, find many friends, or their sons, alive and welcoming, and leave, I hope, a name not without honour and an abiding mutual esteem.

Mountbatten, for his part, was kindly to him in retirement. On 30 June 1950 he wrote: "I always felt that of all the Governors of India you had the most difficult job, and the most thankless task. I shall never forget the magnificent way you behaved to me in the difficult circumstances in which I was placed. You kindly say that my handling over the Referendum in the North-West Frontier Province in 1947 made it possible for a peaceful solution to be arrived at. I would like to return the compliment and say that if you had not behaved as a very great gentleman and made it easy for me by allowing a temporary *locum tenens* to come in during the Referendum, I could never have got it through".

Sir Olaf began his retirement by living in Lancashire with his wife's mother, and after her death they moved to the house at Steyning in Sussex which remained their home for the rest of their lives. He was soon asked to join the editorial board of the *Round Table* by his friend Lionel Curtis, and contributed to this journal for many years; indeed one of his last published writings was a letter to it published in July 1981 on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It does not seem

to me mere coincidence that the journal itself should have expired virtually at the same time as he did; for they both stood for the same principles which, though unchanging, express themselves in different ways.

The first result of Sir Olaf's work for *Round Table* was a book called *Wells of Power*, published in 1951, with a foreword by Curtis. It concerned the Gulf and the oil situation and contains a number of enchanting passages of description. Whether or not it originated the idea of the Baghdad pact, later to be known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) is uncertain; what is certain is that it coined the phrase "Northern screen" (afterwards adapted to "Northern tier") to describe the Muslim countries, non-Arab, later to be associated in the pact as a barrier against Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Sir Olaf also became active on the Council of the Royal Central Asian Society (since re-named the Royal Society for Asian Affairs); and in 1953 joined the Conservative Commonwealth Council, since re-named the Conservative Commonwealth and Overseas Council, where the writer of this memoir first encountered him as a young graduate in 1959. There he became chairman of the group dealing with the Middle East, and with Sir Thomas Rapp and Patrick Reid issued a booklet published in 1960 entitled *From Nile to Indus*, a political and economic survey in the context of oil supply and juxtaposition to the Soviet Union.

Sir Olaf's second book, *Soviet Empire: the Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (Macmillan, 1953)[9] was an attempt to portray the only European imperialism still existing in Asia. The book sought to establish, not so much the unacceptability of empire as such, for, as Sir Olaf wrote, "there have been empires that have made immense contributions to civilization, and nobility and truth may indeed co-exist with alien rule". It was rather designed "to tear away the mask of hypocrisy which prompts the Soviet establishment, itself ruler of a vast empire, to condemn only that imperialism which has crossed the sea in ships".

In between the appearance of his first two books, he was commissioned by the Foreign Office to pay a visit to the United States to tour educational and other centres for the British Information Office to talk on current British policies in Asia. Then, in 1956, he was invited by Iskander Mirza, Acting Governor-General and then first President of Pakistan, and an old friend, to visit the country to collect material for a book on the Pathans. This work, published in 1958 and since reprinted, seeks to trace the history of this people from the era of Cyrus, the Achaemenian ruler of Persia in the 6th century B.C., up to the time of writing, and unlike all works by Muslim writers or analysts, covers more centuries before the Pathans embraced

Islam than those which have since elapsed. "The voyage was long and the seas often uncharted", he subsequently wrote, "the touch may be sometimes uncertain. But I think it has stirred others, including Pathan writers themselves, to set out on their own journeys of discovery".

The book has been widely praised both in East and West. Even *The Times Literary Supplement* was constrained to concede that "if the earlier chapters may seem rather heavy going, the book as a whole amply rewards perseverance" and of the 1976 reprint Patric Dickinson said that "the prose is like the fountain of Bandusia, pouring, *splendidior vitro*, with a continuous crystalline brilliance".[10] The book won for its author both a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Literature and a Doctorate of Letters at his old University, Oxford. But these honours were lightly worn, and Sir Olaf remained to the end of his life a truly modest man.

A second visit to Peshawar, in 1960, was undertaken primarily to visit the University there and to complete arrangements for the publication of a small volume of translations into English of a selection of the poetry of the famous Pashto 17th century poet, Khushhal Khan. This was a joint work undertaken in partnership with Sir Evelyn Howell, who in retirement had become a Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Howell was a scholar and man of action combined, and a brilliant Latinist. In his introduction to the combined translation, Maulana Abdul Qadir wrote that "like all good translation it strikes the reader as original . . . to my mind it reflects in full measure the beauty of the Pashto poetry and the spirit of the Pathan poet, and I cannot find words adequate to express my appreciation of it". The following translation, entirely by Sir Olaf, was read out very movingly at his funeral service by his second son, Michael:

> One King alone I serve, one King obey,
> His orders rule my life, his yea, his nay.
> The friends I loved stand in Thy presence, Lord,
> Wistful and solitary I wait thy word,
> Soon, soon, the call rings out: "Come then to me" –
> Then here am I, my King, my God! Have I not prayed
> Tears from the heart, and shall I feel afraid?

In 1963 Sir Olaf paid a third visit to Pakistan, this time under the auspices of the British Council, and accompanied by his elder son, Richard. He lectured widely and met many old friends. But Ayub Khan, then President, complained to the Foreign Office that he had spent too much of his time on the Frontier with those who did not see eye-to-eye with the Government, meaning the sons of the Khan brothers. Strange irony, and proof, if proof were required, of Sir Olaf's

impartiality. This was his last visit to Pakistan. After the Bangladesh war of 1971 Bhutto succeeded to power and Wali Khan, son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, became leader of the National Awami Party in opposition to Bhutto's Peoples' Party. Sir Olaf's contacts on the Frontier were thus by then more in direct opposition to the Establishment than had been the case under Ayub Khan, so that when early in 1975 he received a personal and generous invitation to go out as the President's guest he decided it would be politic to plead old age as an excuse: he was indeed by then over eighty.

Meanwhile a revived interest, nothing to do with the North-West Frontier, had come to him after the entry of China into Tibet, and the Lhasa uprising in March 1959, as a result of which the Dalai Lama fled from his capital and was given sanctuary by Nehru's government in India. He was followed by nearly 100,000 Tibetans who in the two decades that followed have succeeded in escaping across the Himalayas to refuge in India, and in a less degree the border states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Some have reached Europe and America. Sir Olaf was prominent in founding the Tibet Society of the United Kingdom, formed in aftermath of the Dalai Lama's escape to assist in British understanding of Tibetan problems and in the resettlement of Tibetan refugees; and as Chairman of the Tibet sub-Committee of the Standing Conference of the British Association for Aid to Refugees visited India in the winter of 1963-4 to help in the co-ordination of British with other efforts and especially that of the Indian government. Many places of resettlement were visited, among them Dharmsala, Kangra, Dalhousie, Simla, Mussoorie, Kasauli, Mysore, Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Baksa. At Dharmsala where he met the Dalai Lama he was "deeply inspired", as he afterwards wrote, "by his patience, courage, kindness and gentle persistence, all shot through with a delicious sense of humour". In the course of the same visit, he was also accorded a long private talk with Nehru in his garden, "during which he left me in no doubt that he had invited me as a state guest to India not only to inquire into the many questions that arose over the Tibetan diaspora, but also as a sort of *amende honorable* for his attitude over the North-West Frontier and my part in those affairs nearly twenty years earlier". "I am proud", Sir Olaf added, "that I am the only British ex-Governor invited back as a state guest both by India and by Pakistan". That indeed was the measure of his humanity and his impartiality. Within a few months Nehru himself was to be stricken – the present writer recalls, on a visit to India at about the same time, seeing him holding on to his desk in the great Central Hall of the Legislative Assembly in New Delhi as he rose for the last time to hear the President's speech at the opening of the Indian Parliament: and it was fitting that this

meeting between the two men, both great in their way, should have taken place; a true meeting of minds between East and West.

In 1974 Sir Olaf was again active in arranging for the reception of the Dalai Lama when he visited the United Kingdom. "I noticed", he wrote, "that he had grown heavier and seemed larger, and at first sight more reverend. But gravity was soon replaced by a giggle, and just as at twenty-eight he had seemed wise beyond his years, now at thirty-eight he retained a boyish spontaneity". Sir Olaf's last visit to London, in 1981, was to meet the Dalai Lama when His Holiness came again to address very well-attended gatherings in the Central Hall Westminster, and other places, where his resonant voice, simplicity, self-discipline and manliness made a great impression on many others besides Sir Olaf.

One aspect of Sir Olaf's work for the Tibet Society, of which he was founder-President, resulted in the publication of a booklet, the reprint of an address, entitled *Englishmen in Tibet from Bogle to Gould*, which appeared in the early 1960s. Little has been published in recent times, especially about these early travellers, and this pamphlet was an attempt to fill the gap. In summing up his work for the Tibet Society in October 1977 (he retired as President at the end of that year but continued as a member of its Council), he said that in the first place he had endeavoured to stress the plight of Tibet by making the larger charitable bodies aware of the sufferings of Tibetan refugees and ourselves contributing, and, secondly, to put the case for a free and independent Tibet to public opinion. Earlier, he had thus described a visit to a children's school at Mussoorie in 1964:

> I was privileged, on two bitter days in January, to see this school in action, and to visit most of the twenty-four Homes in secluded spots on the slopes of the forested hills where the children lived. . . . There was snow in the air, and the bitter Himalayan breeze of winter was blowing. It was chilling to sit and watch the children dance in the open air, but the sense of care and affection that surrounded them blew warm as the wind was cold.[12]

In 1969 Lady Caroe died after a long illness. Sir Olaf was grief-stricken but continued with his work. On the memorial plaque to her in Steyning Parish Church he caused to be inscribed the words "the love that never falters" which sums up what she meant to him and to those who had the privilege of knowing her. The present writer only met her once, at a crisis in his life, and can never forget the aura of spiritual serenity which she conveyed. Nor can he forget that she offered him practical help in the shape of biscuits for his journey. This practical help was characteristic both of her and of her husband. In 1976 he sent an appeal to Mr. Bhutto to release Abdul Ghaffar

Khan, then approaching his ninetieth year, from imprisonment in Kohat. The appeal was answered, and Ghaffar was set at liberty. Earlier, in 1964, he had been allowed to come to England for medical treatment, and during a two month's stay spent some time with Sir Olaf at his home in Sussex. His Indian biographer, Tendulkar, in the course of a work which is by no means uncritical of Sir Olaf's public actions, says of this invitation that Sir Olaf "treated him with great courtesy and genuine admiration".[13]

Sir Olaf's closing years, one felt, were marked above all by loneliness caused by the loss of his wife. Friends to some extent made up, or tried to make up for this but failed to replace the loss. As has been mentioned, he continued his work, contributing many brilliant reviews and articles to the pages of *Asian Affairs* (as the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society became called) and to other journals including *Round Table* and the Geographical Society's Journal. His letters to *The Times* and other newspapers continued to command a wide readership, and were read with attention. He was remarkable for always seeming to be up-to-date and to have kept abreast of the latest literature, whether fictional or otherwise. If there was a flaw, it seemed to lie in an occasional loss of faith in the future, though there were times when he was hopeful, as when he wrote:

> As for our own island, we have latent within us a spiritual and cultural power of survival which, as in the past, will enable us once more to rise from a trough of weakness and depression. We wait only for a clarion call:
>
> "Bright is the ring of words
> When the right man rings them".[14]

Let that be his epitaph.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the typescript of Sir Olaf's autobiography, a fairly up-to-date version of which was microfilmed by the Imperial War Museum library a year or two ago and is available to scholars. This autobiography was redrafted with some research assistance from me and in close collaboration with and the entire approval of, Sir Olaf; but I have nevertheless, in the above account, taken care when selecting passages to be sure that they are entirely in Sir Olaf's own words as he originally wrote them.

1. *Civil and Military Gazette*, 13 Oct. 1946, p. 16.
2. This had been noted by Sir Olaf so early as 9 June 1946; see vol. VII in the **Transfer of Power** series, edited by Mansergh and Moon (1977) p. 852.
3. see Maulana Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (1959), pp. 169-70.
4. see also Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal* (1973), p. 430.
5. *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 3 February 1947, p. 57; see also 5 February, pp. 158-62.

6. S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru* (1975), vol. I, pp. 345–6. Dr. Gopal, who had full access to Sir Olaf's papers, is on his own admission an uncritical admirer of Nehru, and his judgment on Sir Olaf's part in these events often seems harsh and unfair.
7. India Office Records file 1446 (3) GG/43. Some of the documents in this file have now been published in the **Transfer of Power** series (note 2, above), vol. X (1981).
8. Ibid. This telegram makes it clear that the suggestion for a referendum (as distinct from fresh elections) originated from the Viceroy's office and not, as was sometimes suggested at the time, from Sir Olaf.
9. A second edition appeared in 1967.
10. *Asian Affairs* (1977), pp. 236–7. The reference is to Horace's *Odes*, III. xiii. The *TLS* review is as quoted in *Book Review Digest* (1959), p. 175.
11. *Poems of Khushhal Khan Khatak* (Peshawar, 1963), p. 65.
12. Tibet Society *Newsletter*, July 1975.
13. D. G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan* (1967) p. 520.
14. R. L. Stevenson, *Songs of Travel* (1896).

A Document about the Cultural Life of Soviet Uzbeks outside Their SSR

EDWARD ALLWORTH

[The document translated by Professor Allworth is part of a larger autobiographical work still in process. We hope to be able to publish other interesting excerpts from this work with annotations by Professor Allworth - Editor]

Soviet documents and secondary sources, except for rather sterile, unverifiable statistics and some ethnographic curiosities, reveal relatively little information about the Central Asians who live beyond the borders of their eponymous union republics. Evidence has appeared, usually sporadically, for the functioning of certain cultural institutions, such as schools, and for the existence of periodicals, newspapers and books published in mother tongues for groups in the Soviet diaspora. Seldom does firsthand testimony come from the region itself, except in the case of exiled groups such as the Crimean Tatars whose active campaign to escape from Central Asian banishment has communicated itself to the outside world.[1]

Uzbeks are dispersed in large numbers beyond the borders of the Uzbekistan SSR within the Soviet Union. This frequently is noticed as a statistical item dating from the time of the ethnic partition of Central Asia during 1924-1925. Census data consistently reflect a persisting degree of imperfection in that lawful segregation of nationalities effected in the mid-1920s. The disparity shown in the record nearly coincides with the moment of the action taken by Moscow to apply the ethnic principle in administration of heterogeneous Central Asia, and especially Turkistan. In 1926, 11 per cent of Soviet Uzbeks remained outside their newly designated homeland. By 1979 the percentage had peaked and declined slightly, standing at over 15 per cent, with absolute numbers of 1,886, 971. Nearly half of these resided in the Tajik SSR, concentrated mainly in Leninobod and Qorghonteppa Oblasts,* where their numbers in both units in

* Tajik place names as well as Uzbek ones are given in these pages in their Central Asian form, rather than in the Russian version. Transliterations have been made according to the tables provided in *Nationalities of the Soviet East: Publications and Writing Systems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 364, 376, 378, 387. Diacritical marks needed for rendering the Tajik and Uzbek alphabets in Roman letters as used in English have been employed in the appropriate places in footnotes and in the text in literary titles and names of publications, but not in personal names within the text, where their presence might be cumbersome and numerous.

1979 approximated 55 per cent of the Tajik population there. Another 3.5 per cent of the entire Soviet Uzbek nationality inhabited the Kirgiz SSR. They comprised the two largest Uzbek concentrations abroad. Almost all Soviet Uzbeks live in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan – only 0.75 of 1 per cent were counted elsewhere in 1979.[2] See the ensuing table:

Table 1. Soviet Uzbeks in and out of UzSSR – 1926–1979 Census Figures

	USSR	UzSSR	No. Out of UzSSR	% Out of UzSSR
1926[a]	3,904,475	3,475,198	429,277	10.99
1939[b]	4,844,000	not avail.	not avail.	not avail.
1959[c]	6,015,416	5,038,306	977,110	16.24
1970[c]	9,195,093	7,724,715	1,470,378	15.99
1979[d]	12,455,978	10,569,007	1,886,971	15.15

Sources: [a]*Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 17 dekabria 1926 g. Kratkie svodki* vyp. IV. *Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Izdanie TsSU SSSR, 1928), pp. 16-17; [b]"Naselenie," *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia. Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialiticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Nauchnyi Institut "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1947), svodnyi tom, columns 60, 62; [c]*Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Moscow: "Statistika," 1973), vol. IV, pp. 11, 13, 15; for Kirgiz figures, *Ibid.*, p. 14; [d]"Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia. Natsional 'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR," *Vestnik statistiki* No. 7 (1980), p. 41; *Ibid.*, No. 9 (1980), p. 61; *Ibid.*, No. 11 (1980), p. 60; for Kirgiz figures, *Ibid.*, No. 9 (1980), p. 61.

The same sources show that the number of Soviet Uzbeks in the TajSSR went from 445,083 (1959) to 873,199 (1979) while the percentage of Uzbeks there declined from 7.39 to 7.01 in that 20 years. Uzbeks remained a sizeable minority in 1979, comprising 39 per cent as many as the Tajiks in their eponymous union republic and 25 per cent of the Kirgiz in theirs.

In view of the solicitude shown in Central Asia for Russians beyond the Russian SFSR, it might be expected that Soviet authorities would pay close attention to the position and development of these several large clusters of Central Asian nationalities cut off from their home bases. The three most numerous are the Kazakhs of the RSFSR, 518,060 in 1979, fairly scattered; the Tajik group within Uzbekistan, 594,627, the same year, and the Uzbeks of the Tajik SSR, already specified.[3] Yet cultural and political data and detailed description in published form seem elusive. This suggests a continuing application by higher authorities of policies intended to sidestep the existence of dispersed non-Russian groups and perhaps to contribute to their assimilation with their host populations. This explanation gains further weight when it is recalled that no direct and specific measures are taken by Communist Party or USSR government leaders to assure ethnic representation of detached segments such as the Kazakhs,

Tajiks and Uzbeks in governance on the union-republic or Union-wide scale. In effect this leaves these hundreds of thousands to the discretion of ethnically alien, often hostile politicians. The practice can and does lead to outright discrimination as well as more subtle forms of condoned deprivation, as this documentary record will demonstrate.

The memoir that follows, though narrowly focused in this selection, sheds some light on the civilization and status of many people living, as it were, displaced, in Central Asia. It shows ethnic and cultural interplay between different groups and areas of the region. Also it treats the dispersed nationalities' way of contemporary life, cultural standard, handling of them by the politicians, their range of aspirations, accomplishments and possibilities. As a record, it provides eye-witness and participant reports for the very recent cultural history of provincial Central Asians, a topic dealt with in a few Soviet monographs, but usually with the studied aim of presenting a laudatory picture of existence under the present *régime*.[4] Here, though the memoirist does not set out to idealize his activity and the satisfactions and achievements of his cultural institution, neither does he proceed negatively. He shows his own passion for excellence and for guiding his charges and colleagues to genuine accomplishment in aesthetic, cultural terms. His report conveys an almost poignant feeling of good-hearted but wistful determination to do well. That it simultaneously reveals the financial, personal and political difficulties confronted in that effort is only natural. For non-Soviet readers, the memoir offers an unusually balanced view, therefore, of Central Asian cultural life at its basic, *raion* stage. It also writes a chapter in Uzbek theatre history heretofore virtually unkown. Both give a small-town scene usually denied us by the tight restrictions impeding foreign communication and travel inside the USSR and from Central Asia to the outside world as well as Soviet scholarship in this field.

Striking above all come those passages detailing social and political conditions surrounding the cultural life and activity described. The writer educates non-Soviet Central Asian readers best, not merely by recounting these interesting episodes, but by carefully pointing out the interconnections between different aspects of provincial existence. Searching for the explanation of economic deprivation affecting a *raion* institution, he considers the ethnic complexity of his region. Tajikistan's intergroup relations are evidently expressing themselves in vigorous hatred. The large parcels of non-Tajik Central Asians have, by their continued presence, managed to intensify mutual dislike between them and their hosts. This antipathy between Central Asian groups may have been fostered by divisive Soviet policies and practices. If so, in one sense they have proved futile, for the

indigenous Tajik minority of Dushanbe, for example, vents its hostility also toward Russians and Soviet Westerners. A former Soviet scholar who worked in Central Asia and recently emigrated, but may not be identified here, referred to Tajiks as "wild animals" who assault non-Central Asians of the USSR on the streets of Dushanbe after dark.

Linked to this open anger is the heavy hand of higher Communist Party and government authorities, who economically hold most Central Asians in this area at subsistence level. Such pressure converts itself into the stifling of art and culture and simultaneously into an instigation for corruption and further conflict. Civilization in the *raion* remains rudimentary, the memoir suggests, because local officials can create venality at the same time as their rigidity discourages betterment and ruins serious cultural endeavours. These facets of Tajik reality have been reported by our autobiographer not gleefully, but gloomily. He reveals himself at every turn as a man of conscience and sensitivity.

Yakov Mosheęv, affectionately called "Yäqubjan" in the Tajik and Uzbek-language press from Tajikistan, has most kindly discussed his experiences at some length in both Uzbek and Russian. In New York during 1981-1982 he has generously begun putting his reminiscences down on paper at my suggestion. After first reading through these recollections, I have made some queries for clarification or expansion, and finally have translated and only lightly edited his own supplemented record into English. Some notes have been added by me to make parts of the memoir more intelligible to non-specialists or to supply facts needed for the history. Mr. Mosheev has not included notes in his text.

The author came to the United States in September 1980 after emigrating from his native Central Asia. His mother tongue is Tajik, though he was born in the Uzbek town of Shahr-i Sabz on 10 January 1932. There, he associated almost entirely with Uzbek children, learning their language fluently. At the end of the 1930s his family moved to Samarkand, a city with a considerable Tajik population.[5] He attended Middle School No. 25, one of many Tajik institutions in the city. The family of six children and parents experienced hard times. Yakov left for Dushanbe (then Stalinobod) in 1947 (at age 15) looking for a better life. In the capital of the Tajik SSR, a centre in which Russian colonists outnumbered Tajiks and Uzbeks together in 1959,[6] an opportunity arose for him to continue his education by entering Tajik Boarding School No. 10 which he left in 1950.

That same year he went on to Tashkent and entered the A. N. Ostrovskii Tashkent Theatre Arts Institute for training, under Dr. Yakov Salomonich Feldman, which he completed in 1955. After graduation, a post in the Ministry of Culture of the Tajik SSR as

inspector of theatrical institutions was given him, but a few months later, beginning in March 1956, Mosheev started to teach the history of Russian theatre, history of Tajik theatre, the art of the theatrical producer, the actor's art, and other subjects, in the Omuzishgohi Madanī Rawshonnamoi Respublikawi (Tajikistan Cultural and Educational College). Practical theatrical work drew him from teaching in 1965 and for almost five years he worked as a producer in the union republic's Tajik-language television service, also writing many scripts for transmission in Tajik. His diploma in Stage Directing, 1967, came from the Vakhtangov State Academic Theatre School.

From television, to which he returned briefly several times, in August 1969 Mosheev was appointed to the department of acting in the Tajik Institute of Arts as instructor of the producer's and actor's art, lecturing in Tajik. During this professional specialization, he wrote several serious works in Tajik: *Problems of the Tajik Nationality Producer* (*Mas"alahoi rezhessurai millī Tojikiston*) *Techniques of Producer Hajiqul Rahmatellaev on the Stage of the A. Lahuti Tajik Theater* (*Khususiyathoi hose rezhessurai rezhessër Rahmatullaev dar sahnai Teatri ba nomi A. Lohuti*) and *The Development of Popular Theatre in Tajikistan* (*Taraqqiyot-i teatr-i khalq-i dar Tojikistan*), as well as dozens of press articles. All this earned him promotion to senior instructor of the actor's art. Mosheev was then accepted by Nizam H. Nurjanov, a leading and much-published Tajik theatrical scholar, as an advanced student in the Department of the Actor's Art, with an approved dissertation topic concerning the Tajik stage and historical "revolutionary" dramas. With his first two sections drafted, according to Mosheev's own account he was suddenly transferred, for "unreliability," to the *raion* centre of Now (Nau),[7] in Tajikistan very close to the Uzbek SSR border. The "unreliability" occurred in the television studios when the decor visible on camera behind a visiting and very popular Uzbek singer, Fahriddin Umarov, showing a six-pointed star from Tajik folk ornamentation, was taken by an ideological censor from the CP of Tajikistan's Central Committee to be the Star of David. The recorded broadcast was abruptly cut after five minutes of what was to be a 35-minute programme. The next morning, Mosheev and others were accused of propagandizing Zionism on the union republic's television screens.

Now, in 1972, was an Uzbek town of 10,000 people that 100 years earlier had been but a fort settlement of a few houses.[8] In Now, Mosheev became chief producer of the Now Musical Drama Theatre for some three years, but in 1976 he again took up his position as producer in Dushanbe's state television studios, sure testimony that the flare-up over Zionism had been unfounded and temporary. The excerpt from his memoirs that follows relates to the period in the

mid-1970s when Yakov Mosheev worked as chief theatrical producer in the *raion* centre.

MY RECOLLECTIONS OF NOW *RAION*: THE STATUS OF A PERIPHERAL THEATRE IN SOVIET TAJIKISTAN

YAKOV MOSHEEV

The sole Uzbek state theatre in the territory of Tajikistan was established at Now comparatively recently.[9] When I worked, beginning in August 1955, in the Department for the Arts of Tajikistan's Ministry of Culture, I became Inspector of Theatres. I often met with the managers of the Now Theatre. An inspector of theatres enjoys no special powers. He is obliged periodically to travel to theatres specified by the chief of the Department of Arts. He gives his opinion about performances put on and offers his advice about the repertoire of the theatre, about the production and acting of one or more performances. But by no means does he resolve any important problems of a creative or financial nature. He prepares a detailed report in writing about every trip. So, for example, at the beginning of 1956, the Department of Arts of the Ministry sent me to Leninobod Oblast, to inspect the Theatre for Musical Drama, presently the Theatre of Musical Comedy. Miserably housed in the bazaar area of the old town, it lacked proper facilities for professional theatre.

In short, there is a great deal of work on the shoulders of the theatre. But notwithstanding this, the Now Theatre even today exists on a primitive level. It is called "Musical Drama Theatre," but is really engaged in giving concerts. The questions arise, why is the Theatre in such a lamentable situation and what are the reasons behind it? One of the principal reasons is a deliberate and indifferent regard for the institutions of culture and art of the [union] Republic toward Now Theatre. For, though the capital's [Dushanbe's] and peripheral Tajik and Russian theatres receive, though small, state subsidies and enjoy some of the [union] Republic's concern – they are provided with creative personnel, actors, producers, stage designers, ballet masters, conductors, and the like – the Now Theatre is deprived of all these privileges and is entirely self-supporting. Despite this, its yearly state financial plan comes to over 100,000 rubles [*sūm*].

If it [that situation] has to do with the attitude of the Tajiks toward Uzbeks and of Uzbeks toward Tajiks, it has a profoundly political colouring. Tajiks, especially now, hate the Uzbeks. They justify their hatred by the fact that in the 1920s political leaders of Uzbekistan headed by Fayzullah Khoja ostensibly unjustly joined such historic Tajik cities as Samarkand and Bukhara, whose basic

population is Tajik, to the territory of the Uzbek [union] Republic.[10] Yes, if they think this way, there is a kernel of truth in this justification. Indeed, these cities were the centre of culture, science and art for the Tajiks. Here, for this reason, a considerable part of the finest Tajik intelligentsia was located. In these cities industry was relatively developed. In uniting them with Uzbekistan territory, the Uzbeks deprived Tajiks of the chance to utilize these possiblilties. In the post-war [World War II] years, during the taking of the population census for these cities [the first post-war Soviet census is dated 15 January 1959],[11] the authorities made propaganda that Tajiks should call themselves Uzbeks in their passports.[12] By this process, the Uzbekifying of these cities was intentionally slow and veiled, in order to avoid active public protest. In the 1930s and even the 1940s there were many Tajik schools in Samarkand and Bukhara. I myself lived in Samarkand in these years and attended one of these Tajik schools. I personally was a witness to the fact that a Tajik school was located in nearly every section [of the city]. Later on, these schools gradually became fewer and fewer. In their place Uzbek schools appeared. And now in these cities scarcely any Tajik schools remain. In these years there were Tajik teachers' colleges and two twelve-month teachers' institutes, but now there's not a trace of them. But all this affair was not the handiwork of the people themselves, but the handiwork of the authorities, of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan [KPUz]. Thus, with the aid of the KPUz, pressure is exerted on a relatively small nationality by a powerful nationality. Because of these actions of the authorities, the simple people have to answer and suffer. We are talking in this memoir about the Now Uzbek Theatre, and I am deeply convinced that the rights of this Theatre are trampled precisely for this reason [the Tajik-Uzbek friction].

But can the Theatre, with its director in the lead, carry out the [annual] financial plan by legal means? If by legal means, then to be consistent with its musical-dramatic character it must have in its repertoire at least some interesting shows (these were lacking in the Theatre for years) and a concert programme of good quality into which might be brought scenes, arias and duets from the shows put on, and especially [there must be] publicity for these shows not only among the show-goers of Now, but the surrounding towns, *raions, kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*, as well. But the Theatre was hardly engaged in this business at all. The Director of the Theatre steered the activity of the artistic personnel in such a way that they fulfilled the financial plan illegally. The troupe is split into several groups, and each is dispatched separately to serve at weddings. The Director of the Theatre hires out each group at a steep price, from 400 to 700 rubles [*sūm*].

And in the quarterly report to the Ministry of Culture he shows fictitious numbers for the putting on of shows and the huge audiences present for them. Correspondingly, the sale of a certain quantity of tickets is shown, and even the names of shows non-existent in the repertoire of the Theatre are given. The Ministry of Culture, having perfect intelligence about all this, intentionally closes its eyes to the activity and accepts all these reports as correct, for only the fact of financial fulfillment of the plan interests it.

I became a witness to all this when I arrived in Now in June 1973 and immediately began to work as chief producer for the Theatre. I created some interesting, full-length shows which audiences loved and which the Oblast and [union] Republic press assessed positively. For some reason, I was convinced that they would publicize the Theatre widely among audiences not only of Now but of nearby towns and *raions* (the Theatre is located in a relatively small *raion* with a population of 20,000). The basic population of Now *Raion* is Uzbek. And not only Now. We often toured with new performances to adjacent *raions* of Leninobod Oblast such as Tabashar, Konsay, Proletar, Asht, and others. In these *raions*, the common language is Uzbek. A good many Uzbeks live also in Konibodom, Isfara and Zafarobod *raions* of the Oblast.

But the Theatre hardly performed as such, because of specific difficulties, including those of a financial nature. Yes, speaking frankly, this [legal way] was a hard road for carrying out a financial plan. But along with this, it was the only correct way to fulfill an artistic plan thanks to which the Theatre might be able to discharge its duty both to itself and to the audiences. It could then commit itself to its "musical drama" name. But no, the Theatre's Director and several actors, essentially of the older generation, did not want to go this route. My efforts to guide the activity of the Theatre into a creative channel led to no sort of positive result. Owing to this, a conflict arose between me and the Director of the Theatre. The longer I worked in the Theatre, the sharper this conflict became.

Jumping ahead a little, I want to say a few words about the Theatre's troupe itself. In the Theatre, representatives of all three generations were working: actors and actresses, singers, musicians, dancers, and so on. [Nearly] all were Uzbeks. The majority of them was uneducated or [almost] entirely illiterate, but persons naturally gifted, talented singers with beautiful voices, musicians no less talented, dancers, actors and actresses . . . these were ordinary individuals, essentially farming people, former grain growers, gardeners, cattle growers, tractor drivers, combine operators, and so on. A love for art, a dream of being a great artist, and of course, need and poverty brought them to the Theatre. Among them, only one actress had special theatrical training.

In all, 45 people worked in the Theatre. Of that number, eight were technicians and the remainder creative personnel: actors, actresses, female dancers, singers, musicians, ballet masters, a conductor, head producer. Because the Theatre was a musical drama one, there were a good many actors and actresses in it who could sing and dance. For instance, such actors as Honoured Performers of the Republic Mirzajan Pardaev, Usmanjan Siddiqov, Darimjan Qosimov; performers Ismoil Babaev, Puladjan Elmuradov, Olimjan Ishaqov, Mahmudjan Mamadaliev, Qurbanbay Qochkarov, Qochkarbay Karimov, Abdugani Husaynov, Berdimurat Turlimuradov, Bagibek Bakirov. At the same time that they created images on stage, they could sing beautifully. There were among them also those performers who played roles with great skill, but possessed no ability to sing, like senior actors of the Theatre Haybullaaka Rahimov and Siddiqjanaka (the latter's last name I don't remember; he was a pupil of the prominent Uzbek producer, Yatim Babajanov).

Also, there were the actresses Zulfiya Odilova, Karima Khojaeva, Jamila Ahmedova, Matluba Siddiqova, Ra"no Abubakirova, who possessed fine vocal gifts and played roles on stage. There were also performers who not only sang and created images on stage but even danced with talent. These were Nasiba Azizova, Munavvara Qosimokhunova, and others. Odina Akbarova, Oktam Azizova, and Dilbor Begimova were dancers. Mahbuba Khudoyberdieva and Muhabbat Ahmedova were singers.

Quite a few musicians worked in the Theatre. During the years I worked in it there were several changes of musical lead (conductors). At first there was Majnun Baratov, then Abdurahman Toshmatov (both were graduates of the nationality section of Tashkent Conservatory). The last of the musical leads was Abdurashid Abdusaidov. *Doira* players [a large-diameter drum on a narrow frame with skin on one side — the favorite percussion instrument of Uzbeks]: Abdurahman Siddiqov, Nabi Qayumov, Abdurahman Mamadrahimov. Accordion player: Hakimberdi Khudayberdiev. *Chäng* player [this is a sort of zither played with small sticks]: Abdurashid Abdusaidov. *Rubab* player [a five-stringed, long-necked plucked instrument]: Rahimbay Jumanazarov. Regrettably, I don't remember the names of the remaining musicians who played directly in the ensemble. There were two *ghijjak* players [this is a small, 3-stringed violin held vertically and bowed] about 60 years of age, one of whom worked in the Theatre regularly, the other coming when the need arose.[13] They sent them to play at weddings, road tours, and so on. There was a *nay* player [a type of Central Asian flute] of Turkmen origin, and another young *nay* player of Tajik origin. By law, a theatre must have an orchestra. There wasn't one here, because the Theatre was

self-supporting, and for this reason could not support an orchestra, but contented itself with an ensemble.

During the period of my work in the Theatre, there was one change in ballet masters. First was Munavvara Qosimova, a young dancer who in her time worked in the Leninobod A. S. Pushkin Theatre of Musical Comedy under the guidance of professional ballet master and Honored Performer of the Tajik SSR, Rema (Ramziya) Bakal. Second was Sulaymon Mullokandov, who served many years in the ballet troupe of the S. Ayniy Theatre of Opera and Ballet in the city of Dushanbe as a dancer, not a soloist, in the *corps de ballet*. The Theatre did not have a permanent set designer. For several months at the beginning of 1974 a graduate of the Dushanbe Art School Theatrical Division (I can't recall his name) worked in the Theatre. Practice showed that he could not independently mount the show "A Mother's Expectation" (*Intizor-i modar*); therefore, we had to appeal to our regular client – head artist of the Leninobod A. S. Pushkin Theatre of Musical Comedy – Ilya Semenovich Burov. The Theatre had for itself no operating workshop, either for properties, carpentry, makeup, costumes or anything else. Likewise, it had neither a chief makeup artist nor assistant. Actors playing specific roles in regular shows I customarily made up myself. These were the Theatre's personnel, with some added information about them. [All are Uzbek except where otherwise noted.]

So these are the unsophisticated people who, when getting into this Theatre, essentially only saw that performers gathering in groups in the evenings rode off to serve at weddings. And this way they earned money not only for the Theatre but also for themselves. And this fact became, for them, very tempting. Gradually, they got used to this business, for they saw that it turns out that serving at weddings is almost the fundamental type of occupation in this Theatre.

We have referred several times to weddings. And what is the Central Asian nationality wedding in contemporary Tajikistan? Parents of a future bride and especially of a future groom make preparations for a long time before a wedding. It is not yet known to whom the young person will be married, but the parents already start to prepare for the wedding by collecting and putting aside money, a penny [*tin*] at a time. They purchase many things, starting from yardage for a dress and suits for the future bride and ending with bedding, carpets, and so on. For less substantial people, this comes to five or six thousand rubles [*sūm*]. For the better-off, it is nine or ten thousand, and maybe more. Whoever doesn't have this money must go into debt.[14] If relatives will not loan the money, the prospective groom may not be able to get married for years.

Almost no one can specify exactly how much the parents of the

groom spend, and there is no precisely established standard of how this is done with the bride price. But the parents of the groom and the groom himself must make these things ready. One of the hard problems for parents of the future groom is the bride price. In some oblasts of Tajikistan, for example in Kūlob and Gharm Oblasts, they pay from 15,000 to 20,000 rubles [*sūm*] as bride price. And in the northern *raions* of the [union] Republic – in Leninobod Oblast – somewhat less, from 10,000 to 15,000. A lot of guests are invited, often over 1,000, to the wedding. Men are lodged separately from women. Accordingly, tables are set for the guests, and the dinner, one must say, is habitually sumptuous. It consists of several national dishes, of alcoholic drinks, basically vodka and wine, and cognac for important guests, sweets, fruit, and so on.

And entertainers absolutely must be invited; otherwise, what sort of wedding is this, without music, songs and dances? The parents of the groom and bride alone negotiate in advance with the entertainers and pay the required sum. For example, they come to the Now Theatre, and the Theatre [Director] proposes a certain group of entertainers to the parents of the groom and bride. A group, headed by Honoured Performer of the Republic, Mirzo Pardaev, is 700 rubles, a group with the Theatre's soloist, Pulad Elmuradov, 600 rubles, and so on. But, besides this, when the entertainers come directly to serve at the wedding, the participants in the wedding and the guests separately reward the entertainers with money, clothes, and the like. This happens this way. Of course, a separate place is set off for the performers as a stage. Customarily, this is a comparatively high platform from which the entertainers are visible to the guests. Microphones and loudspeakers are set up. After some instrumental and vocal numbers, Uzbek dance music is played, and amongst the already tipsy guests a handsomely made-up female dancer starts to dance. Dancing, she approaches one guest after another, and by her gestures and movements and facial expression strives to play up to and please their taste, and, at the same time somehow to beg a gratuity. So, the guests, in response, give money, some more, some less. Thus, she circles all the guests' tables, filling her hands with money. Then a male singer and musicians go out. They, too, go around all the tables of guests, and they too are rewarded with money. Into the arena emerges a second female dancer, then a second male singer. So they take turns. After the wedding, the entertainers rush to split the money collected on the spot, and frequently during this a very unpleasant scene occurs. One (perhaps a male singer) curses another, contending that he had collected more money than anyone and therefore deserves a greater share from the group. Another categorically takes exception to this (perhaps a female dancer), saying that she, in

fact, collected more money than everyone else and that only she should receive extra, and so on. At this moment they demean and insult each other, and it sometimes goes so far as a brawl. And such arguments do not stop after one day but may continue a long time, sometimes for months. Thus, for such individuals, material gain stands in the foreground and art at a fifth or perhaps sixth remove.

In the main, these are not bad people. They are naturally gifted, but a lack of culture, hard Soviet reality, and Soviet psychology have made them into greedy and mean individuals. Under good conditions, with a good upbringing, these people, I am convinced, would put their creativity and their efforts in the sphere of art in the forefront, and, by this means, would elevate themselves as performers and as persons. But, without this, the demeaning of art goes on.

If, let us assume, the performers should not want to serve at weddings, and would be content with the wages that the Theatre specified for them, not with the best will in the world could they feed, not merely their family, but even themselves, alone, for the maximum monthly wage is from 80 to 120–140 rubles. And this is considered high pay in the peripheral theatres of the [Soviet] Union. Performers of the capital's [Dushanbe's] theatres receive a bit more. To live only on the wage means to live half-starved, it means not to live but merely to exist. This signifies that Soviet reality itself compels theatrical workers, in fact not only theatrical workers, to seek and find outside sources of income. But here it is not necessary to seek, here the Theatre's very leadership, in self-interest, directs entertainers into serving at weddings.

The executives in institutions of culture and art of the [union] Republic often appointed as directors of this Theatre persons remote from art. Of all the directors of this [Now] Theatre, I remember three: Said Nurullaev, Gani Joraev and Hamid Tajimuradov, all Uzbeks. The first headed this Theatre in the 1960s and was fired from the position he held at the beginning of the seventies for immorality and demoralization of the Theatre's troupe, as well as for fiscal violations. . . . All of this was noted on the pages of the [union] Republic newspaper, *Sawet Tajikistani*, in an issue at the start of 1973.[15] The second Director served from 1972 to 1977 (I was chief producer of this Theatre from 1973 to 1976, so the personality of this Director is the most familiar to me). He was alien not only to theatrical art but to culture in general. The chief traits of his character were cruelty, treachery and craftiness. He spoke arrogantly and crudely with the personnel of the Theatre. He respected only his personal opinion and did not take into consideration the opinion of the troupe at all. For him, to humiliate, offend, or even to drive any worker out of the Theatre did not matter a bit. His

favourite things were vodka, stuffing with food, and women. Books and newspapers, outside of sports, did not interest him. Being the chief producer of this Theatre, it cost me great effort to convince him of some point connected with putting on the next show. The third Director, Hamid Tajimuradov, is a young poet lacking work experience with a troupe. He was more taken up with his own art than the affairs of the Theatre. [He also praised in print Mosheev's efforts; see below.]

There were periods in this Theatre when relatively strong works of different genres were put on stage: *Justice* (unfortunately, I do not remember the author), the theme of which is how Uzbek women came to join the [November] 1917 revolution.[16] Performing the leading role, that of Adalät, were the popular actress Oftobkhon Ganieva (now a pensioner) and Habiba Akhunova (now People's Artist of the Uzbek SSR and an actress in the Namangan Musical Drama Theatre); the well-known comedy by Hämzä Hakimzadä Niyaziy [1889-1929], *Maysara's Stratagems*; and *An Official's Love*, by Abdumalik Bahorî, which tells about contemporary life in Tajikistan; and others.[17] But these solitary flashes were soon extinguished.

One of the main reasons for the backwardness and primitiveness of Now Theatre is because for long years it did not see a real contemporary professional producer. Said Nurullaev, the former Director, simultaneously fulfilled the function of producer, as well. Having no notion of the principles of stage art or about the principles of producing, he [nevertheless] staged shows. Striking evidence of this was seen in the show, *A Poisoned Life*, based on the work by Hamza Hakimzadä Niyaziy,[18] which I watched when I came to Now in 1973 to take over the Theatre. The play was written in 1916 and bore an enlightener's character.[19] It is a story about a young, educated man, Mähmudkhan, who fell in love with a girl named Märyäm [khanim], who returned his love passionately. But the father of the girl, contrary to the wishes of Märyäm, wants to marry her, against her will, to an old, but cunning and wealthy Ishan [a Muslim clergyman]. All Mähmudkhan's efforts to tear Märyäm from the hands of the crafty Ishan lack success. Märyäm, seeing no escape from this terrible situation, decides to take poison. The play ends with mourning for Märyäm's death. The author of the play sees the cause of Märyäm's loss and the relationship surrounding the love of two young people as the lack of enlightenment of their parents and the individuals living in the society. In itself, the play is not bad. It is didactic, and despite the fact that it was written before the [November 1917] revolution, has a contemporary ring, for in the contemporary reality of Tajikistan exist fathers like this who will sell their daughters

forcibly to any man [for the bride price] against the daughter's wishes.

But, what did we see on stage? In all respects, a wretched show. There was pallid, old, awkward scenery expressing nothing. In no way did it pretend to depict the epoch or give a proper depiction of the place of the events and life of that time. It was primitive in its structure, as well. Several folding screens represented a small, narrow room where it was terribly inconvenient for the leads to move. Moreover, two or three items were located in the room, a colossal Uzbek chest, and a platform on which the leads sat, and an incomprehensible table. The sole door through which the leads entered and exited was so badly made in width and height – low and narrow – that when the leads come in they had to stoop, and this was not a decision that bore a purposeful, ideological burden, but simply happened that way. The leads' clothes likewise had no sort of meaning, nor did they pretend to an accurate reflection of the epoch.

With regard to makeup, different individuals performing the roles of elderly *personae* stuck crude goat's wool under their chins. [A typical device of Central Asian folk theatre]. But the worst aspect of this show was the acting. The actors failed to observe the rudiments of scenic art: interaction, assessment of the situation. The performers blindly, without any connection, pronounced the lines of the roles and the monologues; hence, the songs and music executed in the course of the show looked completely out of place. Naturally, with such a primitive production, nothing could be said about creating artistic images on stage and about the disclosure of the ideas of the show.

But, in spite of all this, there were various positive sides to the show. In stage art, above all, sincere belief is demanded in the circumstances put forward for the hero, and in what the hero does and in what occurs in the show. Just such faith I twice noted in this show. That is, when Märyäm (performer Nasiba Azizova) takes poison and when Märyäm's mother (performer Jamila Ahmedova) comes to the cemetery. But this was in no sense to the credit of the producer, but to the cast members themselves, for, from everything, it was evident that their intuition prompted such sincere faith in them. The musical part of the show inspired confidence. The ensemble played well together and well at a professional level. Majnun Baratov, a graduate of the Nationality Section of Tashkent Conservatory, conducted the musical part. (Soon afterwards, he quarrelled with the Director and left the Theatre.) And performers with beautiful vocal gifts participated in the show. In short, when I was becoming impartially acquainted with the troupe of the Theatre, I discovered serious shortcomings not only in the creative planning, but I also encountered great inadequacies in the organizational planning.

When I began to work in the Theatre, I saw that its creative composition was incomplete, especially in young actors and actresses, most necessary in every show. Nor was there a head ballet master, an artist, a conductor, a makeup artist, etc. We have already noted that the majority of the performers working in the Theatre were semi-literate. Moreover, they did not know what self-education was, did not read, were not interested even in questions of theatrical and musical art. In short, they were far removed from the great culture needed by a performer in musical drama theatre, not merely for creating an artistic image on stage.

Discipline had broken down greatly in the Theatre. Performers, especially of the older generation, came to the Theatre by 11 a.m. only in order to be noticed and not to remain in it, not to rehearse. And, being persuaded of the fact that this evening a trip for serving at a wedding would not be noticed, they would calmly go off home and return to the Theatre no earlier than the next day, also by 11 o'clock, in order to be noticed. And if a trip was planned, they would come to the Theatre by 6 or 7 p.m. and ride off to serve at weddings.

Although shows were put on the Theatre's stage on occasion, they, too, were created on the basis of weak plays, in the majority of cases one-acters and far removed from contemporary reality. One of these was *The Blind Girl* (*Ajizä*), a sentimental play about a blind Uzbek girl. Many performers regarded my first efforts sceptically, and their misgivings were not without foundation, for they had observed that when different producers were invited to the Theatre for various productions, in the course of work on a show the producers met with difficulties and habitually left the Theatre without completing work on the production. There were a whole series of other deficiences, also, about which one doesn't want to speak here, because they were in the sphere of morality or amorality, involving personnel of the troupe.

But, despite all this I remained to work in the Theatre, sincerely believing in the fact that I could cope with the tasks set, for the Ministry of Culture and leaders of the Cultural Section of Leninobod Oblast, and personnel of the *raion* committee of the Party, and the Director as well as some performers of the Theatre promised to help in the liquidation of these deficiencies.

I worked out a whole programme of action and went before the Theatre's collective [i.e., troupe]. The troupe approved it in total. Essentially, the programme showed a way out of a dead end for the Theatre, and an approach to [becoming] a professional theatre within a comparatively brief period. Carrying out this programme, I began with a search for a contemporary, meaningful repertoire. In

search of a repertoire, I set off for the Farghana Valley to the cities of Qoqan, Andijan, Namangan and Farghana [in Uzbekistan]. From a great many plays, I selected *Kumri's Happiness* (*Kumrining bakhti*), *Black Roses* (*Qarä gullär*), *The Radiant Pearl* (*Nurli märwarid*), and *The Beauties* (*Gozäl qizlär*).[20] The first play I selected because in 1974 the Republic of Tajikistan [Tajikistan union republic] was to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary, and I wanted to dedicate the performance to this date, for the play told about the Eastern woman's embracing the [November 1917] revolution. The play *Black Roses* was very popular in Central Asia, and it had even been put on television. It told about the hard life of the Afghans and of the aid of Soviet individuals in the 1960s to the Afghan working man. The genre of *The Beauties* and *The Radiant Pearl* was comedy, but the first told about the life of contemporary Kazakhs, about what changes had taken place in the villages of Kazakhstan. And the second [play] told about the life of Tajiks. But not one of these plays did I manage to bring to the stage, because of the shortage of acting personnel.

When I selected these plays I was convinced that the Ministry of Culture, according to understanding, would help me make up the acting strength of the theatre. But when this question was put directly before the ministry, the Minister of Culture refused. But I didn't lose heart and continued my search for a repertoire further. During this period, I became more closely acquainted with the situation of the *raion*. I visited nearby *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*, conversed with the farmers, and, accordingly, chose a sharply political and timely play, *Friends* (*Dostlär*), by A. Uyghun, which brought the Theatre success and grief.[21]

Starting work directly on the production of this play, according to the programme outlined, I concurrently and regularly began to conduct special lessons with the performers on the skill of the actor, stage speech, and movement. Each lesson on the actor's skill I devoted to a definite theme. For example, today, exercises on the theme of stage interaction, tomorrow, assessment of the facts, the next day stage purpose, scenic action, etc. If one or two lessons did not suffice for more or less mastering these themes by the performers, I held several lessons on each of them. All these lessons I conducted with an eye to the materials of the play selected, and I linked them with work on the production. It has to be said that the further the work went on the production, the higher my authority rose among the performers. Many of them began to relate both to the rehearsals and the lessons with great interest, especially the young people.

Friends was in the genre of drama. So, I wanted to bring it close to the specific character of the Now Theatre by making it a musical drama. For this, the Director of the Theatre and I drove from Now

to the city of Tashkent to see the play's author, A. Uyghun. We went in the small private car of a musician of our Theatre, Abdusaid Abdurashidov, reaching Tashkent in about an hour and a half. (It must be remarked that to have such a car under Soviet conditions is very difficult, for it costs a great deal, and the persons who can acquire one are those who have underground income.) We had forewarned the dramatist by telephone of our visit to Tashkent. We found him in a small apartment of modern construction. In appearance, he was an ordinary looking man, stout, of declining years [Uyghun was then about 68], dressed in a white overshirt and dark house pants, without head covering. Devoid of pompousness and arrogance, he was simple and unassuming. Uyghun at first received us coldly and with reserve. Leading us to the living room, he diffidently offered a seat. But when I began to explain my idea and earnestly told him (in Russian) the content of each verse needed and where it went in the show, in which episodes and scenes I would use it as a song, he somewhat came alive, and begging our pardon (also in Russian), went into another room, saying at this point, "I shall come back immediately." He did return quickly and had pen and paper ready in his hands. He put several questions to me about the content of each verse separately and began to jot down notes rapidly. The taciturn man suddenly became talkative. "Who, then, will write the music for my poems?" he asked, and without waiting for an answer, added: "It would be good if the composer Manas Leviev wrote it" (he is a popular Uzbek composer). And, on the spot, Uyghun wrote a note to composer Leviev and indicated his address and telephone number. Uyghun saw us out amiably.

From his place, we drove at once to Manas Leviev. Leviev lay ill – Uyghun did not know about this, it seems – and he did not accept our assignment, on the grounds of health. But, nevertheless, we drove back from Tashkent cheerfully, because the fundamental matter was taken care of, and for the show's music we had in mind another, no less interesting Uzbek composer. He was Mukhtarjan Murtazaev, Honoured Cultural Figure of Uzbekistan. Murtazaev was a folk artist, whereas Leviev was a highly-trained musical specialist. On arriving back in Now, I at once set out in our Theatre's bus to Qoqan (Khokand) to Murtazaev. He liked our Theatre very much and often travelled to see us. Puladjan Elmuradov, of our Theatre, was his pupil. Murtazaev was an important specialist in the sphere of classical Eastern music, and had skillfully taught it to our singer. A convivial and charming man, he was delighted at our visit and over the cup of tea traditional in the East an interesting conversation started among us in Uzbek. I spent the whole evening telling him about the musical staging of our show, and what was demanded of him as a composer

for it. In two weeks we received the verses from Uyghun, and the work on the musical staging of the show in the Theatre was going full blast.

In connection with this, it would not be inappropriate here to explain in a few words what sort of genre musical drama is. This is a popular genre among the ethnic groups of Central Asia. In musical drama the heroes at the most crucial moments of their lives express their feelings of joy or grief through singing. Songs, music and dances go organically into the fabric of the stage production and actively help to reveal the character as well as the ideas of the heroes. Thus, in the genre of musical drama the theme of the show reaches the ears of the audience both through the living word and via song and music. Only, all this is done not in the manner of operatic singing but particularly in the manner of the nationality tradition of sung and musical rendition. The genre of musical drama is considered relatively complex, for in it is demanded from the performer, along with dramatic talent, the capacity to sing, a musical ear and good vocal gifts.

In the show, *Friends*, I tried to get the players of Häydär's role (Honoured Artist of the Republic Mirzo Pardaev), of Qaräsach (performer Zulfiya Odilova), of Qochkar (Honoured Artist of the Tajik SSR Usmon Siddiqov), and others to do well. During renditions of the songs created by poet Uyghun and composer Murtazaev, they had to live the thoughts and feelings of their hero, to achieve a direct scenic goal by rendition of these songs. And, in this sense, I achieved a certain success. Frankly speaking, it was hard to get such a rendition from them, for they were accustomed in the old shows to sing songs as detached concert numbers.

For set design, I invited the chief artist of the Leninobod Oblast A. S. Puchkin Theatre of Musical Comedy, Ilya Semenovch Burov, to do the show *Friends*. Later on, a good creative partnership arose between us, for he designed all my shows over the next three years. It was mutually interesting for us to work together. On the creative plane I satisfied him as stage producer, and as artistic producer he satisfied me. I am convinced that if there aren't interesting persons, artistically and personally, in a theatre, there won't be interesting shows, either.

Although the Ministry of Culture refused to fill out the artistic complement of the Theatre with young actors and actresses, etc., for a relatively short period, with certain efforts, I succeeded in attracting personnel. We got ballet masters Ramziya Bakal, Honoured Performer of the Union Republic, a Crimean Tatar, and the performer, Sulaymon MuUakandov, a Bukharan Jew, plus new actors and actresses Karimjan Qosimov, Honoured Performer of Tajikistan, Karima

Khojaeva, an Uzbek; the talented, experienced dancers Dilbar Bedimova, a Bukharan Jewess from Dushanbe, and Munavvara Qosimova, an Uzbek, to work on the shows. We got popular composers of both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Mukhtarjan Murtazaev, the Uzbek whom we mentioned, Damir Dostmuhamadov, a Tajik, Odiljan Nazarov, a Tajik, Habiba Rahimova, an Uzbek, and others. I drew interesting dramatists to [cooperate with] the Theatre, including Ansorī and Otabaev, both Tajiks; Uyghun and Yashen, Uzbeks, and others.[22] But it seems we have digressed a little. The description of work on the show *Friends* must be completed.

Sometime around the end of December 1973 I finally put on the show. It was received favourably. But after the premiere, the show was suppressed by the authorities, specifically by Tursunov, First Secretary of the *raion* committee (*Raikom*) of Now Raion. The show had brought up a dangerous theme, [dealing with] the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality in *kolkhoz* life.[23] The performance told convincingly about the terrible tyranny and illegality reigning in *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*. Farm managers, surrounding themselves with toadies and people of evil conscience, persecuted honest, just labourers, and through false accusations put them in prison, and the like. And all this seemed as similar as two drops of water to the life of *kolkhoz* farmers of Now *Raion*. This is exactly what so frightened the leaders of Now, the First and Second Secretaries of the *Raikom* of the Party. So, the presentation was removed from the repertoire of the Theatre. Abdurashidov, head of the Division of Agitation and Propaganda of Now *Raikom* of the Party, summoned me to him and told me off very thoroughly for being self-willed and warned me: "Hereafter, you shall put on only those plays which we suggest to you, and if you, yourself, select some, then bring them to us for authorization."

Mehrubon Nazarov, himself, Minister of Culture for Tajikistan, was interested in the fate of the show *Friends*. At the end of January 1974, he travelled to the town of Leninobod in order to watch the performance given of his play *The Ruin of Customs* (*Haloqat-i odat*), and then drove to Now to watch the presentation of *Friends*. Along with him came the manager of the cultural division of Leninobod Oblast, Abdullaev; Director of the Oblast Theatre of Musical Comedy, Odiljan Nazarov; the leaders of the *Raikom* of the Party, First Secretary Akmalov (Tursunov, former First Secretary of Now *Raikom* of the Party had already been removed from the post he occupied, and Akmalov had just taken up his responsibilities), the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Raion, Turabaev, and others. After viewing the show, the discussion of it began. In his remarks, the Minister of Culture commented positively upon the show and

requested the Director of the Theatre, in the presence of the performers and the *raion* leaders, to publicize the show, *Friends*, widely in the *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* of the *raion* and beyond its boundaries. After the minister's comments were made, the authority of the show rose a bit also in the eyes of the Theatre's performers, and in the eyes of the *raion*'s leaders. Actually, one of the *Raikom* staff, Hamid Tajimuradov, wrote an article making good comments about the show in the [union] Republic's [Uzbek-language] newspaper, *Sawet Tajikistani*, shortly afterwards.[24]

But, they never set out to publicize the show, for the truth lodged in it frightened these very *raion* leaders [who should have advertised it]. And they put this show on the boards and outside the regular Theatre less and less, and then generally stopped showing it at all.

NOTES

1. *Tashkentskii protsess. Sud nad desiat'iu predstaviteliami krymskotatarskogo naroda . . .* (Amsterdam: Fond imeni Gertsena, 1976); A. Sheehy, *The Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans . . .* (London: Minority Rights Group).
2. "Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia. Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR," *Vestnik statistiki* No. 11 (1980), pp. 60, 65.
3. *Ibid.*, No. 7 (1980), p. 43.
4. *Istoriia novykh gorodov Uzbedistana. Tashkentskaia oblast'* (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo "Fan" Uzbekskoi SSR, 1976; *Kul'tura sela Uzbekistana v usloviiakh razvitogo sotsializma* Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo "Fan" Uzbekskoi SSR, 1977.
5. In 1959, census figures for Samarkand totalled 196,484 people. If the entire urban population of Tajiks counted in Samarkand Oblast that year resided in the City of Samarkand, (unlikely, for Jizzakh and Kattaqorghan accommodate many Tajiks) they comprised slightly more than 5 per cent of the whole. Uzbeks probably formed the largest single ethnic group in the city in 1959, according to an American demographer. See Frank Joseph Jankunis, *Samarkand: an Urban Study* (Los Angeles: University of California, Ph.D dissertation, University Microfilms, Inc., 1970), p. 60; *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda. Uzbekskaia SSR* (Moscow: Gosstatizdat. TsSU SSSR, 1962, repr. Kraus 1975), pp. 14, 148.
6. *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Moscow: "Statistika," 1973) vol. IV, p. 299.
7. Iakov Mosheev, "Eto bylo v Tadzhikistane," *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (Jan. 6, 1981), p. 3.
8. "Nau," *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1978) vol. 17, p. 388; Mir Salikh Bekchurin, *Turkestanskaia oblast'; zamietki* (Kazan: V Univ. Tip., 1872), pp. 14-15.
9. Amateur troupes had been formed as early as 1931 at Panjakent, and later in Uroteppa, Now, and elsewhere. Early in 1934 all were said to have been brought under local government support and budgets as *raion* theatres. *Partarkhiv TF IML pri TsK KPSS, f. 3*, op. 1, d. 40, LL. 42-43, cited in N. Kh. Nurdzhanov, *Istoriia tadzhikskogo sovetskogo teatra (1917-1941 gg.)* (Dushanbe: Izdatel'stvo "Donish," 1967), p. 399.

10. Khoja (1896–1938), chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbekistan SSR, was charged with nationalism and killed after a show trial in Moscow, along with Akmal Ikram, CPUz First Secretary, Nikolay Bukharin, and many others. *Report of Court Proceedings . . .* (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice, USSR, 1938), pp. 221–2.
11. The first post-war Soviet census is dated January 15, 1959. Data from it show only 1,726 Tajiks counted in urban places in the whole of Bukhara Oblast. The town of Bukhara had 69,254 people registered in that year. *Itogi . . . 1959 goda. Uzbekskaia SSR*, pp. 14, 148.
12. He refers to the domestic identification card carried by townspeople in the USSR at that time. It is now being required for urban and some country dwellers. Ethnic identity in this document is legally established on the basis of parentage. Western scholars have learned in the USSR that such a listing can be altered illegally in the internal passport with the payment of a modest bribe (75–100 rubles). Officially, each person's identity for purposes of the 1959 census interview was to be established solely by interrogation, not by display of the I.D. card, no doubt because most country people – much the majority of the Central Asian population at that time – could not have shown a "passport" if they had wanted to. See A. A. Isupov, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR (po itogam perepisi 1959 g.)* (Moscow: Statistika, 1961), p. 10. But, in cities like Samarkand pressures may have been applied strongly enough to make changes described by Mr. Mosheev in the results of census taking. New domestic passport laws that went into effect in 1976 ordered reissue of the documents by 31 December 1981. Rural inhabitants even now acquire I.D. cards only if they previously possessed them for some purpose, if they depart from home for other places for more than 6 weeks, or if they move away permanently. See "Ob utverzhdenii polozheniia o pasportnoi sisteme v SSSR," and "Polozhenie o pasportnoi sisteme v SSSR," *Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost'* No. 12 (Dec. 1974), p. 66.
13. For photographs, sketches and discussions of these Central Asian musical instruments, see Johanna Spector, "Musical Tradition and Innovation," *Central Asia: a Century of Russian Rule*, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 441–457.
14. The ruinous extravagance of traditional Turkistan weddings described here in the 1970s became a target of Reformist (*Jadid*) literature early in this century. Qudrätullah Nusrätullah-oghli's 4-act drama entitled *Toy* (The Wedding Celebration) (Samarkand: Gazarof Matba'sidä Basildi, 1332/1914), demonstrated the workings of this destructive social custom – harmful because of the gross expenditure of scarce resources and burden of debt incurred. See M. Rähmanaw, *Ozbek teätri tärikhi* (Tashkent: Ozbekistan SSR "Fän" Näshriyati, 1968), pp. 288–289, 414; concerning traditional weddings as well as Soviet attempts to introduce "*qizil toy*" (red wedding) and other reforms, still fairly limited, judging from Mr. Mosheev's observations, see N. P. Lobacheva, *Formirovanie novoi obriadnosti uzbekov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1975), pp. 22–69. Weddings among emigrant Uzbeks, Turkmens and other Central Asians held in the United States recently entailed expenses running into thousands of dollars for families of very little means.
15. *Sawet Tajikistani* is the Uzbek-language outlet of the Central Committee of the KP Tajikistan and Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the TajSSR, issued daily except Sundays in Dushanbe. In 1970, the paper was

appearing in 83,100 copies each issue. Other than *Sawet Tajikistani*, Uzbek-language papers of Tajikistan exist only in subordinate administrative divisions. The only local paper of Now *Raion* in 1970 was *Kammunizm säri*, published in Uzbek thrice weekly, 6,600 copies, down from a run of around 10,000 in the years immediately preceding, although the Uzbek population of the *raion* was evidently increasing. Only three such papers in Tajikistan appeared then entirely in Uzbek. Twelve others combined Tajik and Uzbek, giving Uzbeks some reading matter (most of these "newspapers" are tabloid-size, 4-page versions, judging from an examination of *Häqiqät* of Lenin Oblast and *Haqiqat-i Kolkhozobod*, two of the bilingual examples) in nearly one-third of the 44 provincial newspapers of the TajSSR. By comparison, one Tajik-language paper served all Tajiks in UzSSR in 1970. See *Letopis' periodicheskikh izdanii SSSR. 1966-1970.* Part 1: *Gazety* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Kniga," 1975), pp. 313-318, 321.

16. The play *Justice* (*Ädalät* — also used as a woman's proper name, as in this application), was written in the 1960s. It is a sentimental, semi-amateur stage piece on the theme of women in the 1917 revolution.
17. *An Official's Love* (*Ishq-i amaldor*), written by Abdumalik Bahori (b. 1927), mainly offers romantic intrigue as its appeal.
18. *A Poisoned Life, or Love's Victims* (*Zähärli häyat yakhud ishq qurbanläri*) (1916) is a 4-act tragedy published by the author in Qoqan in the southern Turkistan Turki language of the time. The play was called by the dramatist "A tragedy of a girl and bridegroom, taken from Turkistan's own daily life." See Hämzä Häkimzadä Niyaziy, *Tänlängän äsärlär* (Tashkent: OzSSR Däwlät Bädiiy Ädäbiyat Näshriyati, 1958), p. 105.
19. Mr. Mosheev refers here to the Soviet terminology classifying Central Asian modernizing educators before November 1917 into approved "enlighteners," in Uzbek, *aqärtiruwchi* or *märifät beruwchi*, said to precede a second, disapproved group of Reformists, *Jädidchilär*. Niyaziy participated in some Reformist periodical publishing and educational efforts, but for personal and political reasons was disruptive in the Reformist educational efforts. In any case, he hardly qualifies as an "enlightener," in the Soviet sense. About Niyaziy's Reformist role, see Ziya Sa'id, *Ozbek waqtli mätbu'ati tä'rikhigä materiyallar. 1870-1927* (Tashkent-Samarkand: Ozbekistan Däwlät Näshriyati, 1927), p. 68; Alexandre Bennigsen et Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 165; Läziz Qäyumaw, *Inqilabiy drämä. Hämzäning drämätik merasi* (Tashkent: Ghäfur Ghulam namidägi Bädiiy Ädäbiyat Näshriyati, 1970), p. 8f.
20. Sotim Ulugh-Zadä (b. 1911) wrote *Nurli Märwarid* in 1962 in Tajik; "Ulug-Zade, Sotim", *Teatral'naiaentsiklopediia* (Moscow: Izdatel 'stuo "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia", 1967), vol. V, pp. 374-375; *Kumrining bakhti* is a full-length Uzbek play that enjoyed limited popularity; *Gozäl qizlär* is an effective Kazakh comedy; *Qarä gullär* is Uzbek.
21. Rähmätullah Atäqoziyew Uyghun (b. 1905) is a widely translated and published Uzbek author who has written many historical as well as contemporary stage works, plus much poetry and some stories. Soviet authorities have granted him a number of awards, including two "Order of Lenin" medals. In 1965 he was named "People's Poet of the Uzbekistan SSR;" See Erkin Nasyrov, Raim Farkhadi, Petr Filippov, *Pisateli sovetskogo Uzbekistana* (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Literatury i Iskusstva imeni Gafura

Guliama, 1977), pp. 195-196. Uyghun's *Dostlär (Orinsiz shubhä)* (1961) is a 3-act drama set in a *kolkhoz*.

22. Kamil Nu"manaw Yäshin (b. 1909) is a much-decorated member of the literary establishment in Uzbekistan and was, until recently at least, a Secretary of the Board of the government-run Union of Writers of the USSR, with its headquarters in Moscow. His playwright's experience began early with a first effort entitled *Two Communists* (*Ikki kammunist*) (1929), and has recently produced *Dawn of the Revolution* (*Inqilab tangi*) (1974), a musical drama. See Erkin Nasyrov, *et al.*, pp. 243-244; Edward Allworth, "Reform and Revolution in Early Uzbek Drama," *Central Asian Review* Vol. XII, No. 2 (1964), pp. 93-95; *Sawet Ozbekistanining yazuwchiläri* (Tashkent: OzSSR Däwlät Bädiiy Ädäbiyat Näshriyati, 1959), pp. 163-165. Abdusalom Atabaev, chief of the editorial board, Ministry of Culture, and Fayzullah Ansori (b. 1931) are authors well known principally inside the Tajik SSR. Ansorī has published other plays, including one in verse entitled *A Mother's Condemnation* (*Hukm-i modar*) (1962). He is also esteemed there as a poet. Mosheev showed diplomatic skill in using the Tajik playwrights.
23. The "cult of (Stalin's) personality" is the conventional euphemism employed in the USSR to explain the political repression and illegality practised at all levels during the decades before 1954.
24. Hämid Tajimuradaw, "Dostlär," *Sawet Tojikistani* (March 24, 1974), p. 3.

Şerkı Türkistan Evazı (The Voice of Eastern Turkistan)

"M.E. UIGHUR"

Mao's Cultural Revolution, with its highly oppressive nationality policy and practices, which were directed with particular vehemence toward the peoples of Eastern Turkistan (now called "Xinjiang" by the Chinese), forced hundreds of thousands of people of Turkic stock (Uighurs, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tatars), some of them remarkable scholars, to leave their homeland and to take refuge in the adjacent regions of the Soviet Union. At present, the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan contain some 300,000 Uighur émigrés from Eastern Turkistan, who, naturally enough, take advantage of whatever opportunities are offered to work in this new country, where many have been brought up and study.

Writers, scholars, and historians among this emigration endeavour to record traditional epics. One such Uighur is Yusuf beg Muhlisi, the Editor of the newspaper *Şerkı Türkistan Evazı* ("The Voice of Eastern Turkestan"), of which I shall have more to say. Yusuf beg Muhlisi was born in 1920 in Kashgar and graduated in 1941 from Xinjiang University in Urumchi, the capital of Eastern Turkistan. He is a learned scholar and archaeologist and one of the best-known Uighur writers. His newspaper, *Şerkı Türkistan Evazı*, which is written in his own hand, began to appear "clandestinely" in April 1979. From information I have been able to obtain, Yusuf beg Muhlisi's handwritten newspaper is mailed to Uighurs who have emigrated from Eastern Turkistan to all the countries in which they currently reside: Turkey in the first place, but also to India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Australia, Western Europe, the United States, and the Arab countries; in addition, it is intended for Uighurs in China.

The fundamental objectives of Yusuf beg Muhlisi's newspaper are readily understood by every Uighur reader living away from his homeland. The newspaper calls on Uighurs - and by implication other peoples who have fled from Eastern Turkistan - to unite against Chinese chauvinism and to proclaim the establishment of "an independent

free state" based on the principles of self-determination and the constitutional law of the United Nations.

Yusuf beg Muhlisi draws deeply on Uighur history and national culture to offer stern warnings about the persistence of recent uprisings among Uighurs under Chinese domination and their painful results. He notes further that, in the past, the Chinese have made many promises to the peoples of Eastern Turkistan but have seldom kept any. What is more, they are currently making new approaches to the Turkic-Muslim community of this region, saying that there will be no more deception; still, there have been few real concessions.

In notes to the leaders of many foreign countries, including former President Carter of the United States, former Prime Minister of Turkey Bulent Ecevit, and to King Halid of Saudi Arabia, Yusuf beg Muhlisi expressed the following sentiments: "I consider it a sin to participate in pleasures and festivities as long as my country is not completely saved from Chinese oppressors, who insult the Uighur people and try to assimilate the Uighur race by sinifying its national language, its national traditions, and its history; that is, so long as an independent "Uighuristan" fails to exist".

According to our information, Yusuf beg Muhlisi travelled in August 1981 to Istanbul to honour a private invitation from the Union of Emigrés from Eastern Turkistan and its president, Isa Yusuf Alptekin. In fact, Yusuf beg Muhlisi had asked to be invited to Istanbul, and he was not disappointed: Soviet authorities in no way hindered Yusuf beg Muhlisi from undertaking this journey; indeed, they almost certainly assisted it in every way possible. He remained in Turkey for 15 days, thence returning to Alma Ata. Information coming from Turkey suggests that his visit was less than successful, perhaps because the real sponsor of the visit, the Soviet government, was unable to allow him to promise enough to his fellow émigrés in Turkey at this time. This is not surprising, for in matters pertaining to Eastern Turkistan, Soviet leaders have traditionally maintained an attitude that can best be described as "a desire to wash one's hands without touching soap or water", a two-faced policy which is apparent in every circumstance. When there is trouble between Moscow and Beijing, when Sino-Soviet relations are at a low point, the Soviets champion the Eastern Turkistan national cause as their own, much as they "adopt" other national movements such as the Palestinians or the Kurds, to further their own political objectives. When relations between Moscow and Beijing are improved, Eastern Turkistan is forgotten.*

* Thus, in 1933, the Government of the Eastern Turkistan Republic at Kashgar was overthrown by the Chinese general Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who was supported by the Soviets and who killed more than 100,000 innocent local inhabitants of the

Soviet interest in Eastern Turkistan is real enough, despite their cynical attempts to manipulate events in that region through the witting connivance or the unwitting naïveté of Uighur and other émigrés, such as Yusuf beg Muhlisi. For example, the Soviets are now concerned that help for the Afghan *muhajidin* resistance fighters may be coming from Eastern Turkistan and that Chinese cadres, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, may be pouring into these strategic border regions. On the economic front, it is thought by many knowledgable people that Eastern Turkistan is oil rich, with potential oil reserves as great as those of the entire Middle East. Exxon Petroleum Company, as well as French, English, and Japanese companies are already beginning to pursue investment strategies in this area. If the USSR is soon going to find itself among the oil importers of the world - as OPEC research has them becoming by 1985 - Eastern Turkistan will become doubly attractive. Thus, the Soviets have many reasons for trying to destabilize Xinjiang province for the dominant Chinese, while simultaneously raising their own image as the best friends of Eastern Turkistan. Of course, the Chinese, through their wildly foolish and oppressive policies in the region, have not helped their own case. It remains to be seen if the new Chinese rulers can successfully blame the entire mass of transgressions on the now-vulnerable Gang of Four and thereby salvage the situation for themselves.

At present, Chinese Communist leaders endeavour to win the affection of the peoples of Eastern Turkistan whilst simultaneously hoping that, thanks to the presence of the large number of Muslims in its western reaches, China can accede for strategic reasons to the rank of a world Muslim power.

Not surprisingly, the tempo of competition for the hearts and minds of the people of Eastern Turkistan has picked up since the Gang of Four's policies were exposed and turmoil and uncertainty set in in the region. A war of radio broadcasts is sweeping across the land: from Alma Ata and Tashkent, from Urumchi and Beijing, the quickened battle for new literature and new historical facts seem to have transformed the region into a huge experiment in the persuasive power of

region at his jail with the help of the Soviet KGB between 1933 and 1944. Similarly, the Free Republic of Eastern Turkistan, established officially between 1945 and 1949 in the three provinces *(vilayets)* of north-eastern Turkistan, was overthrown as a result of an agreement between Mao and Stalin. The national army of the Republic was dispersed and delivered into the hands of the Chinese army. Those struggling for independence in Eastern Turkistan have often relied on Russian promises of aid, but the Russians quickly subsume the interests of the people in this region to their own, at the cost of some 200,000 Turkistani lives to date. These are historical facts of which every Uighur is aware. None forgets.

communications, with the Soviets and Chinese treating the target to particularly brutal bombardment. Now Saudi Arabia has begun a series of one-hour religious broadcasts in Uighur and Uzbek. The latter carry only religious information and news of interest to the Muslim world and to Muslim countries. They cannot fill a very pressing need for objective coverage of internal and international events.

Curiously, the one radio station with credibility among the Uighurs of Eastern Turkestan, Radio Liberty, fell silent only 15 days before the first official visit to America of Deng Shiao Ping. The closure of the Uighur broadcasts from Radio Liberty, sadly, have left the field pretty much to the Soviets: Uighurs and others are already disinclined to believe much coming from official Chinese broadcasts.

Like the Uighur broadcasts from Radio Liberty, another victim of international politics has emerged: *Şerkı Türkistan Evazı*. Apparently of no further immediate use to the Soviets in their campaign to destabilize Chinese Central Asia, this newspaper ceased publication last year in the same month in which fresh contacts between Chinese and Soviets were initiated to discuss the delimitation of their common border, a nagging issue for many decades. Will we see *Şerkı Türkistan Evazı* again? This probably depends on the success or failure of the border talks and, as always, on the Soviets' future political requirements.

Current Kazakh Language Publications in The People's Republic of China

"CANIBEK"

During the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China, vast amounts of books, national art, and other national treasures belonging to the Turkic tribes of Xinjiang (Eastern Turkistan) were destroyed. In recent years, the oppression of natives by the Chinese has become somewhat less, and new books and journals have now begun to appear in the languages of the native inhabitants. This change is especially noticeable in the Kazakh regions, where, in the last few years, many journals and books have appeared in the Kazakh language. Even Kazakh national epics are published; from time to time, the problems of Kazakh national culture are mentioned.

The journals published in the Kazakh language and printed in the Arabic alphabet are *Xalghin* and *İle Aydini*. *Xalghin* appears every three months in Urumchi. Each number contains more than one hundred pages. It is in this journal that the national epics, proverbs, riddles, and anecdotes of the Kazakhs are covered.

İle Aydini is published every three months in the city of İle (Ili); it, too, usually contains more than one hundred pages. Last year in one issue of this publication an important article relating to Kazakh history appeared. In it, the author emphasized that Kazakhstan did not merge voluntarily with Russia; rather, it was captured. This revelation clearly was intended to coincide with the 250th anniversary of the so-called voluntary merger of Kazakhstan to Russia. The author goes on to say that the great Kazakh figure Han Abilay was, in fact, on the Chinese side, which, of course, is not true either. Both sides in fact would benefit from a reading of the works of Professor Zeki Velidi Togan or Lowell Tillet.[1]

Yet another Kazakh language magazine appears monthly: *Ulttar*. This magazine is published in the Chinese-style Latin script.

In addition to these journals, many books have appeared in Kazakh language (in the Arabic alphabet) in recent years. Their subjects are mostly the national epics, poems, and various stories. Some of these books, which are obtainable from the PRC, are listed on p. 132.

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NOTE

1. Professor Z.V. Togan, *Türkili-Türkistan Tarihi*, (2nd edition, Istanbul, 1981); Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

Some thoughts about *Le Milieu des Empires**

GUY IMART

. . . like turkeys in November.
(George Orwell)

CONCEPTUAL FRESH AIR

Published two years after Helene Carrere d'Encause's best seller, *L'Empire Eclaté* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), René Cagnat and Michel Jan's wittily and acutely[1] titled *Le Milieu des Empires* (The Land Between Empires) (Paris: R. Laffont, 1981) testifies to a renewed and increasing interest in Central Asian affairs which is long overdue and welcome in the country of Pelliot and Grenard. Its authors - a sovietologist and a sinologist - appear to be the direct heirs to the contemporary demystifying trend initiated by Solzhenitsyn ("reject the lie") and competently continued by A. Besançon (on Russia and the USSR), Simon Leys (on communist China) and H.R. Lottman's *The Left Bank* (on France).

They reflect without inhibiting ideological preoccupations on a part of the world which most sorely needs it: the Asian "Heartland", where almost 100 million human beings still struggle "between the Russian and Chinese jaws of a vice which keeps closing itself on them" (p. 227). They remind us that the "forgotten nations" - first of all the Turks and Mongols, to which I would add the Tibetans - of this "forgotten backyard of the Third World", were some seventy years ago - that is, long before Africa, Far East Asia and the Arab world - the pioneers of what was to become a tidal wave of decolonization. Throughout the ensuing period these nations have stubbornly yearned for survival while being under the constant threat of seeing their land transformed into an "Asiatis" (p. 55). Despite these early yearnings, Cagnat and Jan remind us further, this birthplace of the anti-colonial movement remains to this day the only area in the whole world where this fundamental civil right of the 20th century has not been able, or has not been allowed, to express itself; rather, the conquered nations, immediately reherded by force of arms back into the empires they helped to topple, are now subjected to the most systematic, most

* This article is dedicated to the memory of Patrick Destenay.

thoroughly planned and executed attempt to wipe out their national specificity by forced assimilation into a foreign body.

It is most tonic to see at last competent specialists stating calmly but loudly to the litigants - who shamelessly claim a bigger and bigger booty and, having failed to agree on a gentlemanly sharing of the spoils, persistently heap filth on one another - that the disputed commodity was not so long ago the free land of free men.

In this respect, Cagnat and Jan's book rates even higher than *L'Empire Eclaté*, not only because of its more acute analysis on many points, but more essentially because it deliberately ignores the artificial border that winds its way across a land which is basically one, dividing people of the same nation and separating human groups which share a common set of historical and cultural values. This global view of the whole Inner Asian world can only be obtained by stating the existence of a real Third World with its own identity, its own natural geographic, ethnic and cultural frontiers, which is squeezed between two superpowers, who, although at war, are in fact accomplices in this imperial enterprise.

The comparison with Africa and other decolonized lands, even if not systematically developed, constantly forces itself upon the reader's mind. For it becomes clear that while, in the past, the Western world was busy scrambling for ephemeral empires (which it gave up largely of its own free will) and, at present, vehemently argues over the rights of Namibians to be ruled by a lifelong president of the kind described in John Updike's *The Coup*, Russia's ancient and not-so-ancient czars, followed all too recently by China's old and new emperors, have been planning empires expected to last 10,000 years, thus throwing themselves headlong onto a collision course with one another.

This scramble for Inner Asia in what was once a power vacuum is already provoking transformations which, if not checked in time, could prove to be devastatingly irrevocable. The scramble has already reduced the grandsons of Avicenna and Genghis Khan to pawns on different chessboards; not their own voices, but only those of Moscow and Peking's well-trained propagandists reach us.

The emergence in France, and more widely in Europe and the United States, of Central Asian-conscious scholars brings to Western minds, accustomed as they are to that uncritical (if not oh-so-sweet) twinge of remorse about their past empire building, a long awaited opportunity to answer their communist critics: in Griboedov's words *"A sudyi kto?"*.[2]

Thus, *Le Milieu des Empires*, because of its healthy reflections and its allusion to Atlantis lost - a total disappearance never planned or even threatened for Africa - should be considered an absolute must for Western politicians and Third World statesmen and intellectuals.

Far too many of them still seem to be just one decolonization late. Also, because it is dedicated to a part of the world which, except intermittently for the Crimean Tatars and the Tibetans, receives less media coverage than, say, Papuasia, the book reminds us that if the whole area is so efficiently sealed off from the outside world it must be because something important, and probably dangerous, is going on there.

Le Milieu des Empires was probably triggered by anxiety arising from the "mongolization"[3] of Afghanistan, a fact bitterly acknowledged in the Fondation des Etudes de Defense Nationale[4] despite the persistent efforts of some of its collaborators to convince themselves that Afghanistan was an exemplary showplace of detente. The book rightly links this last Russian move with the unending *Kriegspiel* carried on by the Russians in Central Asia for more than a century and a half. Both communist Russia and communist China are totally cut off from the nations they control, including their own; in the case of failure, they have no well-defined or recognized parent territory into which they may withdraw.

This is why the very first line of the book, in its classical terseness, is so important: "Empires are believed to be a thing of the past". Such an observation, typically understated in a slightly humorous though serious tone, perfectly illustrates our unfathomable misapprehension of the true relations not only between two socialist countries which remain faithful to their imperialistic, pre-revolutionary traditions, but much more widely, of those between socialism and nationalism. It also illustrates a certain awakening to the brutal truth.

First, the authors, in an excellent introductory chapter, remind us of a time when this area was known for its legendary *prostor*, as the Russians put it, that is for its spaciousness, for the scope, the indefinite freedom of its endless spaces where man, however miserable, could physically feel how much elbow room and inward liberty were imparted to him. In spite of economic backwardness, in spite even of repeated shows of the most revolting kind of "oriental despotism" (a spicy ingredient of the local cuisine adopted by foreign totalitarian rulers which still gives its typical flavour to the gruel with which they provide their subjects), there was a sort of harsh, uncouth poetical tang in the Central Asian *Weltanschauung*, in its wise, brave and hopeful insistence on clinging to life.

There was also, from Manchuria to the Caspian sea and from the Baikal to Lhassa, an evident - and deeply felt as such - unity of civilization, of destiny, spanning a no less evident diversity - racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic. This unity, rightly stressed by the authors, allows them to speak of the "Heartland" as the land of *one* civilization responsible for centuries of free trade, in goods and ideas, between

the Far East and the Far West and of a very special brand of religious, linguistic and cultural toleration. It was also the very basis on which - in spite of Stalin's authoritative, if not scientific opinion - a sense of uniqueness, a stubborn (but not necessarily hostile) differentiation from all external influences had already developed in every social molecule. And this sense of differentiation could have triggered - indeed, began to trigger, until it was stopped by foreign conquest - the evolution to nationhood and modern statehood. Has anyone ever noticed how similar the interethnic ties in Central Asia at the turn of the century were to the theoretical catchphrases about "fraternal nations" and their forever impending *sblizhenie* and *sliianie*?

The answer to this question is found in the authors' description of the fate of the "betweenland" during the last sixty years. They make clear that the rapid shrinking and ultimate disappearance of the power vacuum there was attained by means no less ruthless than the export of slaves to America or the annihilation of whole tribes in South America or along the American frontier. The deeds of Russian professional tomb looters, the repeated Chinese slaughters in Xinjiang, the Soviet ones in Turkmenia and Kokand, and particularly the "collectivization" in Kazakhstan - a truly socialist holocaust and a dress rehearsal for future Cambodias - testify to it. The main difference here between West and East is to be found in the fact that an age-old tradition of secrecy allowed our not too inquiring minds comfortably to ignore these events, even when they were performed as late as the 1930s, even when they had become institutionalized with the Gulag system, even when they are renewed nowadays in Afghanistan.

If the authors' poetical description of the free steppes rightly suggests a comparison with the American frontierland, the result in the former of the white man's conquest has not been the creation on virgin soil of new centres of learning and wealth; instead, it has been the unbelievable human and ecological sterilization of an Eldorado, vividly symbolized by the bazaar in Khiva (p. 61), its transformation into a wasteland, into *the* Gulagland with its hideous dragon of barbed wires stretching across 5000 miles of divided and occupied land.

This transformation meant for the nations of the "Heartland", at the very moment when their own evolution as well as the influence of the outside world was leading them, through various trends - *jadidism*, pan-turkism, pan-mongolism, etc. - toward self-consciousness and self-determination, the brutal imposition of two foreign rules. And each conqueror not only did its best to annihilate the very idea of nationhood and independence, but moreover they continue to compete, in a typically out-dated Fashoda style, to impose on each group of the dismembered nations a common demand for loyalty to themselves and a common policy of assimilation to opposite Big Brothers.

The authors vividly and competently tell us of the attempts by the two empires to wipe out any possibility of local patriotism, to rape local civilization and to embezzle it for their own profit. They rightly describe the "factual complicity" (pp. 129 and 291) uniting Soviet Russia and China in their common attempt to engulf the Third World which still separates them. And these repeated assaults of two competitive jingoisms striving to transform 100 million people into a nonentity - because both empires are enrolled under the banner of the same scholastic Summa Ideologica - exemplify the irreconcilable, irreducible opposition between state socialism and any form of minority nationalism.

The authors also explain how and why and to what extent state socialism, at times, indulges strategically located minorities, how some *natsmen* or *shaoshu minzuren* can, for a while, be coaxed or hoaxed into collaboration and, what is even more interesting, how different state traditions concerned with identical minority problems slowly but steadily coalesce into *one* policy.

Jan, on the one hand, describes the Han rulers' hesitancy and reticence in dealing with Altaic nations and their success in outnumbering and finally assimilating them in Manchuria, which has been transformed into a mere "North-East". Cagnat, on the other hand, illustrates the Russians' eagerness for russianizing "their" natives, their largely acknowledged failure to do so through Russian immigration, but their successes in reaching the same goal through linguistic assimilation, or by way of induced "mongolization" and, where necessary, imposed "afghanization".

Which is the most dangerous in the long run for the besieged nations? For the rulers of the Chinese empire, Chinese statehood extends as far as traces of Chinese civilization are to be found - or introduced. The danger is certain in the long run, but can be delayed or even stopped by a local political and cultural counter-renaissance. For the rulers of the Russian empire, Soviet statehood or a Soviet protectorate extends as far as an evergrowing *Macht* permits. This is, of course, in the short run, the most formidable danger. The former ones have been, and are still, dreaming of an empire *without* neighbours (p. 139); the latter of neighbours *within* the empire.[5] And both are totally blind to the simple fact that empire-preserving and empire-extending (not even for mercantile exploitation, just for the sake of *Macht*)[6] is an activity totally alien to the post-Bandoeng, post-OPEP world; it is, literally, a reactionary policy, prone to backfire at any time.

It seems obvious among Mongols and Turks, that while the commonly shared "landowner mentality"[7] of the rulers - each clinging to its "own" Mongols and Kazakhs - has not yet created serious differences between kinsmen on each side of the border, a commonly

shared political and economic scheme has been efficiently instrumental in erasing traditional local differences, in increasing the number and the relevance of common features, in reinvigorating a common way of life which had not been totally buried by communism or by Islam or Buddhism (p. 32).

Many of the newest trends in the "Betweenland", including an unprecedented demographic boom, are but the continuation by other means and on another scale of the emancipation movement known in Tataria before it was crushed as *Nahada*. Its periodic and systematic resuscitation under one form or another (the Tatar Milli Firkä in 1905, the first Turkic Conference in Baku in 1920, the "latinization" movement in 1926-1934, the stubborn defence of the epic poems in 1949, the growing success of Islamic integration in both empires as something quite different from if not directly opposed to Khomeini's, the resistance to sinification in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet) testifies to an age-old ability and determination to resist any kind of assimilation that would definitely endanger the identity of the "Heartland" and jeopardize its chances of springing up again, someday and somehow, to cultural and political independence. Cagnat and Jan are right in stating (p. 74) that "the idea of a sclerotic area on the wane no longer correponds to reality in Central Asia". If communism has drawn the Czechs into a rebellious passivity which, in comparison with their past deeds, illustrates a decline, it has lifted the Turks up to a passive rebellion which, in comparison with their past history, illustrates progress. Still, the authors wonder - and this is one of the best parts of the book - whether totalitarian aggression in this region can be compared with the innumerable aggressions it suffered in the past at the hands of dictatorial rulers and whether its people really can weather it. Is the age-old Kazakh saying: "It takes 50 years to set up a nation again" still workable? They do not answer this question directly; rather they suggest an answer through an excellent analysis of the diachronical and synchronical *typologies* of foreign imperialistic take-overs in this area.

Each author, in his own field, makes a systematic survey of the psychological attitudes of both centres regarding their control over the "Heartland" and of the political, economic and military methods used to reach this goal. Two points are to be stressed. First, there exists a whole set of mental attitudes which, in spite of their stemming from different psychological approaches and/or different historical backgrounds, prove to be parallel. For instance, the Qing Emperors' - and Mao's - unruffled composure in assessing the unquestionable superiority of the Han civilization over that of the "barbarians" strictly parallels the view of Russian civilization, so haughtily expressed by the last czars, by Lenin, by Stalin in his 1945 toast to the "great Russian nation", and by Brezhnev.

Nowadays, in spite of so many visceral discrepancies, socialism and jingoism, which are shared among the heirs of the two Big Helmsmen, coalesce into parallel brands of national-socialism. The authors might have added that, on both sides of the border, even outside the ruling classes, among state- and not nation-minded men, there is strong sentiment for maintaining a large supranational empire. This was the view of the *Evrazitsy* movement in the 1920s and among many neoslavophiles now, and it is paralleled on the China mainland by the ideas of Fan Wen-lan[8] and in Taiwan by a number of ethnographers.

Second, the empires chose a common, even if differently oriented, goal of destroying the "Heartland" through revenge. The Russian *Drang nach Osten* as well as the Chinese *Drang nach Westen*, in addition to their strategic and ideological implications, fundamentally are an historical revenge aimed at the "final solution" to the Nomadic danger. And the unbelievable archaism of this goal once again illustrates the archaism of the empires in pursuit of it. Is the staunch fanaticism of the Bolshevik commissars in the 1920s, or of the Red Guards in the 1960s when Kazakh or Tibetan societies were systematically destroyed, not comparable to Tamerlane's thugs' narrow-mindedness in destroying towns and irrigation canals? Is it not even worse? Towns can be rebuilt, but can a nation deprived of its civilization, of its language, of its own way of life, ever recover? This systematic comparison between parallel policies results in the emergence (p. 147-150) of what could be called the paradigm of foreign socialist imperialism in Central Asia. In spite of the player's utmost pragmatism - i.e. cynicism - in the day-to-day cornering of pawns on this chessboard, their moves always develop according to one and the same scheme.

First comes a preparatory phase with its systematic scientific, economic and diplomatic survey of the chosen victim. Then comes a period of strategic control through psychological intoxication, economic "help", followed by military threat or, if needed, direct intervention. Finally, there follows a period of administrative integration to the empire through demographic and/or technical implantation; the ultimate move - perhaps not stressed clearly enough by Cagnat and Jan - being the spider's careful attempt to suck out the victim's life, replacing it with a sterilizing venom to make it "national in form and socialist in content".

This scheme squares perfectly with an indefinite number of cases, beginning well before the revolution, with the Qing Emperors' policy to subdue southern Mongols, (faithfully carried on by Mao in 1947) and continuing with the Russian protectorate over Tanu-Tuva, the projected takeover of northern Iran and Turkey in 1946, down to its

latest - if surely not the last - application to Afghanistan. What has been added to this permanent scheme by totalitarianism is:

1. Even stricter planning and better coordination of the moves on a worldwide scale.
2. More continuity and wider scope[9] in the empires' activities.
3. Greater care to prevent or preempt, far in advance, the emergence of factors that could prove to be potentially in contradiction with the empires' future plans.

Indeed, the superiority of this book over others perhaps lies in its ability to show how the twin empires not only subdue and destroy, but also are able, through systematic inveiglement and embezzlement of the national consciousness, to make the very process of national rebirth work for them. Far from enhancing the natural right of every nation to self-determination and self-development, far from permitting the "struggle for national liberation" to blossom into national independence, far from establishing a fundamentally new relationship between European and Oriental, North and South, "technologically advanced" and "backward" nations, totalitarian socialist state imperialism ultimately enslaves nations while promising them freedom.

Needless to say - though it is safer to say it over and over again - how important, for us and for the whole Third World, is the precise knowledge of what happened during the last 70 years in the "Betweenland", since it appears more and more clearly to have been but a dress rehearsal for further adventures. The reviewer is convinced that if the handling of the Mongol, or Kazakh, or Tibetan nations by both the USSR and China had been better known, we would not have been so "stunned" by the *de facto* annexation of Afghanistan, that there would be fewer candidates, from Namibia to El Salvador, for the dubious honour of being a communist puppet state, and many a simple soul would probably not have been so charitable as to help these nations into bondage. Those who indignantly denounce neo-colonialism should read about the Crimeans. Those who rely on communist aid to attain their own goals should know more about the taming of the Kazan Tatars and other Sultangalievs. Those who rightly demand more morals in politics should study the Stalin-Chang-Kai-shek deal against Mao in 1945, the Soviet recognition of Manchukuo, or the systematic genocide of the entire Turkic intelligentsia in 1934 in Soviet Russia. Those who wonder why the USSR got involved in Afghanistan should learn more about the first Russian move against that country in . . . 1830 and about the technique of "caging up" a country. And those who seem surprised by the sending of Cuban troops into Ethiopia should ponder over the role of Buriats (such as "Prince" Ukhtomsky) in the establishment of a *de facto* protectorate over Mongolia. *Usque ad quem* . . .

Last, the book could prove most useful also to those intellectuals and leaders in the "Heartland" who can think freely. There is something tragic and at the same time pitiful in seeing thousands of Kazakhs fleeing from Russia to China in 1916, then thousands of Kazakhs fleeing from China to the USSR in 1962, or Mongols lured by one master into harassing the other, then being crushed by both of them when a provisional gentleman's agreement is reached. There is something even more bitter in seeing the Dalai Lama indulging in a Soviet propaganda show in the hope of Soviet support against the Chinese, while Uzbeks curse their Soviet masters in the streets of Tashkent with an angry "Just wait till the Chinese come!" The authors' parallel study of parallel imperialisms, even if less sophisticated than Professor Bennigsen's, could help all these intellectuals better to understand that they will find on the other side of the border only the same selfish jingoism and that, alas, refugees are just moving from one cell to another inside the same socialist jail of nations. Is it not high time to think about how the "Heartland" *fara da se*?

STRUCTURAL DIFFICULTIES

With regard to the very conceptualization of the book, it has been said that its main interest and value stems from the fact that perhaps for the first time the "Betweenland's" unity and specific identity is recognized and stressed. Cagnat and Jan understood how unscientific it was for them to remain locked up within their own fields of study and acknowledged that the Soviet-Chinese border divides the "Heartland" just as the Demarcation Line divided France in 1940. They came to the sound conclusion that both Russian and Chinese magnetic forces, even if opposite, are applied to the same field.

But this collaboration should have been reflected in the very structure of the book. Instead of an analytical approach, which gives the reader successive, both in time and space, glimpses of the "Heartland" - first from the traditional Chinese and pre-1917 Russian point of view, then from the point of view of communist China and communist Russia - he is entitled to a synthetic approach giving, from the point of view of the Altaic nations, a deductive analysis on a certain number of topics. The systematic comparison of methods and results in the past and present which, without any doubt, constitutes the basis of such a study, should not have remained unknown to the reader, as a mere draft to be ultimately elaborated. The finished product - a book giving us on the most important topics a paradigmatic view of socialist imperialistic behaviour on minorities matters - should and could have listed on each issue certain typologically relevant distinct features. It would have been of the utmost importance and interest, then, to

study how and why each of these distinctive features materializes, or doesn't materialize, in each case, on each side of the border, in the pre- and post-revolutionary eras according to specific Russian and/or Chinese traditions and their specific, local conditions of application.

In fact, the authors do take this approach partially and successfully on such matters as the description of the phases of the takeover process and in the chapters entitled "The Survival of the Asiatis" (p. 39-72) and "The Resistance of the Nations" (p. 260-290). Unfortunately, for most of the book, the authors have not truly integrated their personal experiences, falling short of the needed synthesis. Instead of a study the very pattern of which would have spanned both the area's irrelevant borders and the authors' irrelevant specializations, we have a kind of puff-pastry with two layers of pre-1917 (p. 111-150) and post-1917 (p. 151-197) Russia sandwiched between one layer of pre-1949 (p. 79-110) and one layer of post-1949 China (p. 198--231).

The results of this methodological error are manifold. Similar questions on one and the same nation are discussed in different chapters, and one has to thumb over page after page to grasp the similarities and differences in the handling of the same problem in the name of the same ideology. This is particularly damaging since most of the "Heartland's" issues and nations are, from the outset, unfamiliar, to say the least, to Western readers. What's more, the same "slicing" reappears within each chapter dedicated to one or the other empire. Chapter III, for instance, includes four (excellent) pages on the occupation of Manchuria, followed by four pages on that of Mongolia and four more on Xinjiang. All of them reveal most interesting facts, but they fail to underline the continuity in methods and goals in all three cases. Moreover, the non-specialist could fail to connect them with parallel cases on the other side of the border. For instance, the Manchurian model solution of demographic submersion is the one applied to Inner Mongolia and tested in Xinjiang. But it had been successfully experienced by the Soviets in Tuva and Northern Kazakhstan; it has failed, up to now, both in Tibet and Southern Soviet Kazakhstan. A paradigmatic analysis of similar behaviour (in Outer Mongolia: 1911-1921; in Karelia-Finland: 1939; in Azerbaijan and Northern Iran: 1945-1946; and Xinjiang: 1934-1951) would also have shown how traditional colonialism "next door" naturally expands into worldwide imperialism.

Last, it would have compelled the authors to assign more precise limits to the "Betweenland". This would have thrown new light on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In the future, as soon as the present period of geopolitical redefinition of the "Heartland" comes to an end, this question will prove to be a very touchy one. The area undoubtedly includes at the very least northern, Turkic-speaking

Afghanistan[10] but should also include Tibet, a nation with century-old links with Mongolia and subject to the same kind of cultural rape. Moreover, if Victor Louis is to be believed, *(The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire*, New York, 1979), the Soviets have included Tibet in their worldwide *Kriegspiel.*

The same methodological error probably accounts for an isolated, and most valuable, chapter, "Power and Religions". As far as its aim is to detect the possibilities offered by Islam and Buddhism as means of resistance to foreign duress, its argumentation should have been integrated into one of the two chapters about "Survival" or "Resistance". Anyhow, it very correctly stresses the fact that religion in the "Heartland" is not only a philosophical problem *per se*, but the expression of a downtrodden national renaissance. And it also explains why the Soviets are now trying hard to shift from an ideological analysis of it (that proved inefficient and misleading) toward a geopolitical, *realpolitische und zweckmässige* one including a gross flirtation with the more backward, *kadym*-minded hard core, just as the czars used to do. Thus, Islam and Buddhism, far from being a thorn in the side of the empire, might become a channel for further expansion and, as such, a driving force.

In short, the lack of synthesis - maybe due to haste - transforms into a collection of files, or at best into a dossier,[11] what should have been an excellent Central Asian primer and could have been a thoroughly thought out treatise on how any communist power at any time and in any place handles any national question.

These shortcomings in form disclose shortcomings in substance. To be sure, one of the great merits of this book lies in pointing out how scholars are constantly compelled in their descriptions of the foreign takeover of the "Heartland" to resort, behind a facade of almost perfect diplomatic gentlemanliness, to such concepts as cynicism, hypocrisy, and systematic deceit and cheating: in short, to a subtle mixture of Western yearning for efficiency at any price and of oriental guile. Michelet, writing on Russia more than a century ago, had to face the same problem. René Cagnat[12] at times seems desperately to be trying to find excuses for the Russians. To this end, he brings forth a full load of psychological and parapsychological explanations for their being the way they are. We are told that, as a consequence of the Mongol yoke, the Russians suffered a grave psychological traumatism, that they fear being besieged, hence their famous "glade mentality",[13] which compels them to expand. This "dynamism" is of course, merely "defensive" and dictated by sheer "fatalism" or noble "messianism". It goes on *nolens volens* like Gogol's *kibitka*; if it stops, for a while, this simply illustrated its "flexibility". In other words, what we find here is the usual, uncritical and

masochist Russophilism to which only a Russian like Zinoviev is entitled to answer: "The Soviet love for its neighbour, here's what will choke this world to death".

If such Russophilism were but a subjective, personal attitude, of course I would not even dare to object to it. But it stems from and develops into erroneous views on the history of Russia. The short historical résumé given in Chapter IV uncritically backs the theory of a Russian nation slowly evolving to statehood in a way much similar to that of France, England or, better, Spain. Its "normal" development was allegedly stopped and disturbed by an unexpected calamity coming from outside, the Mongol invasion; this is implicitly compared to the Arab invasion in Spain. This Mongol yoke traumatized the people and its princes for ever, delaying the civic development of the first and forcing the latter to resort to autocracy. In any case, after the yoke ended at Kulikovo, the Russian state (Muscovy) is said to have merely continued to develop along the same lines as its Kievian prototype.

In fact, this kind of interpretation represents the first example, long before the Bolshevik rewriting of history, of official falsification. Produced and packed up by the state as an article to be sold on the national and international market, it falls far short of explaining the innumerable ties linking the Russian state apparatus, and the people, before and after the fall of Kiev, to the *dikoe pole*. Seen from the "Heartland" - and this logically should have been the authors' point of view - the rise of Kievian Russia and of Muscovy is but one among many rises and falls at the hands of the Scythians, the Khazars, the Hsiung-Nus, and others. After them, in an apparently endless cycle, came the Slavs, then the Mongols, then the Slavs again, then . . . But what's worse is that the traditional analysis obliterates the main typological difference between Western and Russian/Asian history. While in the West the history of human societies - of the nations - slowly but steadily evolves into the history of national states (the state tending to be but the managing apparatus of the nation), in Russia the history of the state apparatus and that of the nation are two different things which never coalesced. Kiev from the point of view of the Russian nation was an *infra*-national state since it did not include all the Slavic tribes participating in the formation of the Russian nation but included a great number, probably even a majority, of non-Russian/Slavic tribes. As for Muscovy, as soon as it became powerful enough it became a *supra*-national state, including the main ingredients of the Russian nation but also an ever-growing number of non-Russian tribes.

More than this, state and nation have been and continue to be not only different but alien to one another. They are opposite forces.

Czars yesterday and *apparatchiki* today are not "Russian" rulers. They are rulers *in* and *of* Russia and what was true under the Romanovs remains unchanged under the Leninides. This means that the deeds of the state in Russia can be described and judged almost without reference to the Russian nation, since the latter is and has been as downtrodden as any other conquered neighbouring nation. To explain the exploits of state cheaters, it is wholly useless to tread the beaten path of the *âme slave* and other pseudopsychological and not-so-psychological paraphernalia.

It must be stressed that this kind of misinterpretation is not due to the fact that the author is a foreigner, for it can be found, expressed with crystalline clarity, and good faith, in I.R. Shafarevich's famous article on nationality problems (see note 9). Yet it is precisely on this basis - be it an error due to an uncritical approach to national history or a carefully planned falsification - that there dwells in both empires a stubborn negation of the theoretical *and* practical right of the small and not-so-small nations to total independence.

Thank God, 45 years ago, at least some people cared less about the Germans' psyche and more about the combined 5th Column/*Blitzkrieg* strategy. Thank God, 60 years ago the right of Poles and Czechs to national life was recognized without too many tears for the 1000-year-old "Austrian" empire. And if some day a new *Mitteleuropa* comes to life, it will be through a natural process, without any coaching from outside. An evolution towards cohesive federalism in the "Heartland" is both probable and desirable. But it must logically start with the birth of national entities, free from any kind of foreign and above all "well-meant" intervention. The "Heartland" people are fed up with living in a communal flat, whoever the owner is, and they know too well what "passing" this or that "stage" actually implies.

This means also that in such archaic empires socialism and nationalism are irrevocably opposed forces. The very slogan about a "socialist national policy", as well as the whole usually shipshape and watertight socialist theory about minorities, are but a mockery, combining in themselves the same kind of "internal contradictions" illustrated in George Orwell's "newspeak" by the "minipax", or by a Ministry of Peace chiefly in charge of waging a permanent *stan wojenny* against its own nation.

What is the use of wondering whether Lenin's or Mao's methods reflect, and to what extent, the Russian or Han approach to the world outside the "glade" or the "Middleworld" since neither of them pertains to the Russian or Han nation, but to a thoroughly denationalized mental caste?[14] What is the use of discussing whether "socialist internationalism" and/or "soviet patriotism" are or are not compatible with normal, human love for one's country? From the empires' point

of view, great or small nation nationalism is not compatible nor incompatible, good nor bad: it is, according to the "concrete analysis of a concrete situation", useful or dangerous.

Even if foreign rule in the "Heartland" takes a definite Russian or Han coloration, one must never forget that its final aim is not in the first place to russianize or sinify (this is but a preliminary step for the sake of bureaucratic simplification), but to reach a total homogenization - *sliyanie* - of all the state's subjects alike. This state aims to be a *Weltmachtstaat*: to severe all "horizontal" links - religious, social, linguistic, professional, cultural - and replace them with "vertical", state-suggested and state-controlled ties. Totalitarian socialism is not intrinsically opposed to national patriotism as far as the latter can, temporarily and under due control, be useful. But it is intrinsically incompatible with it as long as national loyalty expresses a deep-rooted sense of specificity and pledges alliance to something other than to the empire itself. Thus, the question ultimately is: Can this natural national feeling be uprooted in the "Heartland's" small nations? The answer would be "no" under classical colonialism. It is "yes" under totalitarian colonialism - unless these nations receive some kind of help from outside.

The authors, no doubt, are aware of the importance of this restriction. They write:

> The Afghan case clearly demonstrates that the success of the (russo-soviet) method depends on the weakness of foreign powers giving the USSR enough time to remedy some errors (p. 273).
>
> . . . the constant blindness of the West . . . has no other origin than its incapacity to make a sharper analysis or its far too theoretical approach to the problem (p. 292).
>
> . . . there is no transmission belt to convey to international public opinion the (Heartland's people's) call for help (p. 284).
>
> . . . Soviet military strategy, Soviet penetration and implantation in foreign countries aims more and more evidently, through more and more sophisticated concepts and methods at meeting the requirements of an applied science, or, at least, of a systematic thought (p. 186).

There can be no doubt that this book courageously rings the alarm bell. But the authors reflectiveness, with its academic imperturbability, even when it awakens real anxiety in the reader's mind, offers up both a contradiction and an ascertainment of impotence.

The happier our surprise at the first sentence, the deeper our

astonishment at the last one: "The countries of Europe, still free or enslaved, are also, in their own way, in-between empires" (p. 294).

One really wonders how scholars who have so convincingly proved their awareness of the true nature of international communism can come to express such commonplaces and to suggest that the United States (why not name them openly?) might be an empire and an empire of the same sort as the Soviet one, endangering the European nations the way the party states endanger the Crimeans or the Mongols.

It always takes time and energy to prove the evidence, so that last issue will not be discussed here, the more so as it is marginal. Perhaps this last sentence is but a *bon mot de la fin*, based on ambiguous "impartiality". It surely is a statement of dubious scholarly value and uselessly mars a sound book with a tinge of "profound, inner diplomatic circle" thinking[15] or, as the French dub it, *Café du Commerce* philosophy.

Despite all their impressive evidence, Cagnat and Jan never ask the proverbial Russian question: "What is to be done?" Perhaps they are not sure, or perhaps they are unprepared to say, preferring self-restraint to having to take a strong position on the subject, even though their analysis leads ineluctibly to a conclusion: the involvement of the empires in and around the "Heartland" is of primary concern to the West, and, in the post-Afghanistan future, the West will find it harder and harder to remain uninvolved. These empires, like all multinational empires, could collapse from their own weight overnight, as did Genghiz Khan's; or they might go on for a long time, slowly decaying and infecting everything around them, like the Ottoman "sick man". History can remain indifferent to this choice; men cannot.

NOTES

1. The title, literally, *The Middle of the Empires*, conceals in French a double play upon words: one triggered by its reverse (*L'Empire du Milieu*, i.e. the Middle Empire, or China) and one based on a loose association of ideas with *le Milieu* (the Underworld, thus: the empires' underworld).
2. "What about the judges themselves?" – a poetic equivalent to the parable about "Those who behold the mote in their brother's eye, but not the block in their own".
3. A harsher version of the prototype of indirect rule unfairly known in Europe as "Finlandization".
4. The semi-official research institute in which the authors are working.
5. This illustrates the difference between the Great Wall and the Berlin Wall.
6. Translated into Russian, *sobaka ne sene*, this expresses the idea that although the hay is of no use to the dogs they will still prevent other animals from enjoying it.
7. Translated into Russian, *sobstvenicheskaya psikhologiya*.
8. I.A. Kurganov: *The Nations of the USSR and the Russian Problem* (in

Russian) edited by Komitet za prava i svobodu Rossii, 1961; I.R. Shafarevich "Isolation or Rapprochement?" *Iz pod glyb*, YMCA Press, Paris, 1974; Jack Chen, *The Sinjiang Story*, New York, MacMillan, 1977. Fan Wen-lan's typically sino-centrist allegation about the Barbarians "resorting to every possible means in order to immigrate to the Han-inhabited areas" (quoted on p. 202) is reminiscent of both Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny* and of the "true tales" published by *Literaturnaya gazeta*, about neighbouring *natsmen* fighting their way towards the Soviet fatherland. As the French put it: "Rien appris et rien oublié".

9. The same typology can be traced in the new realm of the empire's activities from Ethiopia to Nicaragua. The latest gas pipeline suggests that Western Europe is shifting from Phase 1 to Phase 2.
10. The inclusion of Iran, as stated on p. 65 - "Iran is a joint sharer in Central Asia as well as the USSR and China" - is debatable.
11. The Annexes at the end of the book look very much like highly relevant material which has not been woven into its woof.
12. I prefer to illustrate this point with reference only to the USSR, a country I know better than China.
13. "The Russian . . . tempted by small game, skilfully sets his traps and carefully plans his hunting expeditions" (p. 53).
14. This is a traditional French error; De Gaulle refers to the USSR as Russia, as does Camus in *L'Homme Révolté*.
15. Similar to the detente business in Afghanistan (p. 193).

Correspondence

Sir,

Samantha Kazarinov's review of my book, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, in the first issue of *Central Asian Survey*, distorts what I have written and therefore confuses the discussion of important aspects of Russian expansion in Asia.

One of the reviewer's main criticisms is that I have ignored what she describes as Britain's concern with the Russian threat to India in the early 19th century. However, my contention is that in the early 19th century most important British officials concerned with such matters did not perceive Russian expansion on Iran's frontier as a threat to India. Some officials in India voiced alarm but British policy was made by officials in London who felt differently. Thus Britain was cool to Iran's pleas for aid in fighting Russia until the French entered the picture (as Iran's ally). The British became involved in Iran primarily to supplant French influence there and secondarily to help the Iranians fight Russia (then France's ally.) Once Napoleon invaded Russia, Britain's objective was to end the Russo-Iranian war as quickly as possible, on terms disadvantageous to Iran, so that the Tsar's armies could be diverted from the Caucasian front to the battle against the French. After the Napoleonic wars, Britain's policy was to reduce its commitments to Iran. This attitude persisted through the second Russo-Iranian War (1826-1828), which Britain blamed on Iranian irridentism, not Russian expansionism (pp. 62, 124, 133, 137, 139, 141, 154-56). The reviewer does not discuss my argument on this point or acknowledge the evidence on which it is based. She merely puts forth her preferred theory.

The review also states that I neglected to discuss problems encountered by the Russians in administering the Caucasian territories they claimed. In voicing this objection the reviewer has ignored my treatment of such topics as the status of Caucasian Muslims under Russian rule (pp. 84-86, 150), Caucasian uprisings against the Russians (pp. 102, 109) the impact of diseases on Russian personnel in the Caucasus (pp. 103-104), the economic problems of Russia's Caucasian territories (pp. 81, 104, 151-152), the low calibre and small number of Russian personnel in the Caucasus (pp. 104-107), population shifts in the Russian Caucasus (pp. 149-150), and Russian administrative policy towards the Muslim principalities it acquired in the Eastern Caucasus (pp. 145-149).

Apparently the reviewer was more concerned with propounding her own pet theories and demonstrating her superior wisdom than with noticing what I wrote.

Muriel Atkin
The George Washington University



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Book Reviews

Guy Imart. *Le Kirghiz (Turke d'Asie Centrale Soviétique): Description d'une Langue de Littérisation Récente.* With a study on: *The Kirghiz Dialect of the Afghan Pamir*, by **Rémy Dor.** Publications de l'Université de Provence, Aix-en-Provence, 1981. 2 volumes. Bibliography. Index.

Pending the possibility of a review by a linguistic expert capable of assessing these volumes devoted to the study of the Kirghiz language, this interim note simply signals the publication of Guy Imart's work and the interesting notes on the Kirghiz of the Afghan Pamir districts by Rémy Dor.

Though the native language of the peoples inhabiting a wide belt of country stretching from southern Siberia to the Pamirs in Soviet Central Asia, Kirghiz has been relatively little studied in western Europe. Guy Imart spent ten years in the preparation of this work and was fortunate in being able to cooperate with scholars in France during this time. M. Rémy Dor is specifically concerned with the language of the Kirghiz of the Afghan Pamirs. They basically derive from the Teyit and Kesek tribes; the first, coming from the Alay valley, settled in the Little Pamir; the second, from the Karategin area, moved into the Big Pamir. Being located along the commercial road linking Afghanistan and Xinjiang, they were in close contact with many different groups: Uzbeks long settled in Badakhstan, Uighurs of Yarkand and Kashgar, while their dialect was influenced by the Dari (Persian) of Afghanistan and by the Arab languages. Living on the Western limits of the Kirghiz territory, the Teyit and the Kesek were in fact the first Kirghiz to be converted to Islam. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it impossible for M. Dor to continue his study of this Kirghiz dialect of the Afghan Pamir as he had intended. He tells us that the Teyit had to flee into Pakistan in 1978 but does not know what happened to the Kesek, too remote to flee. During a journey to Pakistan in 1980, M. Dor found Teyit people in Gilgit and Hunza living in groups in villages with no contact with each other and culturally *déracinés*, their children being taught in Urdu schools.

Violet Connolly

William O. McCagg and Brian D. Silver. *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*, Pergamon, New York, 1979. £18.00. 280 pp.

This volume contains papers given at a conference held at Michigan State University in 1977 (but updated to take account of more recent political upheavals in the Middle East). It examines the status of various ethnic minorities that straddle the USSR's southern frontiers from the Caucasus to Mongolia. The authors all ask themselves about levels of cultural and economic achievement in the separate

ethnic communities, about the extent of cross-border communication, about attempts, if any, by the Soviet authorities to make use of their nationals in inter-state or inter-communal dealings.

To undertake such an exploration, the organizers of the Michigan Conference recruited specialists from various areas, from traditional Soviet studies, from those whose interests had previously been confined to the Middle East and those whose earlier publications had dealt with China. The variety of backgrounds, of preconceptions, has provided a number of insights; but has not been wholly successful. As someone whose previous experience has been largely within the Sovietist tradition, for example, I found Gerald Libaridian's analysis of the Armenian problem both new and full of interest; and, of course I felt at home with Enders Wimbush on Azerbaijan, even though he should have devoted more attention to economic matters. But the nationalist preconceptions in both Eden Naby's discussion of Soviet-Iranian border minorities and Kemal Karpat's essay on Turkic groups are discordant and get in the way of one's appreciation of the academic analysis. And Professor Teufel Dreyer's analysis of the Soviet component of the Kazakh and Uighur experience struck me as superficial to the point of irrelevance. (But her description of the Chinese component is much better informed.) Further, as with any collective work, there is a fair amount of repetition as individual authors each feel the need to go over similar ground in their respective papers.

In a review of this length it is not possible to discuss adequately all the issues raised in ten stimulating contributions: it is probably not even useful to mention each issue. Rather, I would like to take up and emphasize a theme which is to be found in David Montgomery's essay on the Uzbeks - but which is stated so briefly that it runs the risk of being overlooked.

In the setting of a conference like the one that produced the papers in this volume, the stress is inevitably on Soviet-ethnic or Russian-ethnic relations for each of the groups discussed. And lack of space or the nationalist preconceptions of individual authors frequently result in the impression that the ethnic group is unanimous in its opinions about various issues and that the Russian (Soviet) question is the most important source of tension. Such an analysis is patently false. It is false as an historical assessment and it is misleading as a framework of analysis for future developments.

As a matter of history, the Russians were often seen as protectors of particular groups against the depredations of a local alien élite - for example Azeris and Armenians. Also intra-group differences are almost everywhere a source of deeper political conflict than are relations with foreigners. As Owen Latimore rightly observes, "It was rare for an entire minority people to be against the Russians. Often, part of the intelligentsia said 'Ah, this is our opportunity to take the lead, to liberate our people from the disadvantages they have suffered under the old régime"' (p. 260).

And this is what they did; post-1917 Soviet control in Central Asia *has* resulted in significant social and economic progress. Soviet Central Asians are better educated, better fed, better housed than their co-ethnics outside the USSR; Soviet Central Asian women enjoy immeasurably greater personal freedom and dignity. These groups also enjoy access to a better system of justice. Khomeini's Iran can give us an inkling of what Soviet control has allowed the people of Central Asia to escape - the exercise of power by bigoted fanatics within the framework of a retributive and exploitative traditional Islamic legal system.

Of course such gains were bought at significant cost - in terms of cultural autonomy, access to the rest of the world, indeed with the blood of the traditional cultural and political élite. But in any case these issues do not, in my opinion,

form the basis for continuing support of Soviet power (or opposition to it). First, the advantages of the Soviet system are now taken for granted by today's Central Asians. And one cannot build a lasting political alliance on gratitude for past favours. Second, it is economics, not ideology, that is the more powerful mainspring of political action.

As McCagg and Silver remark in the introduction to the volume, "Social mobilization [sic] is the most important goal for the individual - improvement of his own lot and that of his family's first, and only later improvement of his whole community's lot" (p. xx). So long as individuals believe that their horizons are expanding they will acquiesce in the status quo. When sufficient numbers lose this faith they will challenge it. In the first instance, this challenge is likely to appear as conflict between what one may call Moscow Central Asians (i.e. men like Rashidov who have benefited from the existing system) and a new intelligentsia. That is, it will appear as intra-group politics. How far such a challenge develops into a nationalist dispute will depend upon the responses of the protagonists, upon the extent and ways in which they have recourse to the manipulation of ethnic and religious symbols.

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